Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R.
Justia.com Opinion Summary: E.R., now 10 years old, attended kindergarten and first grade at a public school. E.R. has been identified as having numerous learning disabilities, and health-related problems, including severe food and contact allergies. During the summer after first grade, her parents determined that programs offered by the district were inadequate to address E.R.'s unique needs, and decided to enroll her at a private school that specializes in instructing students with learning disabilities. They filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, seeking compensatory education for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and tuition reimbursement, including transportation expenses. A hearing officer awarded compensatory education for the 2007-2008 school year, reimbursement of tuition for the 2008-2009 school year, and reimbursement for transportation. The district court reversed and the Third Circuit affirmed. The district took reasonable steps to accommodate E.R.'s disabilities and include her in all class activities; it was not required to grant the specific accommodations requested by her parents or otherwise make substantial modifications to the programs that were used for all other students.
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The court issued a Revised version of this opinion on May 31, 2012
PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______ No. 11-1447 ______ RIDLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. M.R.; J.R., PARENTS OF MINOR CHILD E.R. v. JANET CENNAME M.R.; J.R. Parents of Minor Child E.R., Appellants ______ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-09-cv-02503) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg ______ Argued March 19, 2012 Before: RENDELL, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. (Filed: May 17, 2012) Alan L. Yatvin (Argued) Popper & Yatvin 230 South Broad Street, Suite 503 Philadelphia, PA 19102 Counsel for Appellants Jennifer C. Lowman (Argued) Leonard Rieser Education Law Center 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19107 Counsel for Amicus Appellants, Learning Disabilities Association of Pennsylvania and Education Law Center of Pennsylvania John F.X. Reilly (Argued) Delaware County Office of District Attorney 201 West Front Street Media, PA 19063 Counsel for Appellees ______ OPINION OF THE COURT ______ 2 FISHER, Circuit Judge. M.R. and J.R., the parents of E.R., a minor, appeal from an order of the District Court, granting judgment on the administrative record in favor of Ridley School District. The District Court reversed a decision by a Pennsylvania Due Process Hearing Officer that Ridley School District violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (âIDEAâ), 20 U.S.C. 1400, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Â§ 701, et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the order of the District Court. I. Background E.R., who is now ten years old, attended kindergarten (2006-2007) and first grade (2007-2008) at Grace Park Elementary School (âGrace Parkâ) in the Ridley School District (âRidleyâ). E.R. has been identified as a child with numerous learning disabilities, as well as several healthrelated problems, including severe food and contact allergies. During the summer between E.R.âs first and second grade years, M.R. and J.R. (collectively, âParentsâ) determined that the programs being offered by Ridley were inadequate to address E.R.âs unique needs, and thus decided to remove her from Ridley and enroll her at the Benchmark School, a private school that specializes in instructing students with learning disabilities. Parents subsequently filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, seeking compensatory education for violations of the IDEA and Â§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and tuition reimbursement, including transportation expenses, for E.R.âs enrollment in the Benchmark School. A Due Process Hearing Officer 3 awarded Parents compensatory education for the 2007-2008 school year, as well as reimbursement of tuition for the 20082009 school year, and reimbursement for transportation to and from the Benchmark School. The District Court reversed, finding that Parents were entitled to neither compensatory education nor reimbursement for tuition or transportation expenses. A. Factual Background Before E.R. began kindergarten, Parents were concerned about her ability to grasp pre-academic skills, such as letters and numbers, and took her to be evaluated at the Chester County Intermediate Unit (âCCIUâ). Although the testing noted some academic difficulties, the evaluators concluded that E.R. did not qualify as a child with special needs. However, in September 2006, shortly after E.R. began kindergarten, she was identified as needing extra academic support, and was placed in extended-day kindergarten (âEDKâ). Parents were notified of this placement, and were advised that it was intended to improve E.R.âs math skills and reinforce her kindergarten skills generally. In November 2006, due to E.R.âs academic struggles and attention problems, Parents requested that Ridley perform an educational evaluation. Ridley agreed, and an Initial Evaluation Report was completed on January 31, 2007. Although the report indicated that math was difficult for E.R., consistent with CCIUâs earlier determination, Ridley concluded that she did not qualify for special education services because her cognitive ability and academic achievement levels were both in the average range. Ridley 4 also conducted an occupational therapy (âOTâ) evaluation, which was completed on January 24, 2007. The OT findings, which were based largely on the input of teachers, identified the following areas of concern: below grade level ability in math; lack of concentration; inconsistency in remembering numbers one through ten; problems with peer interaction; poor problem-solving skills and desk posture; and difficulty keeping her place when reading. On February 7, 2007, Ridley convened a meeting to review the Initial Evaluation Report. In response to concerns raised by Parents at the meeting, Ridley agreed to conduct additional testing using The Childrenâs Memory Scale, Test of Auditory Processing Skills, and The Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Functioning. The additional testing resulted in two addendums to the Initial Evaluation Report, which stated that E.R.âs academic skills were generally in the average range, but that she demonstrated a relative weakness in retaining and manipulating numbers. Based on this information, the school psychologist concluded that E.R. did not have a specific learning disability. Also in February 2007, a Â§ 504 Service Agreement (âthe Â§ 504 Agreementâ) was issued to provide OT services to E.R., and to address her severe allergies. 1 Under the Â§ 504 Agreement, E.R. was to receive OT services once a week for thirty minutes and consultative services to the home and classroom on a regular 1 âÂ§ 504â refers to Â§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination in federally-funded programs, including public schools, on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. Â§ 794. 5 basis. Despite her allergies, E.R. was to be included in as many activities as possible, and Parents were to be contacted before activities involving food so that appropriate alternatives could be provided for E.R. Pursuant to a recommendation made by E.R.âs kindergarten teacher, Mary Moffatt (âMoffattâ), E.R. was enrolled in the Summer Steps program in the Summer of 2007 to reinforce her academic skills. The Summer Steps teacher reported that E.R. made some academic progress, but that she needed improvement in several areas and had difficulty recognizing numbers and counting. The first six weeks of first grade were spent reviewing kindergarten materials. During this time, E.R. struggled academically and posted several failing grades. In late September 2007, J.R., E.R.âs mother, wrote to E.R.âs first grade teacher, Janet Cenname (âCennameâ), and requested a meeting to discuss E.R.âs poor grades. Cenname declined the request to meet at that time, telling J.R. that it would be premature to meet so early in the year, and that it would be more appropriate to give E.R. time to develop her skills. Cenname explained that she would be âhappy to meetâ a few weeks later, in early October, if Parents still had concerns. Parents did not re-contact Cenname, and instead requested a meeting with the schoolâs principal. During that meeting, which was held on November 1, 2007, Parents were informed that E.R. had been placed on a âreading watch listâ in midOctober. Following the meeting, E.R. was placed in a reading support group, but according to Parents, she had difficulty catching up with the other students because the program had started two months earlier. 6 On November 16, 2007, Parents requested a comprehensive reevaluation of E.R. Ridley issued a Permission to Evaluate on November 27, 2007, and the reevaluation was completed on February 26, 2008. The Reevaluation Report found that E.R. had learning disabilities in the areas of reading decoding and comprehension, math computation, reasoning skills, and written language. E.R. was also found to have fine motor delays and a language disability. As part of the Reevaluation Report, Ridleyâs school psychologist prepared recommendations to be considered by the Individual Education Planning Team (âIEP Teamâ). Based on those recommendations, Ridley offered two alternative placements for E.R.: (1) the learning support room at her current school, Grace Park, or (2) a self-contained classroom at a different elementary school. Parents observed both programs and determined that neither was appropriate for E.R. An IEP Team meeting was convened on March 28, 2008 to review a draft Individualized Education Program (âIEPâ) that had been developed to address E.R.âs educational needs. At Parentsâ request, Ridley agreed to make revisions to the IEP and submit the revisions to Parents for approval. At the meeting, Ridleyâs Special Education Director, Kim Woods (âWoodsâ), suggested a program called Project Read as a possible reading aid for E.R. Woods told Parents that she would do some research on the program and follow up with Parents and the IEP Team in a few days. Woods also provided Parents with a printout from Project Readâs website, and a review of the program conducted by the Florida Center for Reading Research. 7 A Notice of Recommended Educational Placement (âNOREPâ) was issued on April 2, 2008, but Parents refused to sign it until all of the agreed-upon revisions had been made. Another IEP Team meeting was held on April 30 to address Parentsâ continuing concerns regarding the IEP. On May 9, a revised NOREP was issued, and Parents signed it in agreement on May 12. However, Parents remained concerned about Ridleyâs proposed reading program, and requested that Ridley hire someone to provide instruction using The Wilson Reading System. Ridley did not do so. On May 13, 2008, in accordance with the revised NOREP and addendums to the IEP, E.R. began going to Grace Parkâs âresource roomâ every day for one hour of reading assistance in the morning and one hour of math assistance in the afternoon. The resource room reading curriculum consisted of the following instructional programs: Read Naturally, Reading Workshop, Writing Workshop, and Patricia Cunninghamâs Systematic Phonics. The resource room employed a program called Everyday Math for math instruction. There were five other students in the resource room, none of whom were first graders. Aimee Hodges (âHodgesâ), the resource room teacher, explained that although the students were all provided with the same reading programs, different parts of the programs were used for different students, such that assistance was geared toward each studentâs individual needs. Hodges also testified that everything done in the resource room was âmulti-sensory,â which meant that the lessons included visual, oral, and handson components. E.R.âs grades in the resource room improved dramatically in a short period of time, but Parents attributed 8 the improvement to improper resource room assistance, and claimed that E.R. was not displaying similar progress at home. By the time E.R.âs first grade year ended, she had received eighteen days of resource room assistance. On June 9, 2008, the IEP Team met to update the IEP for the 2008-2009 academic year (second grade). The NOREP from the June IEP Team meeting recommended that E.R. continue to receive one hour per day of math instruction and one hour per day of reading instruction in the resource room. The NOREP indicated that the reading instruction would include a direct reading program, as well as a direct phonemic-based program to address E.R.âs needs in decoding vocabulary, fluency, and comprehension skills. The NOREP provided that Ridley would train its learning support staff on Project Read during the summer, and that the program would be âup and runningâ before the end of September 2008. Ridley also agreed to pay for a summer learning program at the Benchmark School, as well as summer math tutoring three times per week. Parents researched Project Read and determined that it was not appropriate for a student with E.R.âs needs. On August 14, 2008, Parents informed Ridley that E.R. would be enrolling at the Benchmark School for the 2008-2009 school year because it provided the âintensive multi-sensory approach to readingâ that they determined E.R. required. B. Procedural History On December 4, 2008, Parents filed a due process complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, 9 alleging that Ridley violated the IDEA and Â§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Parents claimed that Ridley failed to timely identify E.R. as a child in need of special education services, failed to develop an appropriate IEP, and subjected E.R. to discrimination by failing to comply with the Â§ 504 Agreement. Hearings were held before a Due Process Hearing Officer on January 29, 2009, February 10, 2009, and March 10, 2009. At the hearings, the Hearing Officer reviewed documentary evidence provided by the parties and heard testimony from E.R.âs mother, Linda Heller, Parentsâ special education advocate, as well as several teachers and school officials. On April 21, 2009, the Hearing Officer issued a written report, finding that: (1) Ridley had not committed any violations during E.R.âs kindergarten year; (2) Ridley violated the IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act in E.R.âs first grade year; and (3) the IEPs proposed for E.R.âs first and second grade years were inadequate and therefore denied E.R. a âfree appropriate public educationâ (âFAPEâ) because they âlacked appropriate specially designed instruction in the form of a research based, peer reviewed reading program.â The Hearing Officer awarded Parents compensatory education for the 2007-2008 year (first grade), reimbursement of tuition at the Benchmark School for the 2008-2009 year (second grade), and reimbursement of transportation expenses to and from the Benchmark School. Ridley filed a petition for review in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, and the case was subsequently removed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Parents treated the petition as a complaint and 10 filed an answer and counterclaims, in which they challenged the Hearing Officerâs conclusion that no violation occurred during E.R.âs kindergarten year, and asserted additional claims against Ridley and Cenname, whom Parents added as a third party defendant. On October 9, 2009, Ridley filed a motion for judgment on the administrative record. On February 14, 2011, the District Court affirmed the Hearing Officerâs finding as to E.R.âs kindergarten year, reversed the Hearing Officerâs findings as to E.R.âs first and second grade years, and granted Ridleyâs motion for judgment on the administrative record as to all claims. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., No. 09-2503, 2011 WL 499966, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2011). Parents filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Parents raise four arguments. First, they contend that the District Court improperly placed the burden of persuasion on them to demonstrate that Ridley violated the IDEA. Second, they argue that the District Court erred in reversing the Hearing Officerâs finding that Ridley denied E.R. a FAPE during first grade by failing to timely identify her as a student in need of special education services. Third, they maintain that the District Court misinterpreted a provision of the IDEA, and improperly reversed the Hearing Officerâs finding that E.R.âs IEP was deficient in that it lacked research-based, peer-reviewed specially designed reading instruction. Finally, Parents argue that the District Court erred in concluding that Ridley did not violate Â§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 11 II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review The District Court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the state educational agency under 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1415(i)(2), and we have appellate jurisdiction over the order of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. Â§ 1291. When considering a petition for review challenging a state administrative decision under the IDEA, a district court applies âa nontraditional standard of review, sometimes referred to as âmodified de novoâ review.â D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Under this standard, a district court must give âdue weightâ to the findings of the state hearing officer. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). âFactual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct. âIf a reviewing court fails to adhere to them, it is obliged to explain why. The court is not, however, to substitute its own notions of sound educational policy for those of local school authorities.ââ S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting MM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 531 (4th Cir. 2002)). âWithin the confines of these standards, a district court is authorized to make findings based on the preponderance of the evidence and grant the relief it deems appropriate.â D.S., 602 F.3d at 564 (citations omitted); see also Shore Regâl High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing a district courtâs burden as âunusualâ in that it must make its own findings by a preponderance of the evidence, but nevertheless afford âdue weightâ to the administrative officerâs determinations). 12 We exercise plenary review over the District Courtâs conclusions of law, D.S., 602 F.3d at 564, and âwith respect to the question [of] whether the District Court applied the correct legal standards under the IDEA,â Shore Regâl, 381 F.3d at 199 (citation omitted). We review the District Courtâs findings of fact, including a determination as to the appropriateness of an IEP, under a clearly erroneous standard. D.S., 602 F.3d at 564. III. Discussion A. Statutory Framework The IDEA requires states receiving federal education funding to provide every disabled child with a âfree appropriate public education.â 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1412(a)(1). 2 A 2 âThe term âfree appropriate public educationâ means special education and related services that-(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and 13 FAPE âconsists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child âto benefitâ from the instruction.â Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89. Although a state is not required to maximize the potential of every handicapped child, it must supply an education that provides âsignificant learningâ and âmeaningful benefitâ to the child. D.S., 602 F.3d at 556 (citing Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999)). â[T]he provision of merely more than a trivial educational benefitâ is insufficient. L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal marks and citations omitted). When a state is unable to provide a FAPE, the state must reimburse the childâs parents for the costs of attendance at a private school that is able to provide a FAPE. D.S., 602 F.3d at 557. The core of the IDEA is the collaborative process that it establishes between parents and schools. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). The IEP is the âcentral vehicleâ for this collaboration, id., and the âprimary mechanismâ for delivering a FAPE, W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Under the IDEA, school districts must work with parents to design an IEP, which is a program of individualized instruction for each (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under [20 U.S.C. Â§ 1414(d)].â 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1401(9). 14 special education student. 20 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d). âEach IEP must include an assessment of the childâs current educational performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature of the special services that the school will provide.â Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53 (citing 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1414(d)(1)(A)). Although the IEP must provide the student with a âbasic floor of opportunity,â it does not have to provide âthe optimal level of services,â or incorporate every program requested by the childâs parents. D.S., 602 F.3d at 557 (citations omitted); Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that the IDEA guarantees to a disabled child âan education that is appropriate, not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parentsâ (internal marks and citations omitted)). â[A]t a minimum, the IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the studentâs intellectual potential,â Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), and âindividual abilities,â Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at 248. See Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 991 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that an IEP must âbe likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational advancementâ) (citation omitted). If parents believe that an IEP fails to provide their child with a FAPE, they may seek an administrative âimpartial due process hearing.â 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1415(f). A school district may also request such a hearing, if, for example, it wants to change an existing IEP and the parents refuse, or if the parents refuse to allow their child to be 15 evaluated at all. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53. Although state authorities have limited discretion in determining who conducts the hearings and establishing hearing procedures, Congress has legislated the âcentral componentsâ of the administrative hearings by providing minimal pleading standards, and affording all parties the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 54. âAny party aggrieved by the findings and decisionâ made in the administrative proceeding âshall have the right to bring a civil actionâ in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1415(i)(2)(A). A threshold issue we are asked to consider in this case is which party bears the burden of persuasion before the district court. The IDEA does not specify which party bears the burden of persuasion at the district court level or at the administrative hearing level. Before 2005, we had always placed the burden of demonstrating compliance with the IDEA at the administrative hearing on the school district. L.E., 435 F.3d at 391 (citing T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2000); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993)). However, in 2005, in Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. at 62, the Supreme Court held that the burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing under the IDEA lies with the party seeking relief. The Court explained that it saw no reason to depart from âthe ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.â Id. at 56 (citing 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence Â§ 337, at 412 (5th ed. 1999)); see L.E., 435 F.3d at 391 (discussing the significance of Schaffer). 16 However, Schaffer did not address which party should bear the burden of persuasion when a party aggrieved by the decision of the administrative hearing officer challenges that decision in district court. Nor have we explicitly decided this issue in articulating the district courtâs standard of review. We now join our sister circuits in holding that the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of persuasion before the district court as to each claim challenged. 3 See J.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 2010); Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D., 616 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2010); District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2010). As the Supreme Court noted in Schaffer, â[t]he burdens of pleading and proof with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to 3 Our conclusion today that the burden lies with the party challenging the administrative decision is entirely consistent with our previous cases, in which we held that the burden was properly placed on the parents before the district court. In those cases, the parents were the losing party before the hearing officer and challenged the hearing officerâs decision in district court. See Andrew M. v. Del. Cnty. Office of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 345 (3d Cir. 2007); L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 392 (3d Cir. 2006). We did not specify, however, whether the parents bore the burden because they initially challenged the IEP (and the burden carried to the district court) or because they lost at the administrative hearing level. As our decision today makes clear, the relevant consideration is the outcome of the administrative proceeding, not which party requests an administrative hearing. 17 the [party] who . . . seeks to change the present state of affairs.â 546 U.S. at 56 (quoting McCormick on Evidence Â§ 337, at 412). Under the IDEA, it is the party âaggrieved by the findings and decisionâ of the hearing officer that seeks to change the present state of affairs. See 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1415(i)(2)(A). âAbsent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise,â we conclude that the burden of persuasion falls where it usually does, on the party seeking relief. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57-58; see also S.H., 336 F.3d at 270 (explaining that factual findings from the administrative proceeding are to be considered prima facie correct). In this case, Parents argue that the District Court committed reversible error by placing the burden of persuasion on them as to all claims. We disagree. Although the District Court did, in fact, err by placing the burden on Parents with respect to the findings of the Hearing Officer that were challenged by Ridley, the error was harmless. 4 We will deem an error to be harmless if it is âhighly probableâ that it did not affect the outcome of the case. Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In a non-criminal case, an error regarding the placement of the burden of persuasion will frequently be harmless. Schaffer, 4 We note that Parents filed counterclaims, in which they challenged the Hearing Officerâs conclusion that Ridley did not violate the IDEA or the Rehabilitation Act during E.R.âs kindergarten year. Parents appropriately bore the burden of persuasion as to those claims because they were the party aggrieved by the Hearing Officerâs decision. 18 546 U.S. at 56, 58. As the Supreme Court has explained, in a non-criminal case, the burden of persuasion only comes into play where the evidence is âclosely balanced,â id. at 56, i.e., in cases âin evidentiary equipoise,â id. at 58. In this case, as we explain below, no factual issues are so âclosely balancedâ that the burden of persuasion would have affected the outcome of the case. See id. at 56. Although some of the disputed issues involve questions of fact, the Hearing Officerâs errors stemmed largely from mistakes or omissions regarding the application of law to those facts. Questions of law, of course, are unaffected by the burden of persuasion. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that the burden of persuasion is the burden âto persuade the factfinder that oneâs propositions of fact are indeed trueâ (citing Blackâs Law Dictionary 190 (7th ed. 1999))). Thus, we hold that it is âhighly probableâ that the District Courtâs error regarding the placement of the burden of persuasion did not affect the outcome. Forrest, 424 F.3d at 349. B. âChild Findâ Requirement Parents contend that the District Court erred in reversing the Hearing Officerâs determination that Ridleyâs failure to identify E.R. as a child in need of special education services in the beginning of first grade denied her a FAPE. We disagree. âSchool districts have a continuing obligation under the IDEA . . . to identify and evaluate all students who are reasonably suspected of having a disability.â P.P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 738 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1412(a)(3) (explaining that states must âidentif[y], locate, and evaluateâ all children 19 with disabilities who are in need of special education, and must develop âa practical method . . . to determine which children with disabilities are currently receiving needed special education and related servicesâ). This is referred to as the IDEAâs âchild findâ requirement. Matula, 67 F.3d at 492. Each state must establish procedures to fulfill this statutory directive. 34 C.F.R. Â§ 300.111. Pennsylvaniaâs âchild findâ procedures are set forth in 22 Pa. Code. Â§Â§ 14.121 through 14.125. Neither the IDEA, its implementing regulations, nor the applicable Pennsylvania regulations establish a deadline by which children who are suspected of having a qualifying disability must be identified and evaluated. Accordingly, we have previously âinfer[red] a requirement that this be done within a reasonable time after school officials are on notice of behavior that is likely to indicate a disability.â Matula, 67 F.3d at 501. 5 In adopting the âreasonable timeâ standard, we noted the budgetary constraints and staffing pressures facing school officials, and emphasized that we were not 5 In W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995), we were dealing with a challenge to a school districtâs compliance with child find obligations under the IDEA and New Jersey law. However, because nothing in the Pennsylvania regulations establishes a specified timeline for identifying and evaluating students, we will apply the âreasonable timeâ standard to school districts in Pennsylvania as well. See id. at 501 (inferring the âreasonable timeâ requirement because neither the IDEA nor the applicable New Jersey regulations established such a deadline). 20 establishing any âbright-line ruleâ as to what constitutes a reasonable time. Id. Rather, we employ a case-by-case approach and assess whether the school districtâs response was reasonable âin light of the information and resources possessedâ by the district at a given point in time. Id. Here, in finding that Ridley denied E.R. a FAPE by failing to identify her as a student in need of special education services at the outset of first grade, the Hearing Officer never acknowledged that Ridley must be given a reasonable time to identify students as disabled. Rather, the Hearing Officer simply stated that Ridley had provided a number of intervention programs to E.R. during kindergarten, and because E.R. continued to struggle academically in first grade, Ridley should have known that further evaluation was required at the very start of the next school year. The Hearing Officer was particularly critical of E.R.âs first grade teacher, Janet Cenname, explaining that Cenname was âextremely nervous and uptightâ when testifying, she had to refer to notes, and she frequently tried to explain her actions in a ânon-sensical way.â The Hearing Officer concluded that, based on E.R.âs struggles during the first month of first grade, much of which was spent reviewing kindergarten materials, Cenname should have identified E.R. as a student in need of special education services at the very beginning of the year, and thus should have recommended to Ridley that it conduct another evaluation. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer determined that Ridley denied E.R. a FAPE âfrom the beginning of first grade to the time that the evaluation was completedâ in February 2008. 21 As the District Court observed, the Hearing Officerâs finding that Ridley violated the IDEA by failing to identify E.R. as a child in need of special education services at the outset of first grade is difficult to reconcile with the Hearing Officerâs finding that Ridley complied with the IDEA during E.R.âs kindergarten year. E.R. was evaluated during kindergarten, and although areas of weakness were found, E.R.âs academic skills were generally considered to be in the average range. The Hearing Officer concluded that the kindergarten evaluation was âsubstantively appropriate,â and noted that âjust because a child has an area of weakness, it doesnât necessarily mean that [she has] a disability.â The Hearing Officer also noted that Ridley âappeared to be invested in addressing [E.R.âs] needs and providing appropriate instruction and interventions before rushing to special education identification.â As a result, the Hearing Officer properly determined that Parentsâ claim that Ridley violated the IDEAâs âchild findâ requirements during E.R.âs kindergarten year âlack[ed] any basis in the testimony or documents.â 6 In light of the fact that E.R.âs kindergarten evaluations were appropriate, and she did not qualify as a student in need of special education services in June 2007 (the end of kindergarten), we cannot agree with the Hearing Officer that Ridley violated the IDEA and denied E.R. a FAPE by failing to immediately reevaluate her in September 2007. When a 6 Parents do not appeal the District Courtâs decision affirming the Hearing Officerâs finding regarding E.R.âs kindergarten year. 22 school district has conducted a comprehensive evaluation and concluded that a student does not qualify as disabled under the IDEA, the school district must be afforded a reasonable time to monitor the studentâs progress before exploring whether further evaluation is required. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 501. We assess whether a school district identified and evaluated a student suspected of having a qualifying disability within a reasonable time âin light of the information and resources possessedâ by the district. Id. Here, although E.R. struggled during the beginning of first grade, all prior evaluations showed that she did not require special education services. Moreover, as Cenname testified, first grade was the âfirst time that the children ever ha[d] a chance to be in a test taking situationâ and â[t]here were other children that also had difficulty . . . taking a test.â It was reasonable for Cenname to assess E.R.âs progress throughout the first marking period of first grade before recommending that E.R. again be evaluated to determine if she had a learning disability. The IDEA does not require a reevaluation every time a student posts a poor grade. Accordingly, we hold that Ridley complied with its âchild findâ obligations, and E.R. was not denied a FAPE at the beginning of first grade. 7 7 Parents contend that the District Court did not accord the proper deference to the Hearing Officerâs factual findings, particularly her finding that Cenname was not a credible witness. Where a hearing officer âhas heard live testimony and determined that one witness is more credible than another witness, [the hearing officerâs] determination is due special weight.â D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d 23 Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). A district court must accept the hearing officerâs credibility determinations âunless the nontestimonial extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion.â Id. (citations omitted). Here, central to the Hearing Officerâs conclusion that E.R. was denied a FAPE during the beginning of first grade was that Cenname âput offâ meeting with E.R.âs mother when E.R.âs mother expressed concern that her daughter had failed a math test. However, Cenname responded to E.R.âs motherâs request for a meeting by sending back the following note: Dear Mrs. [R], I appreciate your concern about [E.R.âs] test, but it is very early in the year. We need to give her some time. Continue to work with her at home and reinforce what we are doing in class. I will probably be out from Oct. 2 â Oct. 15. If you still have concerns at that time, I will be happy to meet. 24 C. E.R.âs IEP Parents next contend that the District Court erred in reversing the Hearing Officerâs finding that E.R.âs IEP was inadequate. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree. First, to the extent Ridley violated the IDEAâs procedural requirements by failing to include the requisite statement of specially designed instruction in the IEP, the violation was not actionable because it did not have any impact on the substantive rights of E.R. or Parents. Second, contrary to the Hearing Officerâs findings, E.R.âs educational plan included a peer-reviewed reading program, which, in conjunction with the other services that E.R. was scheduled to receive, was sufficient to provide a FAPE. We will discuss these points in turn. 1. An IEP must consist of a detailed written statement arrived at by a multi-disciplinary team specifying the Thus, contrary to Parentsâ suggestions, Cenname did not refuse to meet or indicate that a meeting was unnecessary. She expressed a clear willingness to meet, and simply told Parents that E.R. should be given some time to get her bearings. Parents never responded to this note and never met with Cenname to discuss E.R.âs academic struggles. Therefore, as the District Court found, non-testimonial evidence in the record demonstrates that Cennameâs response to Parentsâ request for a meeting was entirely reasonable, and that it in no way resulted in the denial of a FAPE. See D.S., 602 F.3d at 564. 25 services, including specially designed instruction, that the child will receive. Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1988). Parents contend that they are entitled to compensatory education because the IEP developed by Ridley failed to set forth in sufficient detail the specially designed instruction that would be provided to E.R. Parents acknowledge that subsequent NOREPs issued by Ridley included the required specially designed instruction, but they nevertheless argue that the IDEA requires that such information be included in the body of the initial IEP. 8 Parentsâ argument presents a challenge to Ridleyâs compliance with the IDEAâs procedural requirements. Although we have held that â[t]he content of an IEP . . . does not implicate the IDEAâs procedural requirements for content is concerned with the IEPâs substance,â D.S., 602 F.3d at 565, Parentsâ argument here does not relate to the substance of the IEP. Rather, Parentsâ argument is essentially that Ridley violated the IDEA by including a description of specially designed instruction in the wrong document. We have made clear that although it is important that a school district comply with the IDEAâs procedural requirements, compliance is not a goal in itself; rather, compliance with such procedural requirements is important because of the ârequirementsâ impact on studentsâ and parentsâ substantive rights.â Id. 8 Although the District Court did not address this issue, Parents raised it in their brief before the District Court, and thus preserved it for review. See Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2009). 26 Accordingly, â[a] procedural violation is actionable under the IDEA only if it results in a loss of educational opportunity for the student, seriously deprives parents of their participation rights, or causes a deprivation of educational benefits.â Id. (citing Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007)) (second citation omitted). Here, to the extent that the absence of specially designed instruction in the IEP constituted a procedural violation, it did not affect the substantive rights of E.R. or Parents, and thus does not entitle Parents to an award of compensatory education. See id. Although Parents correctly note that the initial IEP did not specify all of the special education services that E.R. would receive, subsequent NOREPs contained that information. A NOREP issued on May 9, 2008, provided that the educational placement recommended for E.R. was â[r]esource room learning support for math and reading in which a direct reading program will be done as well as a direct phonemic based program to address [E.R.âs] needs in decoding vocabulary, fluency and comprehension skills.â The May NOREP further stated that E.R. would receive âat least 60 minutes per day instruction for reading and at least 60 minutes per day math at Grace Park Elementary School until June 2008.â The NOREP indicated that an IEP Team meeting would be convened in June to review E.R.âs progress and discuss the implementation of Project Read for the 2008-2009 school year. Parents signed and approved the May NOREP. On June 9, 2008, Ridley issued a second NOREP, which explained that Ridley would provide training to its staff on Project Read during the summer and the program would be 27 up and running before the end of September 2008. Until Project Read could be implemented, Ridley would continue to use the other resource room reading programs. The June NOREP was never signed by Parents due to their objection to Project Read. Because detailed specially designed instruction was set forth in the NOREPs, it is properly considered part of E.R.âs overall educational plan. Ridleyâs admitted âmistakeâ in failing to include such information in the IEP itself did not deny E.R. any educational opportunity, nor did it deprive her of any educational benefits. See D.S., 602 F.3d at 565. Moreover, Parents were intimately involved in the process of crafting E.R.âs IEP and do not contend that they were unaware of the services E.R. was scheduled to receive. Thus, they were not denied their participation rights. See id. Accordingly, any deficiency in Ridleyâs compliance with the procedural requirements of the IDEA is not a basis for granting relief to Parents. Whether the specially designed instruction set forth in the IEP and the NOREPs was adequate to provide a FAPE is a separate question, which we will address next. 2. Parentsâ next argument presents an issue of first impression in this circuit. The Hearing Officer found that E.R.âs IEP was inadequate, both for the end of the 2007-2008 school year (first grade), and all of the 2008-2009 school year (second grade) primarily because it âfail[ed] to provide a scientifically research-based, peer reviewed reading program, which [E.R.] needed in order to make meaningful progress.â 28 The Hearing Officer stated that although Project Read, the reading program chosen for E.R., âwas designed to be research based,â there were âflaws in the research supporting it.â These statements were made in conclusory fashion, without elaboration, in a footnote of the Hearing Officerâs 20page opinion. They were not well-explained or wellsupported. The District Court reversed the Hearing Officerâs decision that the IEP was inappropriate, reasoning that the lack of a peer-reviewed instructional program was not automatically fatal to an IEP, and even if it was, Project Read was research-based and peer-reviewed. On appeal, we need not decide whether the lack of a peer-reviewed reading program alone may result in the denial of a FAPE because we agree with the District Court that Project Read was based on peer-reviewed research. We will, however, consider Parentsâ contentions that Ridley denied E.R. a FAPE because the available research regarding Project Read was flawed and did not adequately demonstrate that Project Read would be effective for a student with E.R.âs learning disabilities. As we explain below, Parentsâ arguments are unavailing; the peerreviewed specially designed reading instruction in E.R.âs IEP was âreasonably calculated to enable [her] to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of [her] intellectual potential.â Chambers, 587 F.3d at 182 (citation omitted). Ridley was not required to choose the reading program based on the optimal level of peer-reviewed research, or to implement the specific program requested by Parents. We begin our analysis by reviewing the statutory provision at issue. In 2004, Congress added the following 29 provision to the IDEA: â[t]he term âindividualized education programâ or âIEPâ means a written statement for each child with a disability . . . that includes . . . a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child.â 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (emphasis added). This provision was incorporated into the revised IDEA regulations in 2006, which state that an IEP âmust include . . . [a] statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child.â 34 C.F.R. Â§ 300.320(a)(4). Congress amended the IDEA in 1997 and 2004, in part, to respond to concerns that the statute âha[d] been impeded by low expectations, and an insufficient focus on applying replicable research on proven methods of teaching and learning for children with disabilities.â 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1400(c)(4). The IDEAâs statement of congressional findings explains that â[a]lmost 30 years of research and experience has demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective byâ training teachers on âthe use of scientifically based instructional practices, to the maximum extent possible,â and providing incentives for âscientifically based early reading programs.â Id. Â§ 1400(c)(5)(E) and (F). Unfortunately, neither the text of the IDEA nor the IDEA regulations provide much guidance as to the effect of Â§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV)âs peer-reviewed research provision in this case. Therefore, we will look to other instructive regulatory materials. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 30 (1997) (explaining that when interpreting a statute and its implementing regulations, we may look to the agencyâs interpretation of its own regulations); United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that we must defer not only to interpretations supported by notice-and-comment rulemaking, but also âinformal interpretationsâ); Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3d Cir. 1999) (â[I]f an agency has been granted administrative authority by Congress for a statute, its interpretationâdespite arising in an informal contextâwill be given deference as long as it is consistent with other agency pronouncements and furthers the purposes of the Act.â). In conjunction with its promulgation of the 2006 IDEA regulations, the U.S. Department of Education (âDOEâ) issued an Analysis of Comments and Changes to the 2006 IDEA Regulations (âAnalysis of IDEA Regulationsâ), 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540 (2006). In response to a comment requesting âclear guidance on the responsibilities of States, school districts, and school personnel to provide special education and related services . . . that are based on peerreviewed research,â the DOE stated that âStates, school districts, and school personnel must . . . select and use methods that research has shown to be effective, to the extent that methods based on peer-reviewed research are available.â 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,665. The agency made clear, however, that a studentâs IEP team retains flexibility in devising an appropriate program. The Analysis of IDEA Regulations explained that the changes implemented by the 2004 IDEA amendments and the 2006 updated regulations 31 âdo not mean that the service with the greatest body of research is the service necessarily required for a child to receive FAPE. Likewise, there is nothing in the Act to suggest that the failure of a public agency to provide services based on peer-reviewed research would automatically result in a denial of FAPE. The final decision about the special education and related services . . . that are to be provided to a child must be made by the childâs IEP Team based on the childâs individual needs.â Id. In response to a comment requesting that the DOE require programs provided to a disabled child to be researchbased with demonstrated effectiveness in addressing the particular needs of a child, the Analysis of IDEA Regulations stated, â[w]hile the Act clearly places an emphasis on practices that are based on scientific research, there is nothing in the Act that requires all programs provided to children with disabilities to be research-based with demonstrated effectiveness in addressing the particular needs of a child where not practicable.â Id. The DOE declined to adopt the recommended change because âultimately, it is the childâs IEP Team that determines the special education and related services that are needed by the child in order for the child to receive FAPE.â Id. The DOE also rejected as âoverly burdensomeâ a requirement that all IEP team meetings include a focused discussion of research-based methods and a proposed regulation that would force schools to provide 32 written notice when an IEP team does not provide documentation of research-based methods. Id. 9 We can discern two key principles from these administrative materials and our prior decisions interpreting the IDEA. First, although schools should strive to base a studentâs specially designed instruction on peer-reviewed research to the maximum extent possible, the studentâs IEP team retains flexibility to devise an appropriate program, in light of the available research. See D.S., 602 F.3d at 557; 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,665. Second, under the IDEA, courts must accord significant deference to the choices made by school officials as to what constitutes an appropriate program for each student. See D.S., 602 F.3d at 556-57; Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 172 F.3d at 247; 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,664-65. With these principles in mind, we will consider the two objections that Parents raise to the portion of E.R.âs IEP that addresses her reading and language disabilities. First, echoing the findings of the Hearing Officer, Parents argue that âthere were flaws in the research [regarding the 9 Commenters also requested a more explicit definition of âpeer-reviewed research.â The DOE stated that ââ[p]eer reviewed researchâ generally refers to research that is reviewed by qualified and independent reviewers to ensure that the quality of the information meets the standards of the field before the research is published.â 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,664 (2006). However, the agency made clear that there was no single definition of âpeer-reviewed researchâ and it declined to include a specific definition for purposes of the IDEA. Id. 33 effectiveness of Project Read] which made it impossible to attribute the reading growth the students experienced [in the studies] to Project Read alone.â Second, they contend that none of the studies regarding Project Read demonstrated that the program was effective for students with E.R.âs specific disabilities. Both arguments miss the mark. Given that the IDEA does not require an IEP to provide the âoptimal level of services,â D.S., 602 F.3d at 557 (citations omitted), we likewise hold that the IDEA does not require a school district to choose the program supported by the optimal level of peerreviewed research. Rather, the peer-reviewed specially designed instruction in an IEP must be âreasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the studentâs intellectual potential.â Chambers, 587 F.3d at 182 (citation omitted). According to a 2007 review of Project Read published by the Florida Center for Reading Research (âFCRRâ): âProject Read is a comprehensive language arts program designed to provide explicit instruction in a structured reading curriculum. The goal of the program is to help all students become thoughtful, purposeful, and independent readers. Project Read Curriculum may be implemented in the regular classroom, special education classes, and Title I classes. It may also be used as an intervention reading program for first through sixth graders or with adolescents and adults who struggle with reading or language learning. Whole or small group instruction is delivered by a classroom 34 teacher, a special education teacher, or a reading teacher. Lessons are intended to occur daily within an extended block of time devoted to reading instruction. Emphasis is placed on systematic, direct instruction of concepts and skills supported and enhanced by a teaching approach that includes visual, kinesthetic, auditory and tactile strategies (VAKT), and the use of body language.â After discussing several studies on the effectiveness of Project Read, and citing relevant articles, at least one of which was published in a peer-reviewed journal, the FCRR review concluded that the research â[was] promising and the instructional strategies of Project Read [we]re aligned with current research. Future studies with sound experimental designs including control groups and random assignment may contribute more definitive information about the efficacy of Project Read.â The FCRR review then listed numerous strengths of the Project Read program, and found no weaknesses in Project Readâs curriculum. We understand Parentsâ concern that the available studies did not test Project Readâs effectiveness for students with E.R.âs unique combination of disabilities. However, the research discussed in the FCRR review involved children of E.R.âs age who struggled with reading, and indicated that Project Read was helpful in improving the reading skills of such students. Additionally, Hodges, Grace Parkâs resource room teacher, and Woods, Ridleyâs director of special education, both of whom have expertise in the field of special education, testified that Project Read was an appropriate 35 reading program for E.R. 10 Woods explained that, âProject Read is a multi-sensory program that is based on Orton Gillinghamâs principles that support learning disabled students. The research from Florida was very promising in terms of these students doing quite well.â Woods further testified that â[t]he program . . . had a lot of components that learning disabled students learn by [including] what we called VAKT program, visual, auditory, kinesthetic, and touch. And most learning disabled students do very well when you bring all of the senses into the learning process.â Hodges also testified that Project Read was a research-based program and similar to other reading programs, such as The Wilson Reading System. Parents argue that, in contrast to Project Read, the program they requested, The Wilson Reading System, has been shown to be effective for teaching students with learning disabilities similar to those of E.R. However, Ridley did not have to choose the specific program requested by Parents. See D.S., 602 F.3d at 557. Nor did it have to choose the program supported by the optimal level of peer-reviewed research. See id.; 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,665 (explaining that a school does not have to choose the program supported by the âgreatest body of researchâ). âThe IDEA accords educators discretion to select from various methods for meeting the individualized needs of a student, provided those practices are reasonably calculated to provide h[er] with educational benefit.â R.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., 631 F.3d 1117, 10 The Hearing Officer did not discuss the assessments of Project Read provided by Hodges and Woods. 36 1122 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 (explaining that school districts have â[t]he primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the childâs needsâ). In selecting special education programs, a school district must be able to take into account not only the needs of the disabled student, but also the financial and administrative resources that different programs will require, and the needs of the schoolâs other non-disabled students. See J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that, in the context of the Rehabilitation Act, courts must be aware of the âneed to strike a balanceâ between the rights of the disabled student and fiscal and administrative concerns); 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,665 (rejecting a proposed requirement on an IEP team as âoverly burdensomeâ). We will not set forth any bright-line rule as to what constitutes an adequately peer-reviewed special education program; hearing officers and reviewing courts must continue to assess the appropriateness of an IEP on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the available research. We recognize that there may be cases in which the specially designed instruction proposed by a school district is so at odds with current research that it constitutes a denial of a FAPE. See, e.g., Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. D.L., No. 0700278, 51 IDELR 15 (LRP) (S.D. Iowa Aug. 7, 2008) (explaining that a student was denied a FAPE, in part, because the school district frequently employed strategies which contradicted the relevant research and were even inconsistent with the schoolâs own assessment of the 37 appropriate program for the student). 11 Additionally, if it is practicable for a school district to implement a program based upon peer-reviewed research, and the school fails to do so, that will weigh heavily against a finding that the school provided a FAPE. However, that is not the case here. Ridley relied on available peer-reviewed research in crafting the IEP for E.R., and proposed a program with specially designed instruction that was âreasonably calculatedâ to enable her to achieve meaningful educational benefits in light of her intellectual potential and individual abilities. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. Thus, we conclude that the District Court 11 The IDEAâs peer-reviewed research requirement is not set forth in isolation; it is part of a broader section discussing the content of the IEP, which requires âa statement of the special education and related services . . . that will be provided for the childâ to meet certain specified objectives, namely âto advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals[,]â âto be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum . . . and to participate in extracurricular and other nonacademic activities[,]â and âto be educated and participate with other children with disabilities and nondisabled children inâ educational activities. 20 U.S.C. Â§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). 38 properly reversed the Hearing Officerâs finding that the IEP was inadequate to provide a FAPE. 12 12 The Hearing Officer also awarded Parents compensatory education for the end of the 2007-2008 school year, despite the fact that Project Read was not yet implemented, and Ridley was continuing to use its existing âresource roomâ reading program. The Hearing Officer did not explain this conclusion, and based on the record, we cannot agree. Pursuant to E.R.âs IEP and the May NOREP, both of which Parents agreed to, for the last eighteen days of first grade, E.R. received one hour of reading instruction in the resource room. The resource room reading curriculum consisted of Reading Naturally, Reading Workshop, Writing Workshop, and Patricia Cunninghamâs Systematic Phonics. Hodges testified that although the same programs were used for all students in the resource room, she tailored the programs to each studentâs individual needs. Moreover, E.R.âs evaluations all indicated that she would benefit from multi-sensory learning, and Hodges explained that all activities done in the resource room were multi-sensory. She also explained that âall of the research points to a balanced literacy program which is hammering away at phonemic awareness, phonics, comprehension, fluency, and vocabulary. And with the repertoire that we were using throughout the week, I think we hit all those schools.â We can find no evidence in the record that rebuts this testimony. In light of the fact that