National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald, No. 13-4161 (2d Cir. 2015)
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Amtrak appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing its federal Supremacy Clause claims filed against the Commissioner, claiming that the Supremacy Clause deprived the NYSDOT of authority to condemn Amtrak's property by eminent domain. The district court held that Amtrak's claims were barred under the Eleventh Amendment and, in the alternative, the claims were time-barred. The court concluded that, because one of the parcels of land is not subject to sovereign immunity, the statute of limitations issue must be resolved. Amtrak argued that it suffered two separate injuries: first, when it learned that NYSDOT planned to take its land, and second, when the Commissioner actually executed the takings. Under the circumstances of this case, the court concluded that Amtrak brought its federal claims more than six years afters its claims accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court based on its alternative conclusion that the claims were time-barred.
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13-4161-cv National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. McDonald 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2014 4 (Argued: August 27, 2014 Decided: February 24, 2015) 5 Docket No. 13-4161-cv 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, 8 Plaintiff-Appellant, 9 v. 10 11 12 13 JOAN MCDONALD, COMMISSIONER, THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 15 Before: Defendant-Appellee. WINTER, RAGGI, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges. 16 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 17 for the Southern District of New York (Colleen McMahon, Judge), 18 denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground 19 that New York’s taking of appellant’s land by eminent domain was 20 barred by federal law and granting appellee’s motion for summary 21 judgment on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity and statute of 22 limitations. 23 24 25 We affirm on statute-of-limitations grounds. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN (Christopher E. Kulawik, on the brief), Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 New York, NY, for PlaintiffAppellant. CECELIA C. CHANG, Special Counsel (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Andrew W. Amend & Mark H. Shawhan, Assistant Solicitors General, of counsel), on the brief for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, for Defendant-Appellee. WINTER, Circuit Judge: The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) 16 appeals from Judge McMahon’s grant of summary judgment dismissing 17 its federal Supremacy Clause claims brought against Joan 18 McDonald, Commissioner of the New York State Department of 19 Transportation (the “Commissioner”). 20 that, in light of federal statutes that organize and regulate 21 Amtrak, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 22 deprived the New York State Department of Transportation 23 (“NYSDOT”) of authority to condemn Amtrak’s property by eminent 24 domain. 25 years after its claims accrued, the action was time-barred. 26 therefore affirm. 27 Amtrak’s complaint claimed Because Amtrak brought its federal claims more than six We BACKGROUND 28 The relevant facts are undisputed. 29 Amtrak is a private corporation created by the Rail 30 Passenger Service Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 24101 et seq., to 31 operate intercity commuter rail service throughout the United 2 1 States. 2 of its objectives, Amtrak owns and uses real property, much of 3 which was conveyed to it pursuant to the Regional Rail 4 Reorganization Act of 1973. 5 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 24101(a); 24301(a)(2). In furtherance See 45 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. The NYSDOT is currently engaged in a project called the 6 Bronx River Greenway, involving joint federal and state efforts 7 to convert a 23-mile-long stretch of land along both sides of the 8 Bronx River into urban parkland. 9 adjoins Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor rail lines. Part of the planned Greenway In the course of 10 carrying out the project, NYSDOT determined that it needed to 11 build on several parcels of land owned by Amtrak. 12 Commissioner sought to acquire the land by eminent domain under 13 the authority given her by the New York State Highway Law, N.Y. 14 High. Law §§ 22, 30 (McKinney 2004), and the Eminent Domain 15 Procedure Law (“EDPL”), N.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. Law § 101 et seq. 16 (McKinney 2004). 17 The Before resorting to eminent domain, NYSDOT contacted Amtrak 18 and attempted to negotiate the purchase of the land and easements 19 it needed. 20 communicated for several years about the Greenway project’s need 21 for the land in question. 22 Although Amtrak was willing to sell the land to New York, it 23 demanded indemnification from all potential environmental cleanup 24 liability and the right to pre-approve NYSDOT’s entering and As a result, beginning in 2001, NYSDOT and Amtrak However, a stalemate resulted. 3 1 working on the land. 2 concessions. 3 NYSDOT did not make the desired In April 2005, NYSDOT began proceedings under the EDPL to 4 condemn the properties. 5 NYSDOT published notices of a public hearing. 6 Amtrak officials that the hearing would occur on May 19, 2005. 7 On May 11, 2005, Roger Weld, a NYSDOT employee, called and 8 emailed a regional Amtrak official, Earl Watson, and notified him 9 of the hearing. In accordance with EDPL §§ 202-203, It also notified Watson, in turn, forwarded the NYSDOT email to 10 the Amtrak personnel with authority to act in eminent domain 11 cases, namely the Project Director of Real Estate Development -- 12 Sheila Sopper -- and the legal department. 13 EDPL-mandated notice was sent to an erroneous address for Amtrak, 14 not at the statutory address where Amtrak is to receive service 15 of process. 16 202-03. 17 However, NYSDOT’s See 49 U.S.C. § 24301(b); N.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. Law §§ On May 19, 2005, NYSDOT held the public hearing as 18 scheduled. 19 submit written comments. 20 NYSDOT published the determinations and findings necessary for 21 condemnation of the land. 22 Amtrak could have challenged the condemnation under the EDPL’s 23 judicial review provision, see id. § 207, but did not. 24 conceded at oral argument, it could also have brought the present No one from Amtrak attended, and Amtrak did not Subsequently, on August 17, 2005, See N.Y. Em. Dom. Proc. Law § 204. 4 As it 1 action. 2 the Greenway project with NYSDOT. 3 Instead, from 2005 through 2008, it continued to discuss Meanwhile, in 2007 and 2008, NYSDOT sent Amtrak notice that 4 it planned to condemn six parcels and made an offer of 5 compensation. 6 notices of appropriation and maps with the county clerk. 7 those documents were filed, title to the land vested in New York 8 state. 9 on August 13, 2009, Sopper sent NYSDOT “agreement of sale” On February 19, 2008, the Commissioner filed Id. § 204; see id. § 402(A)(3). When A year and a half later, 10 documents that proposed to sell the land and easements for the 11 same price as the compensation proffered by NYSDOT but also 12 provided for Amtrak’s pre-approval of construction and for 13 indemnification for environmental liability. 14 NYSDOT responded that it had already acquired title to the 15 parcels by eminent domain. 16 April 9, 2012, Amtrak brought the present action claiming that 17 the takings were invalid under the Supremacy Clause as expressly 18 or impliedly preempted by federal law. 19 On August 28, 2009, Nearly two and a half years later, on Joint App. at 8-22.1 The district court held that Amtrak’s Supremacy Clause 20 claims against the Commissioner were barred under the Eleventh 21 Amendment. 22 2d 215, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald, 978 F. Supp. Alternatively, it held them time- 1 Condemnation proceedings for one parcel are not yet completed, but the district court’s dismissal on time-bar grounds applies to that parcel as well. 5 1 barred, because Amtrak brought suit over six years after it knew 2 or should have known that it had a claim. 3 affirm on statute-of-limitations grounds. 4 5 Id. at 242 & n.1. We DISCUSSION We review de novo whether the Commissioner was entitled to 6 summary judgment. 7 137 (2d Cir. 2003). 8 there are no issues of material fact and the movant is entitled 9 to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, Summary judgment is appropriate only where 10 with support in the record. 11 Id. We may affirm on any ground F.3d 635, 640 (2d Cir. 2012). 12 McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 As noted, the district court proffered alternative 13 rationales for dismissing Amtrak’s claims: 14 under the Eleventh Amendment and the time-bar of the relevant 15 statute of limitations. 16 at 235, 242 & n.1. 17 sovereign immunity Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 978 F. Supp. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state in federal 18 court unless that state has consented to the litigation. 19 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276-77 (1986); Pennhurst State 20 Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). 21 exists for suits against state officers alleging a violation of 22 federal law and seeking injunctive relief that is prospective in 23 nature. 24 accord Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. See An exception See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-77 (1974); 6 1 Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011). 2 Amendment immunity, we would lack jurisdiction. 3 New York, 251 F.3d 84, 100 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Woods v. 4 Rondout Valley Central Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 238 5 (2d Cir. 2006). 6 first. 7 If appellee is entitled to Eleventh See McGinty v. Ordinarily, therefore, we would reach this issue However, Eleventh Amendment immunity “is a privilege which 8 may be waived.” 9 273, 284 (1906); see Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 10 (1947); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). 11 have discretion to dispose of a case on a non-merits issue before 12 considering a jurisdictional question. 13 Also, we Because one of the parcels is not subject to sovereign 14 immunity, see Note 1, supra, the statute of limitations issue has 15 to be resolved. 16 Clause preemption claim as to the seventh parcel, see note 1, 17 supra, was time-barred under New York’s six-year catch-all 18 limitations period, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1) (McKinney 2004), and, 19 by footnote, that its claims as to the six parcels already 20 condemned were accordingly barred for the same reason. 21 R.R. Passenger Corp., 978 F. Supp. 2d at 242 & n.1. 22 The district court held that Amtrak’s Supremacy Nat’l At oral argument, recognizing that the limitations issue 23 was dispositive as to all the parcels, the state urged us to 24 exercise our discretion to reach the statute-of-limitations issue 7 1 without deciding whether the suit is barred by sovereign 2 immunity. 3 disposition of the limitations issue, we may treat the state’s 4 suggestion as a waiver of the immunity issue for purposes of this 5 appeal. 6 See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 21:2-7. In view of our The parties disagree as to the relevant statute of 7 limitations. 8 period under EDPL § 207 or, alternatively, the three-year period 9 applicable to Bivens actions. Kronisch v. United States, 150 10 F.3d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 1998). Amtrak argues for a six-year 11 period based on Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 162 F. Supp. 12 2d 107, 137-38 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 306 F.3d 1264 (2d Cir. 13 2002). 14 notice of its claims well before April 9, 2006, the date six 15 years before it filed the present action on April 9, 2012. 16 action is, therefore, barred even if the six-year limitations 17 period applies. 18 The Commissioner urges upon us the 30-day appeal We need not resolve this dispute because Amtrak had The Amtrak argues that various deficiencies in the NYSDOT’s 19 giving of notice of the eminent domain proceedings prevented the 20 limitations period from beginning to run. 21 failed to give Amtrak formal notice strictly according to the 22 procedures of the EDPL and did not serve Amtrak at the address 23 referenced in 49 U.S.C. § 24301(b). 24 formal notice requirements is not necessarily the trigger 8 For example, NYSDOT But full compliance with 1 beginning the relevant limitations period. 2 Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 326 (2d Cir. 2004) 3 (declining to establish “mechanical rule that failure to notify a 4 claimant of her right to bring an action in court automatically 5 tolls the statute of limitations”). 6 accrued -- and the limitations clock started running -- when 7 Amtrak had reason to know of its injury. 8 9 See, e.g., Veltri v. Rather, Amtrak’s claims “Under federal law, a cause of action generally accrues ‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 10 that is the basis of the action.’” 11 Educ., 334 F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Leon v. Murphy, 12 988 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1993)). 13 the precise date on which NYSDOT knew, or had reason to know, 14 because both possible dates are well beyond six years from the 15 date this action was brought. 16 informing Amtrak that NYSDOT would hold a May 2005 public hearing 17 on the subject of condemning Amtrak’s land, Amtrak arguably had 18 reason to know of the alleged Supremacy Clause violation that is 19 the basis of its present claim. 20 title, and Amtrak concedes that it suffered not merely potential, 21 but actual injury once its property became the subject of EDPL 22 proceedings. 23 in August 2005, when NYSDOT announced its findings. 24 v. Village of Port Chester, 173 F. App’x 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2006) M.D. v. Southington Bd. of We do not pause to determine In 2005, when Weld sent the email Eminent domain proceedings cloud At the very latest, Amtrak had notice of this harm 9 See Didden 1 (summary order). 2 six years before it filed its lawsuit. Accordingly, Amtrak had actual notice more than 3 Amtrak argues that it suffered two separate injuries: 4 first when it learned that NYSDOT planned to take its land, and 5 the second in 2008, when the Commissioner actually executed the 6 takings. 7 final act of the intrusion on Amtrak’s alleged Supremacy Clause 8 rights that accrued in 2005 at the outset of the condemnation 9 proceedings. the However, the completion of the takings was merely the See City of Plattsburgh v. Weed, 945 N.Y.S. 2d 812, 10 813 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012) (exercise of eminent domain is a 11 single “two-step process under the EDPL”). 12 sense to begin a limitations period -– or restart it –- when 13 title to the real estate actually vests in the state, an act that 14 occurs only after notice to interested parties and the requisite 15 findings have been made. 16 leave the validity of a condemnation of its property in doubt for 17 some six years after title has passed. 18 mention the record of Amtrak’s failure to take any of the obvious 19 protective measures, directs otherwise.2 20 therefore, did not reset when NYSDOT took formal title in 2008. It would make no Indeed, Amtrak’s proposed rule would 2 Common sense, not to The limitations period, In that regard, Amtrak advances a post hoc argument to explain and avoid the consequences of its lassitude in the face of events that unambiguously portended condemnation. At oral argument, we were asked not to “impose a practical nightmare on Amtrak by inviting states to come in and do piecemeal takings . . . because it will be too much of a burden for Amtrak to come into court every time someone wants to take [its] property.” See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 18. We know of no record evidence of such a “nightmare” or its purported consequences, and, even if we did, a legislative, rather than judicial remedy, would seem appropriate. 10 1 Similarly, the takings are not an “ongoing violation” of 2 federal law. 3 the right to use the land by virtue of its title. 4 considers an “ongoing violation” -- New York’s entry onto and use 5 of the land -- is not even a violation of the law, because New 6 York has legal title to it. 7 statute of limitations indefinitely for eminent domain challenges 8 by Amtrak. Once title vested in New York, the state acquired 9 10 What Amtrak To hold otherwise would toll the CONCLUSION Amtrak’s injury accrued at the very latest when the state 11 announced its findings. 12 judgment of the district court is, therefore, affirmed. See Didden, 173 F. App’x at 933. 13 11 The
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