United States v. Bajoghli, No. 14-4798 (4th Cir. 2015)
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Defendant, a board-certified dermatologist, was indicted for executing a "scheme or artifice to defraud" when billing public and private healthcare benefit programs and related offenses. The district court granted plaintiff's motion to strike as unduly prejudicial certain financial details alleged in the indictment, a motion in limine to exclude evidence of post-scheme conduct the government intended to introduce to show defendant's consciousness of guilt; and a motion in limine to exclude all evidence of the scheme that was not directly related to one of the 53 specifically charged executions. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in limiting the government’s proof to that which is directly relevant to one or more of the 53 executions charged in the indictment, without taking into account the relevance of uncharged conduct to the alleged overarching scheme; the district court abused its discretion because it misapplied Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and 403 in excluding evidence of defendant's post-scheme conduct; and the district court abused its discretion where, because a violation of the healthcare fraud statute requires knowing and willful conduct, the government must establish defendant's intent to defraud. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.
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PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4798 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellant. v. AMIR A. BAJOGHLI, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge. (1:14-cr-00278-GBL-1) Argued: March 25, 2015 Decided: May 11, 2015 Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Floyd and Senior Judge Hamilton joined. ARGUED: Paul Nathanson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Peter Hugh White, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Matthew Burke, Assistant United States Attorney, Katherine L. Wong, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Joe Robert Caldwell, Jr., BAKER BOTTS LLP, Washington, D.C.; Kirk Ogrosky, Murad Hussain, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. 2 NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: Dr. Amir Bajoghli, a board-certified dermatologist, was indicted for executing a “scheme or artifice to defraud” when billing public and private healthcare benefit programs during the period from January 2009 through August 2012, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347, and for related offenses. The indictment set forth, in 53 of its 60 counts, particular “executions” of the fraudulent scheme. On September 30, 2014, several weeks before the scheduled trial date of October 22, 2014, Bajoghli filed a motion to strike as unduly prejudicial certain financial details alleged in Paragraph 50 of the indictment; on October 13, he filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of post-scheme conduct that the government intended to introduce to show his consciousness of guilt; and on October 20, he filed a motion in limine to exclude all evidence of the scheme that was not directly related to one of the 53 specifically charged executions. court granted all three motions, the latter before the trial was scheduled to begin. government filed this interlocutory two The district on the day On the same day, the appeal, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, challenging the rulings. Because unduly we restricted conclude the that the latitude district reasonably court’s necessary rulings for the government to carry its burden of proof, we reverse and remand. 3 I Bajoghli is the owner of the Skin and Laser Surgery Center, a medical practice that operates from three offices in Virginia and one in diseases Washington, and According the to D.C., and performance the of indictment, that Mohs Mohs specializes in micrographic surgery is skin surgery. a “highly lucrative,” “specialized surgical technique for the removal of skin cancer from healthy skin” that is “generally performed on sensitive areas of the body, such as the head and neck, where preservation of healthy tissue and cosmetic appearance are particularly important.” On August 12, 2014, the grand jury returned a 60-count indictment against Bajoghli, charging: 53 counts of healthcare fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347; 6 counts of aggravated identity theft defraud, in committed violation in of connection 18 U.S.C. with § 1028A; the scheme and to count of 1 obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The indictment period -- from alleged that January 2009 over a through three-and-one-half August 2012 -- year Bajoghli “knowingly and willfully execute[d] . . . a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain, by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, . . . money owned by and under the custody and control of health care benefit programs, in connection with 4 the delivery of health care benefits, items, and services.” More particularly, seventeen counts alleged executions of the scheme in which Bajoghli routinely diagnosed patients with skin cancer, even though they did not, in fact, have cancer, and then performed tissue. which the medically Fifteen Bajoghli assistants” unnecessary counts alleged directed to perform surgery executions “unlicensed wound Mohs and closures of the on scheme unqualified on the benign in medical Mohs surgery patients and then billed the healthcare benefit programs as if he personally had performed or supervised the closures, thereby claiming more money than reimbursement schedule. he was entitled to under the Ten counts alleged executions of the scheme in which Bajoghli billed for services that he claimed he had personally performed when, in fact, they had been performed by non-doctors, again allowing him to claim a higher reimbursement than he would have been allowed to claim had he disclosed eleven bills that counts “for non-doctors alleged preparing had performed executions and the services. in which Bajoghli analyzing [skin pathology] And submitted slides” when, in fact, he had personally performed neither service, but instead had hired outside contractors to perform the services at a cost far below the amount he claimed from the programs. Bajoghli filed three pretrial motions government’s evidence against him at trial: 5 to limit the the September 30 motion to strike allegations of certain financial details from Paragraph 50 of the indictment; the October 13 motion in limine to exclude evidence of post-scheme conduct, which the government planned to introduce to show consciousness of guilt; and the October 20 motion in limine to exclude any evidence that was not directly related to one of the 53 executions specifically charged in the indictment. In the September 30 motion, Bajoghli sought to strike from Paragraph 50 the allegation that he “regularly billed the health care benefit programs $300 to $450 per slide.” Paragraph 50 alleged in full: The defendant fraudulently submitted claims to patients’ health care benefit programs for preparing the permanent section slides and analyzing those slides, when he actually performed neither service. The defendant regularly billed the health care benefit programs $300 to $450 per slide, when he had paid the Ohio company and the dermatopathologist a total of approximately $15 per slide for actually rendering the services. (Emphasis added). Because healthcare benefit programs reimburse physicians predetermined at a rate, Bajoghli claimed that evidence of what he billed would be unfairly prejudicial because those amounts did not represent what he actually expected to receive from the programs. The district court granted Bajoghli’s motion and, in doing so, also excluded, sua sponte, any evidence of “the fees or payments Defendant allegedly made to outside sources to perform” these services -- that is, the 6 $15 per slide paid to outside contractors. that the government could introduce The court stated evidence to prove that Bajoghli “would have been paid less (or not at all) had the claims not been materially false,” but that it could not state the specific dollar amounts. In the October 13 motion, Bajoghli sought to exclude evidence of actions that he had taken after the charged scheme had ended, which the government planned to introduce at trial to show his consciousness of guilt. The government intended to show that after Bajoghli was interviewed by law enforcement, (1) he immediately stopped sending pathology slides to outside contractors; (2) he stopped performing Mohs surgery without a supporting biopsy; and (3) he deleted scheduling data for past wound repairs that were performed by medical assistants. Bajoghli argued that this evidence was irrelevant; that it was evidence of subsequent remedial measures, which is barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 407; and that, if admitted at trial, it would be unfairly prejudicial, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The district court did not rule on this motion until it ruled on the October 20 motion. In the October 20 motion, Bajoghli sought to exclude “volumes of irrelevant, uncharged misconduct” evidence, as he characterized it, that related to his fraudulent conduct during the three-and-one-half year period of the scheme but that was 7 not directly tied to any of the 53 charged executions. He argued that because this evidence was not directly relevant to any of the 53 charged counts, it was therefore improper “[p]ropensity evidence” offered only to show the defendant’s bad character, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). He also argued that by waiting until so close to the date of trial to give him notice of its intent to introduce this evidence, the government failed to comply with the notice requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2). On October 21, the day before the scheduled trial date, the district court issued an order granting both the October 13 and October 20 motions. explanation, 53 charges that in the In “[a]ll doing so, testimony indictment,” Bajoghli’s uncharged conduct. the court is . . . thus ruled, limited excluding without to evidence the of And in excluding evidence of the defendant’s post-scheme conduct, it gave as reasons that the government had not provided adequate notice of its intent to introduce this “prior ‘bad act’ evidence,” as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2), and, in any event, that the evidence would be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, as “the probative value of [the post-scheme] evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” The government filed this interlocutory appeal, seeking review of the district court’s pretrial evidentiary rulings. 8 II The government first challenges the district court’s ruling limiting “[a]ll testimony . . . to the 53 charges of the indictment” and thus excluding evidence of Bajoghli’s uncharged conduct in furtherance of the scheme during the three-and-onehalf year period. debilitating It because notes that Bajoghli’s this ruling criminal is intent especially is hotly contested in this case, and it therefore contends that it needs to rebut “isolated the defense mistakes” by that the demonstrating “cherry pick” aberrant transactions. able to prove the charged entire that transactions it did not were merely As it argues, it must be scheme, including intentional and willful conduct in executing it. Bajoghli’s Such a burden, it maintains, requires that it be allowed to introduce evidence that, although perhaps not directly related to any of the 53 executions charged, scheme itself. is nonetheless relevant to proving the The government warns that if it were not able to offer evidence of uncharged executions in proving the scheme, it would have to charge hundreds, if not thousands, of counts in every large-scale healthcare-fraud case, such as this one. Bajoghli maintains that the district court correctly concluded that the evidence at trial must relate to one of the specifically charged executions of the fraudulent scheme and that “evidence of an uncharged fraudulent scheme should not be 9 admitted.” He asserts that the government’s brief paints with too broad a brush, ignoring the 53 specific and discrete charges it brought under § 1347. As he argues, “the evidence at trial must relate to a specific allegation of fraud that the jury will have to consider.” uncharged charged Rule 403 conduct Because, as he contends, any evidence of would executions, as be the unfairly only evidence “loosely should prejudicial and relevant” be to excluded under the under Rule 404(b), including Rule 404(b)(2)’s notice requirement, as “other acts” evidence. The scope of relevant evidence dictated by the indictment. at trial is, of course, In this case, however, Bajoghli’s position reveals a misunderstanding of the nature of the charges in the indictment and the scope of proof that is relevant. Section 1347 punishes “[w]hoever knowingly and willfully executes . . . a scheme . . . to defraud any health care benefit program” when delivering healthcare § 1347(a)(1) (emphasis added). element of the offense. 129, 137-38 (4th Cir. services. 18 U.S.C. A “scheme to defraud” is thus an See United States v. McLean, 715 F.3d 2013) (“To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, the government [is] required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knowingly and willfully executed a scheme to defraud insurers by billing for medically unnecessary procedures” (emphasis added)). 10 While fraud can be committed simply by engaging in an isolated transaction, a scheme to defraud requires a plot, plan, or arrangement that is executed by Dictionary a 1546 fraudulent (10th ed. transaction. 2014) See (defining Black’s “scheme” as Law “[a] systemic plan; a connected or orderly arrangement”; or “[a]n artful plot or plan, [usually] to deceive others”). In this case, the scheme alleged in the indictment is described as encompassing four types of conduct, beginning in January 2009 and continuing through August 2012. And although the indictment charged only 53 “executions” of the scheme in 53 separate execution counts, was “part it of also the alleged scheme and that each artifice to particular defraud.” Thus, the indictment charged that “for the purpose of executing the aforementioned scheme and artifice,” described earlier to have lasted from January 2009 through August 2012, the defendant engaged in the particularly described fraudulent transactions. (Emphasis added). Because a scheme is an element of a § 1347 offense and because the specifically alleged three-and-one-half year scheme is made part of each execution, evidence of the entire scheme is relevant to proving each particular execution. It is important to recognize that just as all the overt acts of a conspiracy need not be charged in an indictment, see United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2004) (“It is well established that when seeking to prove a conspiracy, the 11 government is permitted to present evidence of acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy even though they are not all specifically described in the indictment”), all executions of a scheme likewise need not be charged, see United States v. Pless, 79 F.3d 1217, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“That the government chose to charge as the execution of the scheme only the three deposits in National [Bank] does not reduce the boundaries of the scheme, which the statute requires the government to prove. . . . [I]t is not necessary for the government to charge every single act of execution of the scheme in order to prove the whole scheme”). Nonetheless, evidence of transactions and conduct not charged is relevant to proving the existence of and the boundaries of the conspiracy or scheme. See Janati, 374 F.3d at 275 (“[T]he government has the right and the burden to prove in its case-inchief a conspiracy alleged [and] government a broader therefore reasonable the than the individual district opportunity to court carry overt acts must give the this burden”); Pless, 79 F.3d at 1220 (“[T]he government is [not] artificially limited to presenting to the jury only that portion of scheme that directly related to [the charged executions]”). the A scheme and a conspiracy thus are, for these purposes, similar concepts. See United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Because an essential element of these offenses is a fraudulent scheme, mail and wire fraud are treated like 12 conspiracy in several respects”); United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, conspiracy 1239 (7th embrace Cir. 1981) analogous, but (“A scheme not to identical, defraud and concepts”); United States v. O’Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1978) (equating “a continuing scheme” with a conspiracy); SEC v. Nat’l Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (describing “the possibility of reading ‘scheme’ as synonymous with a conspiracy” in a federal securities statute). We therefore conclude that when the government charges a defendant under § 1347 with a scheme to defraud and elects to charge only some of the executions of that scheme, its election does not limit its proof to only the charged executions. It may introduce other evidence of uncharged executions to prove the scheme. To be sure, a district court still retains broad-ranging discretion to manage trials instance, overly duplicative. and limit proof that is, for But, as we noted in Janati, its discretion must be balanced by the need to give the government adequate latitude to prove its case, especially in a large and complex healthcare-fraud intent is placed at issue. case where the defendant’s See 374 F.3d at 273-74. criminal We conclude that, in this case, the district court abused its discretion in failing to give the government sufficient latitude to carry its burden of proof. 13 In addition, it follows that because evidence of conduct not charged in a specific execution may be relevant to the nature and scope of a scheme charged under § 1347, such evidence is intrinsic to the “scheme” element, and Rule 404(b) therefore does not, as Bajoghli argues, regulate it as “other bad acts” evidence. See Unites States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 832 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts’ evidence is relevant to establishing an element of the offense, Rule 404(b) is not even implicated”). In sum, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in limiting the government’s proof to that which is directly relevant to one or more of the 53 executions charged in the indictment, without taking into account the relevance of uncharged conduct to the alleged overarching scheme. The government has the burden of proving a scheme to defraud and Bajoghli’s knowing and willful conduct in executing the scheme. And to that end, it must be allowed to offer evidence probative of these elements, even if that evidence is not directly related to one of the 53 executions. III The government next challenges the district court’s ruling to exclude evidence of the defendant’s post-scheme conduct. It seeks to introduce evidence (1) that “after being interviewed by 14 law enforcement, [Bajoghli] pathology slides” interview, “the without biopsy”; a to outside defendant and immediately contractors; stopped (3) that stopped (2) that performing the sending after Mohs defendant his surgery “delet[ed] scheduling data for the past wound repairs that were performed by medical evidence assistants.” to be The “prior district ‘bad act’ court considered evidence” governed this by Rule 404(b) and excluded it on the ground that the government had not provided Bajoghli with adequate notice, as required by Rule 404(b)(2). ∗ Moreover, the court excluded this evidence under Rule 403, concluding that its probative value was “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . , confusing the jury . . . , government argues and waste that the of judicial district court resources.” erred in The applying Rule 404(b) because the evidence is intrinsic to the charged crimes; that is, it “bear[s] directly on the defendant’s intent as to the charged fraud (not ∗ some other crime) and [is] Even if Rule 404(b) were to apply, it is difficult to understand how the government had not provided adequate notice to Bajoghli. Bajoghli’s motion to exclude evidence of his postscheme conduct admitted as much, stating, “The government has indicated that they plan to introduce evidence of changes in procedures and practices in [his] offices after he became aware that he was under criminal investigation, presumably to demonstrate that the prior practices were illegal.” Moreover, in his motion to exclude this evidence, Bajoghli did not raise a lack of notice as a ground for exclusion. 15 inextricably intertwined with how he committed the fraud and his efforts to conceal it once he learned [of the] investigation.” Bajoghli contends that Rule 404(b) does apply to this evidence because, as he argued with respect to the evidence of his uncharged conduct, it would not be “tied to any one of the 53 narrowly defined executions of healthcare fraud” and thus would not be “intrinsic” to the charged offenses. More particularly, he contends that “evidence of remedial measures,” as a matter of law, “cannot be ‘intrinsic’ to any of [the charged] offenses” because the remedial measures all occurred after the period of time noted in the indictment as encompassing the alleged fraudulent scheme. its admission would be In addition, he contends that unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, parroting the district court’s conclusion. Again, we agree with the government. As the government points out, it intends to offer evidence of Bajoghli’s postscheme conduct to prove his knowledge and intent to defraud, as is required by § 1347. For instance, that Bajoghli stopped sending pathology slides to outside contractors after he learned he was under investigation, but before federal agents had even become aware of this practice -- as the government represents -would tend to prove Bajoghli’s fraudulent intent knowledge with respect to this aspect of the scheme. and guilty Similarly, the government notes that Bajoghli “intends to challenge [the 16 charge of Mohs reasonable exercised fraudulent surgeries] medical by judgment asserting in that performing he Mohs surgeries and that any errors were the product of innocent . . . mistakes.” Thus, it reasons, evidence that Bajoghli stopped his practice of performing Mohs surgeries without first reviewing biopsies once he learned of the investigation would tend to show that he knew the accepted standard of care for diagnosing skin cancer and had deliberately chosen to disregard it. And finally, as the government notes, evidence that Bajoghli deleted scheduling data from his computers -- data that revealed who had actually performed wound-repair procedures -- would tend to refute his claim that this aspect of the fraud resulted from honest billing mistakes. Cf. McLean, 715 F.3d at 139 (concluding that evidence that the defendant “attempted to shred patient files subpoenaed” by the government was probative that the defendant knew he “had something to hide”). The proffered evidence therefore would be probative to prove knowledge and intent, which indictment. are elements of the crimes charged in the And because Rule 404(b) does not apply to conduct that is intrinsic to the charged crime, the district court erred in applying the rule to this evidence. See United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 326 (4th Cir. 2009) (“The Rule 404(b) inquiry . . . applies only to evidence of other acts that are 17 ‘extrinsic to the one charged’” (quoting United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 87 (4th Cir. 1996))). Bajoghli cannot be nonetheless intrinsic to argues the that charged his post-scheme offenses because conduct it took place after the end of the period of activity charged in the indictment. But it simply does not follow that conduct that takes place after the end of the period of activity charged in the indictment is -- as a matter requirements of Rule 404(b). of law -- subject to the In fact, our case law demonstrates that simply because a defendant’s conduct takes place outside the time frame of the activities charged in the indictment does not, as Bajoghli extrinsic to argues, charged the Rule 404(b). automatically offense and render that therefore conduct subject to See United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The basic flaw in [the defendant’s] argument is that . . . [it] erroneously assumes that all evidence falling outside the separate, charged unrelated [Rule 404(b)]. conspiracy offense period subject necessarily to the involves strictures a of It is well-established, however, that the mere fact that the evidence involved activities occurring before the charged time transform frame that of the evidence conspiracy into does ‘other not crimes’ automatically evidence”). Instead, conduct that takes place outside the time frame of the charged offense can avoid having to comply with the requirements 18 of Rule 404(b) where it is, inter alia, establishing an element of the offense.” at 831-32. “relevant to Grimmond, 137 F.3d And, as we concluded above, Bajoghli’s post-scheme conduct is relevant to proving his fraudulent intent and guilty knowledge. The district court’s additional ruling -- that Rule 403 requires exclusion of the evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and other constitutes concerns -- unfair reflects prejudice a misunderstanding under Rule 403. of Once it what is recognized that evidence is probative of an element of the crime charged, “the balance under Rule 403 should be struck in favor of admissibility, sparingly.” and evidence should be excluded only United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 31920 (4th Cir. 2008). And in this context, unfair prejudice “speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” Basham, 561 F.3d at 327 (emphasis added) (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither ground Bajoghli that would nor the support district a finding court of has guilt proof that is specific to the offense charged. 19 identified different any from Because Rule 403 the in district excluding court misapplied evidence of Rule 404(b) Bajoghli’s and post-scheme conduct, it abused its discretion. V Finally, the government challenges the district court’s ruling to exclude evidence that, despite receiving between $100 and $130 per slide from healthcare benefit programs based on his claim that he both prepared and analyzed his patients’ pathology slides himself, Bajoghli paid outside contractors only $15 per slide to evidence perform of those financial tasks. gain The “is government critical in establish a defendant’s intent to defraud.” arrangement between Bajoghli and the a contends fraud that case to It argues that the outside contractors is “part and parcel of proving this aspect of the fraud” and that “an essential part of this arrangement was the amount that the defendant paid substantial them.” disparity According between the to the amount government, that the “[t]he defendant received, and what he paid” can only “underscore[] [Bajoghli’s] motive for this intentional deception.” Bajoghli contends that evidence of what he paid the outside contractors is irrelevant, and thus he urges us to affirm the district court’s ruling to exclude it. According to Bajoghli, “this case is about billing and whether or not the billing was 20 false.” Because “[a]ny amounts paid to outside contractors were not part of the alleged misrepresentations in bills submitted to insurers,” those amounts, he argues, “were not material to the charged offenses of executing healthcare fraud schemes by submitting false claims.” We agree with the government. Because a violation of the healthcare fraud statute requires knowing and willful conduct, see 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a), the Bajoghli’s intent to defraud. government must establish United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001). And evidence of financial gain is particularly a defendant’s Beverly, accord probative intent 284 United F. to fraud defraud. App’x States in 36, v. case See, 40 to e.g., United (4th Cir. 2008) 490 F.3d 541, Davis, establish States (per 549 the v. curiam); (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dearing, 504 F.3d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 2007) (endorsing the Sixth Circuit’s declaration in Davis that evidence of profits can serve as indirect proof of one’s intent to defraud); United States v. Wheeler, 889 F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 (D.D.C. 2012) (“In a § 1347 [healthcare-fraud] case, ‘intent [to defraud] can be inferred . . . from profits’” (quoting Dearing, 504 F.3d at 901)). Moreover, the district court’s ruling allowing the government to introduce evidence that the defendant “would have been paid less (or not at all) 21 had the claims not been materially false” simply does not allow the government present its case with sufficient detail and narrative. to Cf. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183 (recognizing “the offering party’s need for evidentiary richness and narrative integrity in presenting a case”). We conclude, accordingly, that the district court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. REVERSED AND REMANDED 22
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