Chauncey Payne v. City of Laurel, Maryland, No. 09-1837 (4th Cir. 2010)

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-1837 CHAUNCEY LOUIS PAYNE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF LAUREL, MARYLAND, CRAWFORD; JOHN PROCTOR, a municipal corporation; DAVID Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (1:07-cv-00583-RDB) Argued: October 27, 2010 Decided: November 15, 2010 Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Matthew August LeFande, Arlington, Daniel Karp, KARPINSKI, COLARESI Maryland, for Appellees. Virginia, for & KARP, PA, Appellant. Baltimore, Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Chauncey Payne, a reserve officer with the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (the D.C. Police Department ), brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) against Laurel Police Officer John Proctor, the City of Laurel, Maryland, and Laurel s Chief of Police, David Crawford. Payne also asserts state common law and constitutional claims against these defendants. because Officer deficient provided warrant no Payne Proctor alleges deliberately affidavit probable that cause that, for if he or suffered recklessly corrected, charges. granted summary judgment to the defendants. The injuries filed would district a have court We affirm. I. On April 20, 2006, Officer Proctor drafted and filed an application for statement of charges (the warrant affidavit ) based on his investigation of Payne. The investigation arose from complaints that Lasheka Brown lodged against Payne with the Laurel Police Department. In short, Brown reported that on March 11 and 15, 2006, Payne approached her in the vicinity of the apartment complex in which she lived. The complex is located at 9407 Springhouse Lane in Laurel, Maryland. Brown alleged that during their first encounter Payne identified himself as Chauncey, and advised 2 her that he was a police officer, who had the authority to issue warnings for vehicles not registered in vehicle was registered in South Carolina. Maryland. Brown s According to Brown, Payne further told her that he had seen her exercising at the Sport Fit gym. Brown subsequently spoke with someone at Springhouse Lane's leasing office and learned that there was no resident in the complex with the name of Chauncey, and that the apartment complex had never granted anyone the authority to issue vehicle warnings. During the second encounter, Brown reported that Payne ran after her car as she drove away from her apartment. * On March 28, 2006, Officer Proctor met Brown at Sport Fit after she reported seeing Payne there. that Brown was noticeably afraid. Officer Proctor observed He investigated and learned that the gym had offered Payne a law enforcement discount; he discovered in Payne s membership file a photocopy of a D.C. Police Department badge, which bore the word Reserve on the top and lacked any identifying information. The membership file also indicated that Payne lived not at Brown s apartment complex but at 8714 Cresthill Court, Laurel, Maryland. * Although Payne and Brown have conflicting recollections of the encounters, Payne does not dispute that Brown recounted her version of events to the police. 3 As part of his investigation of Payne, Officer Proctor additionally contacted the D.C. Police Department and inquired whether Payne was a D.C. police officer (but not whether he was a reserve Proctor officer). that Department s Payne A was database. personnel not employee listed informed the Proctor Officer in D.C. also Officer Police visited management office of Brown s apartment complex. the The manager informed Officer Proctor that Payne was not a resident of the complex and that the complex had not granted Payne the authority to issue warnings or citations on the premises. Officer Proctor learned that the apartment complex listed an Anabel Payne as a resident, but he did not knock on the door of Anabel Payne s apartment, or attempt to contact Payne at the Cresthill Court residence listed in the Sport Fit membership file. In fact, at the time of the events in question, Anabel Payne, the signatory on the lease of an apartment in the Springhouse Lane complex, was Chauncey Payne s mother and Chauncey Payne had resided in her apartment since December 2005. In the warrant affidavit, Officer Proctor identified Payne s residence as the Cresthill Court address shown on the Sport Fit possession showing membership of a Payne s file. Maryland residence Although Motor as Vehicle 9407 Officer Proctor Administration Springhouse Lane, Proctor made no mention of that fact in the affidavit. 4 had report Officer Nor did Officer Proctor include in the warrant affidavit that the Springhouse Lane complex listed Anabel Payne as a resident. On April 20, 2006, on the basis of Officer Proctor s warrant affidavit, a state court commissioner issued an arrest warrant charging Payne with two counts of impersonation of a police officer (one count as to Brown and one count as to Sport Fit gym), one count of wearing police articles, and one count of stalking. On the first day of the ensuing trial, the prosecutor issued a nolle prosequi on all charges. Thereafter, Payne filed this suit. claims is the charge that Officer At the heart of Payne s Proctor violated Payne s Fourth Amendment rights by deliberately or recklessly omitting facts from the warrant affidavit, and that these omissions were material in improperly establishing probable cause for the warrant. II. The district court concluded, as a matter of law, that Officer Proctor had not alleged sufficient facts to support any violation of Payne s Fourth Amendment rights. that the Officer proffered Proctor facts could deliberately or not support recklessly information from the warrant affidavit. The court held a finding omitted that material The court reasoned that even after including the information that an Anabel Payne was 5 listed as a resident and the fact that Payne lived at 9407 Springhouse Lane (as corrected warrant opposed affidavit to 8714 would Cresthill still Court), establish the probable cause for -- at minimum -- the impersonation charge. Further, the district court determined that, in any event, qualified immunity barred Payne s claims against Officer Proctor because it was reasonable for Proctor to believe, under the circumstances, that his warrant affidavit exhibited probable cause. Based on its findings that probable cause existed for Payne s arrest and that Officer Proctor was entitled to qualified immunity, the district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment on all of Payne s federal and state claims. Payne filed a timely appeal. judgment de novo, examining the favorable to the nonmoving party. We review a grant of summary facts in the light most Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2001). III. Having carefully considered the record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the controlling authorities, we conclude that the district court s analysis was correct. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the district court s well 6 reasoned opinion. See Chauncey Louis Payne v. City of Laurel, Md., No. RDB-07-583 (D.Md. June 29, 2009). AFFIRMED 7

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