US v. Desmond Smith, No. 09-4118 (4th Cir. 2009)

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The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on September 27, 2011.

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Vacated by Supreme Court, June 21, 2010 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4118 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. DESMOND JAMAR SMITH, Defendant Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (4:08-cr-00033-BR-1) Submitted: October 30, 2009 Decided: December 9, 2009 Before MICHAEL and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Jr., Research and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Desmond Jamar Smith pled guilty without a plea agreement to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2006), and was sentenced to 210 months in prison. Smith s sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred in sentencing him as an armed career criminal because he alleges that: (i) his four prior North Carolina felony breaking and entering convictions were not proper predicate offenses under the Armed (2006), Career since Criminal they Act allegedly ( ACCA ), do not 18 involve U.S.C. § conduct 924(e) that is purposeful, violent and aggressive and were not punishable by more than twelve months imprisonment; and (ii) his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the district court enhanced his sentence based on uncharged facts about prior convictions neither admitted to by Smith, nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith Finding no error, we affirm. contends that we should review the district court s decision that his prior convictions for breaking and entering are violent crimes under the ACCA in light of the Supreme Court s decision in Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008) (holding that a violent felony under the otherwise clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006) must be roughly similar to enumerated crimes), and Chambers v. United States, 2 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009) (holding, in accord with Begay, that failure to report for penal confinement is not a violent felony under § 924(e)). Begay was decided well before Smith pled guilty or was sentenced, but he did not object to his armed career criminal status on this ground in the district court. Therefore, this issue is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). We look to our case law interpreting both the terms crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing § 4B1.1 (2008) and violent felony under language defining materially these terms is indistinguishable. United is one of the crimes enumerated in violence. Manual § 924(e) because the nearly 551 F.3d 226, 229 n.2 (4th Cir. 2009). Guidelines identical States v. [] and Roseboro, Burglary of a dwelling § 4B1.2(a)(2) as a crime of As Smith concedes, this court has held that the North Carolina offense of breaking and entering is generic burglary. United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2005) (following Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), in interpreting § 924(e)). Because the Supreme Court in Begay made clear that that a felony is one of the example crimes specifically enumerated in the statute (i.e., burglary) is a proper predicate offense, Smith career offender. 3 was properly sentenced as a Smith predicate because, also asserts convictions under for North that his he armed Carolina s lacked career structured the required criminal sentencing status scheme, his particular prior convictions were not punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. concedes that his argument is Smith nonetheless correctly foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that to determine if a crime is punishable by a term exceeding one year, a sentencing court should consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history ). Last, Smith argues that the district court violated his constitutional rights when it sentenced him as an armed career criminal because the predicate felony convictions used to increase the statutory penalties for his offense were not alleged in the indictment or admitted by him as part of his guilty plea. This argument fails under controlling circuit See Thompson, 421 F.3d at 284 n.4 (holding that an precedent. indictment need not reference or list the prior convictions underlying the enhancement); see also United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, convictions used 352-53 as (4th the Cir. basis for 2005) an (holding armed that career prior criminal sentence need not be charged in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 4 Moreover, although Smith recognizes that the Supreme Court has also held that the Government need not plead a prior conviction in an indictment or present such evidence to a jury in order to rely on it to enhance a sentence, see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 247 (1998), he asserts that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, as suggested in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489 (2000) ( [I]t is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided. ), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided ) argued (citations that the Almendarez-Torres omitted). prior may Though many defendants conviction no exception set longer good Booker be maintained the prior conviction exception. law, forth have in clearly See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) ( Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence . . . must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury ). Thus, while a sentencing court is not permitted to resolve disputed facts about a prior conviction that are not evident from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25, a determination that a defendant is eligible for sentencing under determination that the ACCA may the predicate 5 be based on convictions are a judge s for violent felonies or drug trafficking crimes if the qualifying facts are inherent in the predicate required to perform convictions additional fact and the court finding. See is not Thompson, 421 F.3d at 282-83; see also Cheek, 415 F.3d at 354 (holding that, under the Sixth Amendment, the fact of a prior conviction need not be submitted to the jury or admitted by the defendant for it to serve Accordingly, criminal we as find enhancement the that to basis the for a sentence district Smith s enhancement). court s offense armed level career was not unconstitutional. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court s judgment. legal before We dispense with oral argument because the facts and contentions the court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 6

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