Rudin v. Myles, No. 12-15362 (9th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CasePetitioner, a Nevada state prisoner, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging her convictions. Here, the Ninth Circuit withdrew an opinion filed on September 10, 2014 and filed a new opinion reversing the district court’s order dismissing Petitioner’s application as untimely. The Ninth Circuit held that extraordinary circumstances prevented Petitioner from filing her application for federal habeas relief, and therefore, she was entitled to equitable tolling of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) statute of limitations. Specifically, the Court held (1) Petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling under 2244(d)(2) for the duration of her state post-conviction proceedings; (2) Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling during a significant period of time in which she was pursuing her rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way; and (3) because Petitioner filed her petition within the tolled limitations period, her petition was timely filed.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus The panel withdrew an opinion filed on September 10, 2014, and filed a new opinion reversing the district court’s order dismissing as untimely Nevada state prisoner Margaret Rudin’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging her conviction of murder with the deadly use of a weapon and unauthorized surreptitious intrusion of privacy by listening device. The panel held that because the Nevada State Supreme Court concluded that Rudin’s state post-conviction petition was untimely under state law, Rudin is not entitled to statutory tolling under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for the duration of her state post-conviction proceedings. The panel held that extraordinary circumstances prevented Rudin from filing her application for federal habeas relief, and that she is therefore entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations, between November 10, 2004, and August 22, 2007 – during which period the first attorney appointed to represent Rudin in collateral review proceedings abandoned her, and during which period she was diligent in pursuing her rights. The panel held that the state post-conviction court’s finding – at an August 22, 2007, status conference, immediately upon discovering counsel’s failure to file a RUDIN V. MYLES 3 post-conviction petition in state court – of “extraordinary circumstances” that would “extend the one year deadline,” coupled with the state’s failure to brief the timeliness question or move to dismiss Rudin’s petition, “affirmatively misled” Rudin into believing that the state court had excused her late filing and that her federal limitations period would be statutorily tolled. The panel explained that until the state court’s finding was challenged or reversed – that is, as long as Rudin’s petition was deemed “properly filed” by the state post-conviction court – Rudin remained entitled to statutory tolling of the federal clock. The panel held that Rudin satisfied her burden to show that she is entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitations period until January 20, 2011, when the extraordinary circumstances making it impossible for her to file her federal petition on time were removed, giving her until September 9, 2011, to file her petition for federal habeas relief in the district court. Because Rudin filed her petition on April 25, 2011, the panel concluded that her petition was timely filed. The panel remanded for further proceedings and denied the state’s motion to expand the record on appeal. Concurring, District Judge Adelman wrote that a contrary result would require the essentially pointless early filing of federal petitions by prisoners who reasonably believe that their claims are properly pending, unexhausted, in state courts. Dissenting, Judge O’Scannlain wrote that Rudin is not entitled to equitable tolling beyond the August 22, 2007, conference because she failed to act with reasonable diligence 4 RUDIN V. MYLES to protect her rights for the duration of the relevant time period.
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on September 10, 2014.
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