US v. Philip Murph

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4893 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. PHILIP MURPH, a/k/a Phil, a/k/a Phillip Murph, a/k/a Philip Murphy, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (7:94-cr-00036-BR-2) Submitted: March 31, 2011 Decided: April 5, 2011 Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Philip following distribution after he was placed release his Murph from imprisonment for federal Murph’s supervised release was crimes. was again convicted for on supervised federal drug release drug revoked distribution violations; he was sentenced to thirty months of imprisonment for violating his supervised release. On appeal, Murph argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the court failed to explain why it denied his request to have the sentence imposed run concurrently with the federal sentence he was then serving. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is within range and not plainly unreasonable. 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). the prescribed statutory United States v. Crudup, In determining whether a sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first consider whether the sentence imposed is unreasonable. Id. at 438. determination, we procedural considerations that sentences.” Id. follow we at “the employ 438. In in this our In making this and review inquiry, we substantive of original take a more deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion sentences. Cir. 2007). than reasonableness review of Guidelines United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Only if we find 2 the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable, “plainly” so. must we decide whether it is Id. at 657. While a district court must consider Chapter Seven’s policy statements and the statutory provisions applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010), the district court need not robotically tick through every subsection, and it has broad discretion to revoke the previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to Moulden, 478 the statutory maximum provided by § 3583(e)(3). F.3d at 656-57 (4th Cir. 2007); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Moreover, while a district court must provide a statement of the reasons for the sentence imposed, the court “need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be States v. when imposing Thompson, a 595 post-conviction F.3d 544, 547 sentence.” (4th Cir. United 2010); see United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 938 (4th Cir. 2010) (a properly preserved objection to an inadequate explanation is reviewed for harmless error). Here, prior to imposing sentence, the district court listened to arguments from both parties, heard from Murph himself, and stated that it had considered the relevant Chapter Seven policy statements in the Sentencing Guidelines, and the § 3553(a) factors applicable to revocation sentences. although Murph sought a concurrent 3 sentence, the Moreover, Government informed the court that any term of imprisonment for a violation of supervised release must be imposed to run consecutively to any term of imprisonment then being served by a defendant under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.3(f), p.s. (2009). See id. the (stating “[a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of supervised release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving”). the district Under these circumstances, we do not find that court’s failure to grant Murph’s concurrent sentence was plainly unreasonable. request for a Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656; Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. Accordingly, we affirm Murph’s thirty-month sentence. We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 4