United States v. Coppola

10-0065-cr United States v. Coppola UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 2010 (Argued: May 20, 2011 Decided: February 14, 2012) Docket No. 10-0065-cr UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. MICHAEL COPPOLA, Defendant-Appellant. Before: RAGGI, LYNCH, and WALLACE, Circuit Judges.* On appeal from a judgment of conviction for substantive and conspiratorial racketeering entered after trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gleeson, Judge), defendant Michael Coppola challenges (1) the legal validity of the extortion and wire fraud subpredicates comprising Racketeering Act One, particularly after Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010); (2) the sufficiency of * Judge J. Clifford Wallace of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. the evidence to prove any of the Racketeering Act One subpredicates; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the pattern element of racketeering; (4) various evidentiary rulings; (5) the jury charge; and (6) the reasonableness of his sixteen-year prison sentence. AFFIRMED. ROBERT A. CULP, Esq., Garrison, New York, for DefendantAppellant. AMY BUSA (Peter A. Norling, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, for Appellee. REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge: Defendant Michael Coppola was found guilty after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (John Gleeson, Judge) of conducting and conspiring to conduct the affairs of the Genovese organized crime family through a pattern of racketeering activity evidenced by the use of extortion and fraud to control the New York�New Jersey waterfront generally and International Longshoreman�s Association (�ILA�) Local 1235 in particular, and by the possession of false identification documents. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d). On this appeal from the December 31, 2009 amended judgment of conviction sentencing him to concurrent terms of sixteen years� 2 incarceration, Coppola challenges (1) the legal validity of the extortion and wire fraud subpredicates charged as Racketeering Act One, particularly after Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010); (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to prove any of these subpredicates; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the pattern element of racketeering; (4) various evidentiary rulings; (5) the jury charge; and (6) the reasonableness of his sentence. For the reasons stated herein, we reject these arguments and affirm the judgment. I. Background A. The Crimes of Conviction Coppola was convicted on a two-count superseding indictment charging him with substantive and conspiratorial racketeering in connection with his activities over three decades as an associate, soldier, and ultimately captain of the Genovese organized crime family, one of the five arms of La Cosa Nostra in the New York metropolitan area.1 The pattern of racketeering through which Coppola was alleged to have conducted and participated in the affairs of the Genovese family was charged in three predicate acts. Racketeering Act One alleged conspiracy to extort, extortion, and wire fraud in connection with the Genovese family�s control of ILA Local 1235. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 1951(a), (b)(2). As to the extortion subpredicates, the indictment charged 1 In New York, La Cosa Nostra has traditionally operated through five organized crime families: Bonanno, Colombo, Gambino, Genovese, and Lucchese. See United States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2008); accord United States v. Basciano, 599 F.3d 184, 188 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010). 3 that between January 1974 and March 2007, Coppola and others obtained or conspired to obtain the property of Local 1235 members both in the tangible form of �Local 1235 labor union positions, money paid as wages and employee benefits and other economic benefits that such Local 1235 union members would have obtained but for the defendant and his co-conspirators� corrupt influence over such union,� and in the intangible form of �the right of Local 1235 members to have the officers, agents, delegates, employees and other representatives of their labor organization manage the money, property and financial affairs of the organization in accordance with Title 29, United States Code, Section 501(a).� Indictment ¶¶ 16, 19.2 The property was allegedly obtained with the consent of union officials �induced by wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence or fear.� Id. As to the wire fraud subpredicate of Racketeering Act One, the indictment charged that between January 1974 and March 2007, Coppola and others devised a scheme to defraud Local 1235 union members of (1) the same tangible property charged in the extortion subpredicates, and (2) intangible property in the form of �the right of the honest services of the Local 1235 Presidents.� Id. ¶ 20. The particular use of wires charged to execute the scheme was an interstate telephone conversation between Coppola and an unindicted confederate, Edward Aulisi, on March 6, 2007. 2 Although the indictment also charged extortion of �the right of Local 1235 union members to free speech and democratic participation in the affairs of their labor organization,� Indictment ¶¶ 16, 19, that theory was not submitted to the jury, and we discuss it no further. 4 Racketeering Act Two charged Coppola with the April 10, 1977 attempted and actual murder of Giovanni Larducci, also known as �John Lardiere� and referred to as such in the record. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:113-1, 2A:113-2 (1977). Racketeering Act Three alleged that between August 1996 and March 2007, Coppola conspired to possess with intent to use various false identification documents. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(3), (f). Because the jury found only the first and third predicates proved, our factual discussion focuses on these matters, with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2009). B. Trial Evidence The government adduced extensive evidence of the Genovese family�s criminal control over the Manhattan and New Jersey waterfronts generally and over Local 1235 in particular. Genovese family member George Barone, Genovese associate Michael D�Urso, Gambino family member Primo Cassarino, and Lucchese family member Thomas Ricciardi testified that mob control over the metropolitan area waterfront dated from the 1950s, with an understanding between the Genovese and Gambino families that the former enterprise would dominate unions and businesses operating on the Manhattan and New Jersey docks, while the latter enterprise dominated unions and businesses operating in Brooklyn and Staten Island. Asked how such control was exercised, Barone replied, �intimidation, fear, whatever.� Trial Tr. at 1114. While much of Barone�s 5 testimony focused on mob dominance of Manhattan-based ILA Local 1804-1, which was eventually exercised by Coppola and his one-time Genovese captain, Tino Fiumara, the totality of the evidence demonstrated that intimidation and fear was the common scheme or plan used by the Genovese family to secure and maintain waterfront control. In a recorded conversation, Local 1804-1 vice-president Thomas Buzzanca stated that �everybody fears and respects [Fiumara],� and �we all live under[] fear.� Gov�t Ex. TRCD-5b at 1�2, 5 (emphasis added). Evidence showed that the Genovese family used its control of unions to dictate what businesses worked on the waterfront. D�Urso explained that if an �ordinary guy wanted to go into the trucking business on the docks, or wanted to open up something on the docks� the Genovese family would �sic the union on the them.� Trial Tr. at 877. In short, because the Genovese family �ran the union[s],� it �could bring [a legitimate] business to a screeching halt.� Id.; see also Gov�t Ex. TR-CD-3 (T1). Robert Delaney, a New Jersey State police officer who had participated in an undercover investigation of organized crime on the New Jersey waterfront in the 1970s, corroborated this account with particular reference to Coppola. Delaney testified that while he was posing as the owner of a trucking company, Coppola had represented that he and Fiumara, through �contacts,� could provide �labor peace on the waterfront where [Delaney�s] trucks were picking up containers.� Trial Tr. at 148. Such peace, however, came at a price in the form of �tribute� payments that the Genovese family demanded 6 from both waterfront businesses and unions, payments that Barone testified generated �millions� of dollars in income for the enterprise. Id. at 1103. Officer Delaney testified that Coppola and Fiumara had required him to pay a percentage of his trucking profits to them in return for getting business on the waterfront and operating without labor disturbances: �We made percentage and cut payments based on the earnings that the company made . . . . to Mr. Fiumara�s group.� Id. at 143. D�Urso, who acknowledged collecting tribute payments for the Genovese family, explained that monies extorted from businesses were sometimes channeled to the enterprise through the unions: �[V]endors who have businesses on the docks� would pay �handouts[,] . . . contributions, shakedowns, whatever. . . . They want to get something done they pay off maybe one of the [union] presidents or somebody close to him, find a way to get this stuff down and expedite it quickly.� Id. at 884. Barone confirmed the practice, testifying that Burt Guido, whose business operated on the waterfront, made regular tribute payments to Local 1804-1 officials, who would pass the payments on to Barone. In addition to monthly tribute payments, the Genovese family demanded �Christmases,� special year-end payments from waterfront businesses and unions. D�Urso stated, �during Christmas, people show their appreciation . . . . [L]egitimate businesses that you help, they usually put together a Christmas package for you . . . . It�s a tribute payment.� Id. at 882. The practice was evidenced, inter alia, by a December 12, 1978 recorded conversation between Local 1804-1 vice president Buzzanca and William 7 Montella, the owner of a waterfront business called Quinn Marine, in which Montella told Buzzanca that he had a $2,000 tribute payment and a $5,000 �Christmas� payment for Fiumara. Also, a March 14, 2001 videotape of a meeting between Genovese confederates D�Urso and Cafaro shows the two men discussing Barone�s demand for a $90,000�$100,000 �Christmas� payment from Andrew Gigante, another waterfront business owner. With respect to the Genovese family�s extortion of labor unions under their control, a recorded September 14, 1998 conversation shows enterprise confederate Stephen DePiro telling Fiumara, �Christmas time I want double. . . . I don�t want [union official] Brief saying, like no 2%, this, this is the way it�s going to be. . . . [H]e�s got all his guys that he works there. Bring us double and that�s that.� Gov�t Ex. TR-CD-6b at 17.3 Further, Officer Delaney testified that Genovese family member Larry Ricci told him that he collected regular $15 payments from waterfront union members for the enterprise under the guise of a dental plan. When one union member indicated an expectation that his dental bills would therefore be covered, Ricci employed classic extortion techniques to set the member straight: he �hit the guy in the chest� and told him �the dental plan is there to keep your own f---ing teeth.� Id. at 152. Lucchese member 3 Based on other recorded conversations in which Fiumara stated that he wanted �Brief� to obtain a �C-card� for someone�a type of seniority card held by ILA union members�the jury reasonably could have concluded that Brief was a union official and that DePiro�s demand for a larger �Christmas� from Brief and �all his guys that he works there,� referred to a demand for tribute money from union members. 8 Ricciardi testified that his brother-in-law, William Bell, a New Jersey longshoreman, was required to pay $500 to the Genovese family in order to be called for work on the docks. With particular reference to Local 1235, the evidence showed Genovese family control of that union for more than thirty years through three successive local presidents: Vincent Colucci, also known as �Cong� (1975�80); Albert Cernadas, also known as �Bull� (1981�2006); and Vincent Aulisi, also known as �Vet� or �Pop� (2006�09). Barone testified that Colucci was the first to �gang[] up his association with us, the Mafia.� Trial Tr. at 1144. Thereafter, Barone himself put Cernadas ��on record� with the Genovese family,� id. at 1145, whereupon Cernadas �[a]lways, always� went along with Genovese demands, id. at 1270. Barone stated that he advised Cernadas �to be associated with Tino [Fiumara] and Michael [Coppola]� because �there was the power in that area of the Mafia.� Id. at 1145. That Cernadas paid tribute over the years to these members of the Genovese family is evidenced by a recorded March 6, 2007 conversation between Coppola and Edward Aulisi, whose father Vincent Aulisi had succeeded Cernadas as Local 1235 president the previous year. At the time of this conversation, Coppola was subject to a 1991 court order prohibiting him from having any dealings �whatsoever� with any officer, member, or employee of the ILA or a related labor organization such as Local 1235. See Default Judgment, United States v. Local 1804-1, Int�l Longshoremen�s Ass�n, AFL-CIO, 90-cv-963 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1991). Nevertheless, Coppola received the younger Aulisi�s assurances, on behalf of his father, that Local 1235 would continue 9 to pay monthly tribute and �Christmases� to the Genovese family despite seemingly contrary statements by Cernadas as he was leaving office: Aulisi: Ohh, and the Vet [i.e., Vincent Aulisi] told me to pass it on. Umm. What the hell did he say to me? Ohh, that, ah, he was glad that, ah, the other, the Cuban, that Ricky Ricardo, was there when this guy [i.e., Cernadas] made mention hey, once I�m outta, once I�m gone from here, this thing stops. So Mike, [laughs] the Vet said, this thing stops? The beat goes on, whether you�re here or not. But, Ricky Ricardo was there when he said, he said it. Coppola: Who, who? Aulisi: He said I, want you to relay that. Coppola: Which guy? Who said that? Aulisi: The Bull [i.e., Cernadas]. You know when this is gone, when I�m gone, he says this thing is gonna end. Meaning, meaning ahh, the month, you know, the the Christmases, and everything else, he [i.e., Vincent Aulisi] says what you talking about? Coppola: Yeah, yeah. Aulisi: This gonna, things gonna go on. Gov�t Ex. TR-CD-7 (T6) at 6. Then, still with reference to tribute payments, the younger Aulisi stated that his father wanted him to tell Coppola that �this thing almost, almost doubled.� Id. Another recorded conversation between Edward Aulisi and Coppola the same day showed Coppola asking about the amounts collected and Aulisi acknowledging Coppola�s 10 control over their disposition. Aulisi reported receiving �another chunk,� and stated that he knew Coppola was �directing that to the other half.� Gov�t Ex. TR-CD-7 (T7) at 1. In response to Coppola�s query as to �how many months� of payment Aulisi had obtained, Aulisi replied �we�re gonna have three.� Id. at 2. He stated that one person had given him �sixty something and then he just gave me . . . twenty-eight hundred,� but �there ain�t gonna be nothing [more] there.� Id. Coppola stated that he was �not worried about that because I told him to take whatever he had to take for the other, ah, for the other situation. So I knew it was gonna be down to nothin�.� Id. at 3. Evidence also showed that the Genovese family exploited its control over waterfront unions to make union employment decisions. Barone testified that the Genovese family �sen[t] word� to ILA president John Bowers to put Harold Daggett into a senior position with the union. Trial Tr. at 1119. The Genovese family then �told [Daggett] what we wanted him to do. . . . If he didn�t do it, we take him out.� Id. at 1117. Barone testified that he personally secured union employment for numerous Genovese associates, including positions at an ILA health care clinic for Coppola�s brother and Cernadas� wife. Officer Delaney testified that Genovese member Ricci told him that he held a union job that paid him �$45,000 a year . . . and all he had to do was put his feet on the desk, the only time he worked [was] if the other guy [i.e., Fiumara] called him for something.� Trial Tr. at 150. 11 In the first of their March 6, 2007 conversations, Coppola and Edward Aulisi discussed past and future placement of friends and family in Local 1235 positions, with Coppola making clear his ability to exercise a final say. Referencing a time when Colucci �wanted to leave his wife� in a union position, Coppola stated, �we were right next to him all the time during this whole thing,� and �[w]e said under no circumstances.� Gov�t Ex. TR-CD-7 (T6) at 7�8. As to another placement of someone�s daughter, Coppola told Aulisi, �I sent . . . word back, under no circumstance.� Id. at 8. And as to a placement then under consideration, Coppola instructed the younger Aulisi to tell his father, �[i]t�s, it�s, not gonna happen to, you relay that to, to, Pop that�s all.� Id. at 9. Moments after concluding this call, Coppola again spoke with Edward Aulisi, reiterating, �you let him be aware of that, that�s not gonna happen.� Gov�t Ex. TR-CR-7 (T7) at 1. Evidence showed that Coppola�s racketeering activities persisted through March 2007, not only despite the 1991 court order, but also despite his status as a fugitive from an August 8, 1996 subpoena ordering him to provide a DNA sample to New Jersey authorities investigating the Lardiere murder. Coppola was able to avoid apprehension and continue overseeing enterprise activities because organized crime confederates provided him with both money and false identification documents. D�Urso testified that while Coppola was �on the lam, on the run,� Trial Tr. at 860, the Genovese family had money delivered to him by Thomas Cafaro and Chuck Tuzzo. Meanwhile, in recorded February 2007 conversations, Coppola�s son-in-law Louis Rizzo reported that he had 12 secured �the BC [i.e., birth certificate] and the SS [i.e., Social Security card]� for Coppola, Gov�t Ex. TR-CD-7 (T1) at 1, as well as a credit card, but needed more time to obtain a fraudulent driver�s license. A month later, at the time of Coppola�s March 9, 2007 arrest, he was in possession of a New York identification card, a Blue Cross insurance card, as well as various credit and debit cards in the name �José Quinones.� Meanwhile, a search of Coppola�s New York apartment yielded credit cards and identification documents bearing the names Michael Rizzoli, Joseph Rizzoli, Joseph Carro, Hector Carro, and Olga Quinones, and thousands of dollars in cash.4 A search of Coppola�s San Francisco apartment yielded bank records in the names Joe Quinones and José Quinones and thousands of dollars in cash. C. Verdict and Sentence In finding Coppola guilty of both racketeering and racketeering conspiracy, the jury indicated with specific reference to Racketeering Act One that it found extortion, extortion conspiracy, and wire fraud proved. The jury further indicated that it found the wire fraud subpredicate proved under both theories charged, i.e., a scheme to defraud Local 1235 members of tangible property and a scheme to defraud Local 1235 members of the honest services of their union�s presidents. The district court rejected pre- and post-verdict challenges to Racketeering Act One, as well as to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the pattern element of racketeering. 4 Because Coppola�s wife joined him after he became a fugitive, she too was in need of fraudulent identification to avoid providing leads to her husband�s whereabouts. 13 In calculating Coppola�s Guidelines range at sentencing, the district court determined that the total offense level for the extortion subpredicates was 29, while the total offense level for the wire fraud subpredicate was 30,5 grouping the offenses to yield a total offense level of 30.6 The district court declined to apply an obstruction of justice enhancement, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, to its calculation of either the extortion or fraud offense levels, invoking United States v. Agudelo, 414 F.3d 345, 350 (2d Cir. 2005) (cautioning against assumption that defendant who submits affidavit to justify suppression hearing is automatically subject to obstruction enhancement if suppression 5 The curious result of fraud having a higher total offense level than extortion arises from the following Guidelines calculation. With respect to the extortion crimes, the Guidelines provided for a base offense level of eighteen, see U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(a); a two-level enhancement for the implied threat of bodily injury, see id. § 2B3.2(b)(1); a six-level enhancement for a total loss of more than $2.5 million, see id. § 2B3.2(b)(2) (crossreferencing § 2B3.1(b)(7)(G)); and a three-level enhancement for role in the offense, see id. § 3B1.1(b). With respect to the fraud crimes, the Guidelines provided for a base offense level of seven, see id. § 2B1.1(a)(1); an eighteen-level enhancement for a total loss of more than $2.5 million, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J); and a three-level enhancement for role in the offense, see id. § 3B1.1(b). What afforded fraud a higher Guidelines range than extortion in this case was a further two-level enhancement for commission of the crime in violation of a court order. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(8)(C) (renumbered in 2011 to § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)). While the record suggests that the district court reasonably thought that this fact should also raise Coppola�s extortion offense level, see Sentencing Tr. at 13, the extortion Guideline contains no parallel provision to § 2B1.1(b)(8)(C), and the total offense level of 29 employed for extortion does not reflect any court-order-violation enhancement. We have no occasion here to discuss whether the factor might support a Guidelines departure or the imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence, as the district court did not so support the challenged sentence. 6 In grouping the offenses pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, the district court persuaded the government to abandon its argument that grouping analysis did not apply to extortion offenses, previewing its intent to impose a non-Guidelines sentence in stating, �[n]othing hinges on this particular ruling.� Sentencing Tr. at 15. 14 motion is denied). It also declined to apply the higher offense level of 43 that would derive from treating the Lardiere murder as relevant conduct, explaining that, while there was probable cause to think Coppola had committed the murder, it did not find the crime proved by a preponderance of the evidence.7 Cf. United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 526 (2d Cir. 2005) (Sotomayor, J.) (recognizing that court may use acquitted conduct to calculate Guidelines range when found by preponderance of evidence). In explaining its application of a loss amount of at least $2.5 million to calculate the extortion and fraud offense levels, the district court specifically declined to aggregate the salaries paid to Local 1235 presidents from 1975 to 2007, as urged by the prosecution and recommended by the Probation Department. See Sentencing Tr. at 7�8 (rejecting salary aggregation as �very clumsy way to estimate loss� in Coppola�s case). Instead, it assessed loss by reference to the revenues realized by the Genovese family as a result of its corrupt control of Local 1235. See id. at 8 (observing that for the 33 years at issue in the case �[t]his union local and the members it was supposed to represent was a cash generating machine for the Genovese family�). Without attempting to calculate these revenues precisely, the district court noted that they allowed the defendant �to maintain an apartment in San Francisco and an apartment in New York�s West Side for the 11 7 The district court stated, �[i]t is hard to fathom why [Coppola] would choose to become a fugitive back in 1996 or so, when he fled, unless he thought the DNA evidence would implicate him [in the Lardiere murder] . . . . It is hard to fathom why he would think his own DNA would implicate him unless he was there, but I don�t think that�s enough to prove the murder by a preponderance of the evidence.� Sentencing Tr. at 5�6. 15 years he was a fugitive.� Id. at 9.8 Further, Coppola �was hardly the only person the evidence showed that benefitted from the cash cow that Local 1235 was to the Genovese family.� Id. Thus, the court concluded that it did not even need to consider Coppola�s involvement in the broader conspiracy, which extorted still other waterfront unions and businesses. �It is sufficient for me to say that even focusing only on Local 1235, the 2.5 million amount is, to put it mildly, an extremely conservative estimate.� Id. Relying on a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of IV, the district court determined that Coppola�s advisory Guidelines range provided for a 135-to168-month term of incarceration. The district court nevertheless invoked its discretion to impose a more severe non-Guidelines sentence, explaining that the racketeering Guidelines failed to �capture the significance of the crime,� particularly Coppola�s racketeering crime, which �was committed by the defendant as a member of the Genovese family, an organized crime family.� Id. at 31�32. The district court specifically faulted the racketeering Guidelines for not doing �anything but funnel[ing]� a sentencing court into the Guidelines applicable to the predicates, which could be committed in �any number of ways, . . . some of which have nothing to do with sustained criminal activity.� Id. at 32. The district court emphasized that Coppola�s racketeering crime spanned �more than 30 years� and that �criminal conduct was Mr. Coppola�s livelihood. It is what he did.� Id. Further, Coppola chose to pursue his �lifetime occupation� of crime �as part of an 8 At the time of his arrest, Coppola and his wife were living in an eleventh floor apartment of a sixteen-story pre-war building located at 74th Street and Amsterdam Avenue. 16 organization that gave him enormous additional power . . . derive[d] from a well grounded fear that if you cross a member of that organization you will be killed.� Id. at 32�33. This was why the Genovese family in general, and �Mr. Fiumara, this defendant, the others associated with him� in particular, �were so successful.� Id. at 33. Finding the Guidelines �woefully insufficient . . . to capture the essence� of the racketeering crimes of conviction, id. at 34, the district court sentenced Coppola to concurrent prison terms of 192 months, i.e., sixteen years, to run consecutive to an undischarged 42-month prison term imposed on a related conspiracy charge of harboring a fugitive (himself), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1071, to which Coppola had earlier pleaded guilty, see Judgment, United States v. Coppola, 07-cr-225 (DLI) (E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2008), ECF No. 77. This timely appeal followed. II. Discussion A. Racketeering Act One Coppola contends that his conviction must be reversed because the alleged subpredicate acts comprising Racketeering Act One (1) fail to state extortion or mail fraud offenses, particularly after Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896; and (2) were not proved by sufficient evidence. We review Coppola�s first challenge de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 320 (2d Cir. 2006). Because the jury returned findings of guilt on each of the 17 identified subpredicate acts, we will uphold the jury�s finding that Racketeering Act One was proved if any one of the identified subpredicate acts�extortion conspiracy, extortion, or wire fraud (whether to obtain tangible property or intangible property in the form of honest services)�states an offense. See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 922�23 (2d Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 61�62 (1997); see also id. at 925�28 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).9 Where, however, the jury returned a general verdict as to any subpredicate act charged under multiple theories, we can uphold the jury�s finding as to that subpredicate act only if every charged theory states an offense, see Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 8�10 (1978); United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 2003), unless the pleading error was harmless, see Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58 (2008); accord Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. at 2934 n.46 (extending Hedgpeth harmlessness principle beyond habeas review). As to Coppola�s sufficiency challenge, we will uphold the jury�s finding as to Racketeering Act One if the evidence was sufficient to prove any one of the subpredicate acts on any legally valid theory charged. See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56�57 (1991); United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d at 624. 9 While we make this In fact, the government does not defend the honest services theory of the wire fraud subpredicate, which was not charged to require proof of the bribe-kickback element identified in Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907. 18 determination de novo, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we will reverse only if we conclude that no reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 105�06 (2d Cir. 2010). Applying these principles to this case, our analysis can begin and end with the extortion subpredicates, which state a viable offense and are supported by sufficient evidence. 1. Validity of Extortion Subpredicates To charge extortion under the Hobbs Act, an indictment must allege that a defendant obtained (or in the case of conspiracy, schemed with others to obtain) property from another with his consent induced by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(2).10 In this case, the indictment charged Coppola with obtaining and conspiring to obtain both intangible and tangible property from Local 1235 union members, with the consent of union officials induced by the wrongful use of threats and fear. a. The Intangible Property Theory The government�s intangible property theory was based on a provision of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (�LMRDA�), Pub. L. No. 86257, 73 Stat. 519, stating that the officials of a labor organization �occupy positions of 10 Because �color of official right� was not at issue in this case, we do not reference that means of extortion further. 19 trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group.� 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). That provision specifies particular duties owed by officials to the union and membership they serve: It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the organization. Id. Explaining this provision to the jury in this case, the district court charged that �union members have a right to the loyal service of union officials; and this right constitutes a form of property.� Trial Tr. at 1816. This instruction conforms to our precedent, which recognizes that the concept of property under the Hobbs Act reaches beyond tangible property to include union members� �LMRDA rights to loyal representation by their officers, agents, and other representatives.� United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d at 325; see also United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075�76 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that �concept of property under the Hobbs Act . . . is not limited to physical or tangible property or things, but includes . . . any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth� (citations omitted)). 20 Coppola does not contend that the district court misconstrued Gotti. Rather, he asserts that we must revisit Gotti�s holding in light of the Supreme Court�s recent decision in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896. Skilling was not a Hobbs Act case. It considered a conviction under the �honest services� provision of the wire fraud statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (defining term ��scheme or artifice to defraud�� to include �scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services�). To avoid �due process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine� in the undefined phrase �right of honest services,� Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. at 2931; see id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), the Supreme Court construed the statutory provision as limited to �fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied by a third party who had not been deceived,� id. at 2928 (identifying bribe and kickback schemes as �core� of honest services fraud recognized by appellate courts before McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)). Coppola argues that there is little difference between the LMRDA rights alleged in this case and the right to honest services at issue in Skilling. He maintains that both are too vague to state a criminal charge consistent with due process. See Appellant Br. at 67 (stating �it makes no sense to posit that the same �honest services� that are too vague to be defrauded nonetheless can be extorted�). We disagree. 21 First, to the extent Coppola asserts that Skilling identifies vagueness concerns with intangible rights generally, he is mistaken. Skilling addressed a particular intangible right�to honest services�identified, but not defined, by § 1346. It did not identify vagueness concerns with all intangible rights. To the contrary, Skilling held that even the intangible right of honest services can constitutionally be the basis of a wire fraud prosecution when that intangible right is deprived through a bribe or kickback. See 130 S. Ct. at 2928. Thus, nothing in Skilling warrants a conclusion that intangible property rights can no longer support a Hobbs Act extortion or extortion conspiracy charge. See United States v. Cain, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 265882, at *5�6 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming conviction for extortion under Hobbs Act of intangible right to solicit business). Second, the vagueness concerns identified in Skilling with respect to the § 1346 right to honest services do not translate to the LMRDA rights derived from § 501(a). A statute is not void for vagueness if it �define[s] the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.� Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); accord Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 224 (2d Cir. 2008). �This test does not demand meticulous specificity in the identification of proscribed conduct. Rather, it requires only that the statutory language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.� United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 139 (2d Cir.) 22 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Sabir v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 833 (2011). Additionally, �[v]agueness challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light of the facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied basis.� Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988); accord Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d at 223. In challenging § 501(a) as vague, Coppola notably avoids discussion of the statutory language, a failure that obscures critical textual distinctions between § 501(a) and § 1346. Whereas § 1346 provides no textual guidance about the duties whose violation will amount to a deprivation of �honest services,� see, e.g., Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discerning no �coherent limiting principle� defining what �honest services� is, �whence it derives, and how it is violated�), § 501(a) specifically enumerates the duties that labor representatives owe to their union and its members: (1) to hold union money and property solely for the benefit of the union and its members; (2) to manage, invest, and expend union money in accordance with the union�s constitution and bylaws and any applicable resolutions; (3) to refrain from dealing with the union as an adverse party or on behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected with the representative�s union duties; (4) to refrain from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of the union; and (5) to account to the union for any profit received by the representative in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf 23 of the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). Thus, in contrast to § 1346, which references, at best, only a general and undefined fiduciary standard, see Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. at 2936 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), § 501(a) avoids unconstitutional ambiguity by detailing the duties owed and the persons from and to whom they are owed, see Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964) (�A simple reading of [§ 501(a)] shows that it applies to fiduciary responsibility with respect to the money and property of the union and that it is not a catch-all provision under which union officials can be sued on any ground of misconduct with which the plaintiffs choose to charge them.�). Third, while § 501(a) creates the intangible right here at issue, it does not define the predicate crime. That task is performed by the Hobbs Act, which identifies a crime only when property�including the intangible rights specified in § 501(a)�is obtained by extortion. The Hobbs Act, unlike § 1346, cannot be construed to proscribe mere selfdealing, that potentially �staggeringly broad swath of behavior,� Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. at 1309 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), that had raised particular vagueness concerns regarding honest services fraud before Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2932�33 & n.44 (noting that if Congress wished to criminalize self-dealing, it would have to speak �more clearly than it has,� and further noting various concerns with limiting standard proposed by government). To eliminate that vagueness concern, Skilling cabined honest services fraud to cases in which the breach of duty was procured by the corrupt 24 participation of a �third party� who paid either �bribes or kickbacks� for the breach. See id. at 2928. By contrast, because the principal in a Hobbs Act violation is not the party committing the fiduciary breach, but the person who procures the breach by statutorily specified wrongful means�extortion�the ambiguity concerns with § 1346 are simply not present in the Hobbs Act. The extortion element of the Hobbs Act serves the same limiting function as the bribe-kickback element of § 1346, serving notice that a crime depends on a third party obtaining property through the wrongful use of threats or fear to achieve the property�s surrender. Indeed, such extortion with respect to § 501(a) rights fits within the core misconduct that is labor racketeering. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 262�63 (1992) (noting Congress passed Hobbs Act to prohibit labor racketeering). In sum, we identify nothing in Skilling that warrants a deviation from our holding in Gotti that intangible property, specifically, the LMRDA rights derived from the enumerated duties in § 501(a), can support a valid Hobbs Act extortion charge. b. The Tangible Property Theories The indictment alleged that Coppola obtained and conspired to obtain tangible property from union members in the form of �labor union positions, money paid as wages and employee benefits and other economic benefits� that the union members would have obtained but for the conspirators� �corrupt influence over [the] union.� Indictment ¶¶ 16, 19. Through trial and on appeal, the government focused on two tangible property 25 theories: (1) �tribute payments� from membership funds, and (2) �the salary and benefits paid to [Local 1235] presidents who were not living up to their obligations to have the membership in their best interest.� Trial Tr. at 1544. Coppola does not�and cannot�contend that the extortion of tribute payments from a union by an organized crime family fails to state a viable Hobbs Act offense. Rather, he challenges the viability of the government�s �salary theory,� i.e., that Coppola obtained tangible property from Local 1235 union members in the form of the salaries they paid to corrupt union presidents. See Trial Tr. at 1644 (government summation: �When the Mob threatens a union leader to get a union leader to do what it wants, the Mob deprives the union membership [of] the benefit of the salary that they paid that official. The Mob deprives the membership of a union leader who will exercise his rights solely in the interest of the membership of the union.�).11 In support, Coppola relies on Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003), which holds that the use of threats or fear to interfere with or disrupt a person�s exercise of property rights is not enough to establish a Hobbs Act violation. A 11 We note that this salary theory is somewhat distinct from the variant upheld by a number of courts in the fraud context, where a defendant fraudulently obtains a position and therefore also receives the salary and benefits that come with that position. See, e.g., United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 280 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47, 60 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.); but see United States v. Ratcliff, 488 F.3d 639, 645 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting that theory in election fraud context); United States v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667, 681 (6th Cir. 2006) (same). We have no occasion to determine whether, as the government urges, this court has implicitly accepted that variant of the �salary theory.� See United States v. Schermerhorn, 906 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1990); Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 1988). 26 defendant must �obtain� the property for himself. Id. at 405. The government has never claimed that the Genovese family obtained the actual dollars that were supposed to be paid as salary to Local 1235 presidents. Rather, it contends that the enterprise received the loyalty of these presidents without having to pay for it because the presidents were compensated by the union membership. This, Coppola submits, at most alleges the procurement of members� intangible right to their presidents� honest services, a claim that cannot be maintained under either the Hobbs Act or § 1346 after Skilling. Cf. United States v. Goodrich, 871 F.2d 1011, 1013�14 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding, in fraud context, that similar theory could be maintained only as fraudulent deprivation of intangible rights, not property). The point merits little discussion because even if we were to agree with Coppola and, further, conclude that Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 312, applied to these circumstances, any error would be harmless. See Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. at 58; accord Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. at 2934 n.46. If the jury found that Coppola conspired to extort the salaries of Local 1235 presidents by corrupting them to act in the interests of the Genovese family rather than their membership, then the jury necessarily would have had to conclude that Coppola conspired to extort the union membership of its intangible LMRDA rights under § 501(a).12 12 For the reasons stated in the preceding The Supreme Court in Skilling did not specify the standard applicable to harmless error review in this context. See United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 481�82 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting uncertainty and determining whether, on review of record, appellate court could determine beyond reasonable doubt that jury would have convicted on valid ground, 27 section, we conclude that the alleged extortion of such LMRDA rights is validly proscribed by the Hobbs Act even after Skilling. Moreover, as discussed below, the government adduced sufficient evidence to support the jury�s finding that Coppola extorted the LMRDA rights of Local 1235 members. We thus reject Coppola�s challenge to the validity of Racketeering Act One. 2. Sufficiency of Evidence To Prove Extortion Subpredicates Coppola challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury�s conclusion that (a) he obtained and conspired to obtain tangible or intangible property from Local 1235 members; (b) with consent; (c) through the wrongful use of actual or threatened fear or violence. The record defeats his arguments. a. Property Obtained from Local 1235 Members The recorded March 6, 2007 conversations between Coppola and Edward Aulisi provide direct evidence that Coppola obtained and conspired to obtain property belonging to the members of Local 1235 for the benefit of the Genovese family. The conversations indicate that the property at issue was both tangible, insofar as Coppola received monies belonging to the union membership, and intangible, insofar as he deprived members of their § 501(a) right to have union presidents hold union �money and property solely for the citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19 (1999)); United States v. Black, 625 F.3d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 2010) (asking whether reasonable jury might have convicted on invalid theory but acquitted on valid theory). We need not decide this question, because the error here would be harmless under any conceivable standard. Proof of extortion under the salary theory necessarily establishes the facts required to show extortion of LMRDA rights. 28 benefit of the organization and its members� and obtained for himself the right to dispose of such money and property for the benefit of the Genovese family. In reaching this conclusion, we assume that the jury interpreted certain coded terms to reference three Local 1235 presidents: (1) �the Vet� referenced then-Local 1235 president, Vincent Aulisi, based on the context of the conversation as well as the fact that Vincent Aulisi�s initials, �VA,� are an acronym for the Veterans Administration; (2) �Cong� referenced Vincent Colucci, based on Coppola�s statements that Cong had �the same name� as the younger Aulisi�s �Pop,� i.e., �Vincent,� and �was the first one,� i.e., the first Local 1235 president to align the union with the Genovese family, as testified to by Barone, Gov�t Ex. TR-CD-7 (T6) at 7;13 and (3) �Bull� referenced outgoing Local 1235 president Albert Cernadas, based on Coppola�s statement that a party was being thrown for him, which was corroborated by agent testimony. With this understanding, a reasonable jury could have found that, in the March 6 conversations, the younger Aulisi was conveying to Coppola his father�s assurances that Local 1235 would continue to make tribute payments to the Genovese family. Edward Aulisi reported to Coppola that outgoing Local 1235 president Cernadas had made statements suggesting that �month[ly]� payments and �Christmases� were �gonna end� when he stepped down as president. Gov�t Ex. TR-CD-7 (T6) at 6. By themselves, such 13 As the government argued, the inference was reinforced by the fact that Colucci�s initials, �VC,� were a common acronym for the Viet Cong, sometimes called simply �the Cong.� The Vietnam War ended in 1975, the first year of Colucci�s presidency. 29 statements confirmed that Coppola and the Genovese family had obtained membership money in the past. The younger Aulisi, however, went further, stating that his father had told Cernadas that he was wrong about the payments ending: �[T]he beat goes on, whether you�re here or not.� Id. Indeed, Edward Aulisi told Coppola that payments not only would continue, but also that amounts collected had �almost doubled,� id., and that he had �another chunk� for Coppola, representing approximately three months� payments, Gov�t Ex. TR-CD-7 (T7) at 1�2. These statements permitted the jury to find that Coppola was involved in a continuing scheme to obtain union members� tangible and intangible property. In urging a different view of the March 6 conversations, Coppola submits that the government�s interpretation of coded references and its assertion that the conversations concerned money payments were uncorroborated. In any event, Coppola asserts that, even if the conversations did reference money payments, the source was not necessarily Local 1235 membership funds. The payments could as easily have come from Edward Aulisi�s trucking business or from Vincent Aulisi�s personal funds. The argument is not convincing. As our discussion of code names in the March 6, 2007 conversations demonstrates, the references are not as obscure as Coppola urges. Nor are the interpretations and inferences urged by the government so speculative as to preclude adoption by a reasonable jury familiar with the totality of the evidence. Indeed, the inferences are entirely consistent with the totality of the evidence, which established 30 the common scheme or plan employed by the Genovese family to control substantial parts of the New York�New Jersey waterfront and to extort millions of dollars from businesses and unions alike through fear. Insofar as Coppola hypothesizes alternative sources for the monies paid, we are �mindful that the task of choosing among permissible competing inferences is for the jury, not a reviewing court.� United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 154�55 (2d Cir. 2006). Coppola was free to argue�and in fact did argue�alternative inferences in urging the jury to interpret the March 6 conversations narrowly in his favor, but we cannot conclude that a reasonable jury was compelled as a matter of law to adopt Coppola�s arguments. Assuming, as we must, that the jury drew the inferences permissibly urged by the government, we conclude that the March 6 conversations provide direct evidence that Coppola had obtained and conspired to obtain tangible property in the form of Local 1235 membership monies and intangible property in the form of the members� § 501(a) right to have union presidents dispose of that money for the sole benefit of members and the union, not for the benefit of the Genovese family. This part of Coppola�s sufficiency challenge, therefore, fails on the merits.14 14 We note that, as further evidence that Coppola extorted union members� § 501(a) rights to have Local 1235 presidents dispose of union property for their benefit rather than that of the Genovese family, the government points to parts of the March 6, 2007 conversations indicating that Coppola had made and was continuing to make final decisions regarding certain union job placements. Coppola counters that the statements show that he prevented Local 1235 presidents from engaging in nepotism, conduct that did not violate union members� rights but rather protected them. This misses the point. A jury could reasonably conclude that if Coppola exercised control over union presidents� job decisions 31 b. Consent Coppola contends that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the Hobbs Act�s consent element because the victims of the charged extortion were the Local 1235 members whose property was obtained, not the union presidents, and no union member �testified to consenting to any property transfer.� Appellant Br. at 54.15 Indeed, in its bill of particulars, the government maintained that Local 1235 members were unaware that �their leadership was beholden to organized crime . . . [or] that tribute payments were being made to members of organized crime.� Gov�t Letter at 2, United States v. Coppola, 08-cr-763 (JG) (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009), ECF No. 33. While styled as a sufficiency challenge, Coppola�s argument appears to question the legal validity of the indictment, which specifically charged Coppola with conspiring to obtain the property of �Local 1235 union members . . . with the consent of such union members� officers, agents, delegates, employees and other representatives, which consent was to be induced by wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence and fear.� Indictment ¶¶ 16, 19. Coppola appears to be arguing that only a property owner, and not despite having no position in the union and, in fact, being legally barred from having any dealings with union members, such control did not operate to the benefit of members. We need not pursue the matter further because, even without this evidence, the record of money payments to Coppola is sufficient to support a jury finding that he deprived Local 1235 members of the § 501(a) right to have union monies disposed of for their benefit and had obtained for himself the right to have such monies disposed of for the benefit of the Genovese family. 15 The government does not argue, and we therefore do not consider, whether the union presidents were also members of the union. 32 an agent in possession, can provide the consent necessary to establish an extortion. We are not persuaded. In Gotti, the district court similarly charged the jury that the members� agents, representatives, or trustees could provide the necessary consent. See United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d at 329. While we had no occasion in Gotti to discuss the consent element of extortion, upon review of the language of the statute, we now clarify that there is no requirement that the property owner provide the necessary consent. See generally Connecticut Nat�l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253�54 (1992) (�[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.� (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); accord United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2008). Title 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) defines extortion as �the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.� The statute does not use the word �owner� to limit the class capable of giving the requisite consent. Nor would such a limitation make sense given that the consent element serves not to distinguish illegal from legal obtaining of property by the wrongful use of threats or fear, but rather to distinguish between two illegal means of so obtaining property: extortion (with consent) and robbery (without consent). See United States v. Zhou, 428 F.3d 361, 371�72 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that 33 �victim�s consent� is essential element of crime of extortion and �razor�s edge that distinguishes extortion from robbery�). A predecessor statute employed somewhat different language with respect to the consent element: �[o]btains the property of another, with his consent.� Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979, § 2(b) (emphasis added). Even if the quoted language from this earlier statute might be construed to require the consent of the person who owns the property obtained�a question we need not decide�the language of the phrase �obtaining of property from another, with his consent� in the current statute reaches more broadly. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis added). It references any circumstance in which property is obtained from a person with that person�s consent. This plainly encompasses persons holding property in a fiduciary capacity for an owner, such as the union officials referenced in the indictment. Indeed, this court has upheld Hobbs Act convictions involving extortions of individuals not in lawful possession of the property obtained. See, e.g., United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d at 325�26 (deeming �untenable� proposition that �one can never �extort,� under the Hobbs Act, illegal property (such as narcotics)�); United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 999 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming conviction for extorting rival drug dealers); see also United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming conviction for extorting forfeited drug proceeds); cf. United States v. Celaj, 649 F.3d 162, 168�69 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming conviction for Hobbs Act robbery of marijuana). Moreover, we have recognized that businesses may be extorted 34 under the Hobbs Act by using threats or fear to induce certain employees� consent to part with company property. See United States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 1977). Thus, while we have described the consent element by reference to �victim�s consent,� United States v. Zhou, 428 F.3d at 372, the requirement can be satisfied, as in this case, by showing that union officials were wrongfully induced to consent to surrender property that they held in trust for the union membership. Indeed, while Local 1235 members were undoubtedly the primary victims of the charged extortion in that they lost both tangible and intangible property, their union presidents might also be deemed victims�albeit less sympathetic ones�insofar as they were forced to choose between �relinquishing some property [belonging to the membership] immediately or risking unlawful violence.� United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 395 (2d Cir. 1999). The Hobbs Act �prohibits the extortionist from forcing a victim to make such a choice.� Id.; see United States v. Cain, 2012 WL 265882, at *6 (noting that extortion victim is presented with �Hobson�s choice� (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because there is no question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that Local 1235 presidents consented to surrender to the Genovese family property that the presidents held for the union membership, this part of Coppola�s sufficiency challenge also fails. c. Use of Fear Similarly meritless is Coppola�s sufficiency challenge to that element of extortion requiring that consent be induced by the �wrongful use of actual or threatened force, 35 violence, or fear.� 18 U.S.C. § 1