United States v. Terrance Pargo
Criminal case - Sentencing. Anders case. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing, as a special condition of supervised release, the requirement that defendant undergo sex-offender treatment, given his prior conviction for a sex offense against a minor, his failure to register under SORNA and his absconding; defendant's classification as a Tier II sex offender was not plain error. [ November 05, 2013
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
Terrance Leon Pargo
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines
Submitted: October 29, 2013
Filed: November 6, 2013
Before LOKEN, BYE, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Terrance Pargo pleaded guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex
offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. Â§ 2250. The district court1 imposed a sentence of
The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.
21 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has moved
to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
arguing that the district court erred in imposing, as a special condition of supervised
release, the requirement that Pargo undergo sex-offender treatment. The brief also
states that Pargo believes he was incorrectly classified as a Tier II sex offender for
purposes of calculating his advisory Guidelines sentence.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
supervised-release condition. See 18 U.S.C. Â§ 3583(d)(1)-(3); United States v.
Schaefer, 675 F.3d 1122, 1124-25 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review). Specifically,
Pargoâ€™s sex offense, although 14 years earlier, was against a minor, and his
subsequent repeated convictions for failure to register, and his absconding, reflected
impulsive behavior, poor decisionmaking, and a reluctance to comply with
registration requirements. See United States v. Walters, 643 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th
Cir. 2011) (requirements for district court to impose special condition of supervised
release); United States v. Smith, 655 F.3d 839, 845-46 (8th Cir. 2011) (requiring sexoffender treatment as supervised-release condition for new failure-to-register offense
was supported by record, which reflected history of avoiding sex-offender registration
and committing sex offense against minor), revâ€™d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 2712
(2012) (Mem.); United States v. Smart, 472 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding
supervised-release condition requiring defendant to undergo sex-offender treatment
following conviction for being felon in possession of firearm, where defendant had
earlier state convictions for sex offenses). We also conclude that Pargoâ€™s
classification as a Tier II sex offender was not plain error. See 42 U.S.C. Â§ 16911(3)
(defining Tier II sex offender); Minn. Stat. Â§ 609.345(1)(b) (1998) (defining criminal
sexual conduct in the fourth degree); United States v. Molnar, 590 F.3d 912, 914 (8th
Cir. 2010) (standard of review).
Finally, having reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80
(1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counselâ€™s motion to
withdraw, and we affirm.