Caceres v. The Port Authority of New York & Jersey, No. 09-3064 (2d Cir. 2011)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

09-3064-cv(L) Caceres v. The Port Authority of New York & Jersey 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 2009 (Argued: April 15, 2010 Decided: January 31, 2011) Docket Nos. 09-3064-cv(L), 09-3217-cv(XAP) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x JOSEPH CACERES, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, - v.THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, POLICE OFFICER MICHAEL BARRY, (SHIELD NO. 1810), SERGEANT K. COTRELL, (SHIELD NO. 304), POLICE OFFICER M. LYDON, (SHIELD NO. 1585), POLICE OFFICER J. MALICE, (SHIELD NO. 2442), POLICE OFFICER A. PINIELLO, (SHIELD NO. 1856), POLICE LIEUTENANT ROENZO SANGIORGI, (SHIELD NO. 166), POLICE OFFICER TRUGLIO, (SHIELD NO. 2105), individually and in their official capacities, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, JOHN DOE, 1-10 individually and in their official capacity, the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown, JANE DOE, 1-10 individually and in their official capacity, the name Jane Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown, Defendants. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, McLAUGHLIN and SACK, Circuit Judges. 1 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey detained 2 Plaintiff Caceres for two days on a warrant erroneously 3 attributed to him. 4 $10,000, joint and several, against the Port Authority and 5 one of its officers. 6 the Southern District of New York (Koeltl, J.) entered a 7 judgment, against the Port Authority in the amount of the 8 verdict, and in favor of the officer as a matter of law on 9 the ground of qualified immunity. A jury assessed false-arrest damages at The United States District Court for Caceres appeals the 10 qualified immunity ruling; the Port Authority cross-appeals 11 on the ground that absent liability of any of its officers, 12 vicarious liability does not lie. 13 favor of the officer; we vacate the judgment against the 14 Port Authority and remand to dismiss that claim for lack of 15 jurisdiction. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 We affirm the judgment in BRETT HARRIS KLEIN, Leventhal & Klein, LLP, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant-CrossAppellee. SCOTT CHARLES OCCHIOGROSSO, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees-CrossAppellants. 2 1 2 3 DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge: 4 painter on the George Washington Bridge, which is maintained 5 and operated by the Port Authority of New York and New 6 Jersey ( Port Authority ). 7 site without the requisite permit, his car was impounded at 8 the Port Authority police station in New Jersey. 9 went to pick up his car, a routine computer search of his 10 name and date of birth showed that Caceres had a New York 11 State Identification ( NYSID ) number, which is a 12 (supposedly) unique designation assigned to each arrestee by 13 the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. 14 The search also linked Caceres to a John Doe bench 15 warrant. 16 Authority supervisor, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant 17 Roenzo Sangiorgi, determined the warrant was for another 18 person who was erroneously issued the same NYSID number as 19 Caceres. Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Joseph Caceres was a After he parked near his work When he Caceres was detained for two days, until the Port 20 Caceres sued Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant Port 21 Authority and numerous Port Authority officers for, inter 22 alia, false arrest under state law and for violation of his 23 federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 A 1 jury assessed false-arrest damages at $10,000, joint and 2 several, against the Port Authority and Sangiorgi. 3 United States District Court for the Southern District of 4 New York (Koeltl, J.) entered a judgment, against the Port 5 Authority in the amount of the verdict, and in favor of 6 Sangiorgi as a matter of law on the ground of qualified 7 immunity. 8 damages award that was fully recoverable from the Port 9 Authority) appealed the qualified immunity ruling; the Port 10 Authority, which had been content to pay the judgment, then 11 cross-appealed on the ground that absent liability of any of 12 its officers, vicarious liability does not lie. 13 the judgment in favor of the officer, and vacate the 14 judgment against the Port Authority and remand to dismiss 15 that claim for lack of jurisdiction. The For some reason, Caceres (not content with a We affirm 16 I 17 18 Caceres challenges the qualified immunity ruling under 19 both federal and state law. We review a district court s 20 grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the 21 same standards as the district court. 22 Capital, Inc., 418 F.3d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 2005). 4 Black v. Finantra Judgment 1 as a matter of law is appropriate when a party has been 2 fully heard on an issue and a reasonable jury would not 3 have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the 4 party on that issue. 5 review, we consider the evidence in the light most 6 favorable to the party against whom the motion was made and 7 give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences 8 that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the 9 evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). In our Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 70 (2d 10 Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 11 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1988)). 12 entitlements are considered separately. Federal and state law 13 14 A 15 On the federal false arrest claim, Sangiorgi enjoys 16 qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for the 17 officer to believe that probable cause existed or if 18 officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether 19 the probable cause test was met. 20 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987). 21 22 Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d At the threshold, Caceres argues that the warrant itself is facially invalid because it does not conform to 5 1 the New York Criminal Procedure Law. 2 an officer in a different jurisdiction, out of the thousands 3 of jurisdictions in the United States, all of which may 4 issue bench warrants with various characteristics and 5 requirements. 6 failed in other respects to follow proper police procedures. 7 Assuming that Sangiorgi erred, error is what is indulged by 8 qualified immunity. 9 However, Sangiorgi was Similarly, Caceres argues that Sangiorgi More particularly, Caceres emphasizes the several 10 physical differences between himself and the descriptive 11 particulars in the warrant. 12 grossly disparate, and some other features matched. 1 13 Caceres is a light-skinned Hispanic, whereas the warrant 14 specified a black man of dark complexion. 15 Height, weight and age were not But A reasonable officer could have concluded nevertheless 16 that the warrant was for Caceres. 17 a given race classification, and the descriptive terms in 1 Complexion varies within Caceres s hair color matched the description on the warrant; his dark eye color was a near match (black, compared with brown on the warrant). The height discrepancy was two inches, the weight was within twenty pounds, and the age discrepancy was about five years. The age difference would not necessarily be apparent to the eye, but an officer might (or might not) have noticed that the birth date in the warrant did not match the birth date that Caceres gave, or had on his license. 6 1 the warrant reflected one person s subjective classification 2 at one point in time. 2 3 reasonably assume that the skin color and race information 4 were entered incorrectly--particularly since height, weight, 5 age, hair color and eye color were either accurate or within 6 bounds. 7 A Port Authority officer might Far more implausible was the actual explanation for the 8 confusion: that two individuals were erroneously associated 9 with the same NYSID number. That is so rare (if not unique) 10 that it was unheard-of by the testifying officers. 11 reasonable officer could therefore have concluded that the 12 warrant hit conferred probable cause notwithstanding an 13 incompatible physical description, reasoning that a false 14 hit from the historically reliable recordkeeping system-- 15 organized by NYSID number--is at least as rare as error in 16 the physical description fields. 17 Santa, 180 F.3d 20, 27 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding that 18 arresting officers reliance on historically reliable 19 warrant recording system was objectively reasonable). 20 officers of the New York City Police Department came to the 2 A Cf. United States v. Three Uncontroverted testimony by Sangiorgi established that the race and skin color information was based on observations by the arresting officer. Trial Tr. at 660-61. 7 1 same conclusion: Caceres had been detained three times 2 before on the basis of the same bench warrant. 3 v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 646 F. Supp. 2d 412, 418 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 5 innocence and explained to the Port Authority officers that 6 the warrant was a mistake; but police are not bound to 7 credit such protestations. 8 9 See Caceres Caceres further argues that he professed Accordingly, Sangiorgi is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal false arrest claim. 10 11 B 12 On the state law false arrest claim, Sangiorgi s 13 liability is governed by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act 14 ( NJTCA ). 15 provides a statutory good faith exception--a variant of a 16 qualified immunity defense--the exception is unavailable in 17 claims for false arrest or false imprisonment. 18 3. 19 was enacted were not preempted. 20 N.J. 101, 117 (1995) ( When liability is established under 21 the [NJTCA], it is still subject to immunity specified in 22 the Act as well as any common-law immunity which predated See N.J.S.A. § 59:3-1(a). Although the NJTCA See § 59:3- However, common law defenses that existed when the NJTCA 8 See Fielder v. Stonack, 141 1 2 the Act. (emphasis added)). In deciding qualified immunity, the district court 3 assumed that the New Jersey common law standard is 4 coextensive with federal law, citing DelaCruz v. Borough of 5 Hillsdale, 183 N.J. 149 (2005). 6 2d at 426; Joint Appendix at 489, 496. 7 ambiguous as to the availability of qualified immunity under 8 New Jersey common law; but the court relied on the parties 9 own readings of the case, which (though divergent) were See Caceres, 646 F. Supp. DelaCruz is 10 consistent in material respects. 3 11 circumstances, we accept the parties consensus. 12 E. Heller & Co. v. Video Innovations, Inc., 730 F.2d 50, 53 13 (2d Cir. 1984) ( The parties by their acquiescence . . . may 14 induce the . . . court to assume that foreign law is similar 15 to that of the forum. ). Under these Cf. Walter We therefore need not decide what 3 There is a slight disagreement about the scope of the purported DelaCruz standard. The parties agree that it is an objective reasonableness standard; Caceres suggests it is parallel to the federal version, but the Port Authority argues it is only an objective reasonableness standard, and not the disjunctive two part test for the federal defense. The disagreement is irrelevant. Because it was objectively reasonable for Sangiorgi to believe that probable cause existed, he is entitled to qualified immunity under either party s interpretation of the standard. 9 1 New Jersey law would be if it were clear, which it is not. 4 2 Sangiorgi is entitled to qualified immunity on the 3 state law false arrest claim for the same reasons he enjoys 4 qualified immunity on the federal claim. 5 claim would be insubstantial in any event. 5 ) (And the state law 6 7 II 8 The Port Authority argues that it cannot be held 9 vicariously liable for the conduct of an employee (such as 10 Sangiorgi) who has successfully established immunity. 6 As a 4 Compare, e.g., N.J.S.A. § 59:3-3 (excluding false arrest claims from good faith defense for public employees) , with Visidor Corp. v. Cliffside Park, 48 N.J. 214, 221 (1966) ( [T]he nonliability of individual public officials for damages ensuing upon their good faith exercise of judgment and discretion in the performance of their duties, has long been recognized in our State. ). See generally Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 355-56 (1993) ( Liability of the public employee . . . is subject to the immunities of the [NJTCA] and the common law. ). 5 Even if qualified immunity for the state law claim were unavailable, Caceres s damages would be severely limited at best: The NJTCA prohibits damages for pain and suffering in the absence of substantial bodily harm, reflecting the policy choice that in view of the economic burdens presently facing public entities a claimant should not be reimbursed for non-objective types of damages . . . except in aggravated circumstances. N.J.S.A. § 59:9-2(d) & cmt.; see also DelaCruz, 183 N.J. at 164. Caceres makes no claim of substantial bodily harm. 6 Caceres argues that the Port Authority forfeited this argument by not raising it in its Rule 50 motions before the 10 1 preliminary matter, we have an independent obligation to 2 consider our subject matter jurisdiction to hear this claim 3 even in the absence of a challenge from any party. 4 v. Blumenthal, 577 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2009). 5 See Dean The Port Authority, a bi-state agency created by a 6 compact between New York and New Jersey, enjoyed sovereign 7 immunity until 1951, when New York and New Jersey consented 8 to suits against it in limited circumstances. 9 Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 144 N.J. 176, 183 (1996). See Bunk v. The 10 Port Authority s statutory immunity was waived by identical 11 New York and New Jersey statutes that required a sixty-day 12 notice of claim and commencement of suit within one year from 13 the date of the accrual of the cause of action. 14 § 32:1-163; N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 7107. 15 are jurisdictional. 16 N.J. Super. 83, 85 (Law Div. 1978), aff d, 171 N.J. Super. 38 17 (App. Div. 1979); Pinckney v. Jersey City, 140 N.J. Super. 18 96, 100-03 (Law Div. 1976) ( It is a firmly established rule 19 in American jurisprudence that . . . provisions which are 20 conditions which the sovereign attaches to the waiver of district court. See N.J.S.A. These requirements See Matthews v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 163 See Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 161 (2d Cir. 2001). Because of the jurisdictional issue discussed infra, the forfeiture issue is irrelevant. 11 1 immunity are jurisdictional. ). 2 conditions will result in withdrawal of defendant s consent 3 to suit and compels the dismissal of the action for lack of 4 subject matter jurisdiction. 5 N.J., 643 N.Y.S.2d 571, 571-72 (1st Dep t 1996). 6 The failure to satisfy these Lyons v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & This analysis is consistent with Hess v. Port Auth. 7 Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994), in which plaintiffs 8 sought damages from a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Port 9 Authority 7 under the Federal Employers Liability Act 10 ( FELA ), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. 11 within the three-year time limit set by FELA but beyond the 12 one-year limit specified by the New York and New Jersey 13 consent-to-suit statutes. 14 between the Port Authority s finances and the fiscs of New 15 York and New Jersey, the Court held that the Port Authority 16 lacked Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from federal 17 statutory claims. 18 does not bear upon the validity of conditions for waiving 19 sovereign immunity over claims arising under state law. 7 The claim was brought Relying mainly on the attenuation Hess, 513 U.S. at 49-52. But this holding See In Hess, the Supreme Court treated the subsidiary, PATH (Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation), as equivalent to the Port Authority for purposes of sovereign immunity because it is wholly owned. 513 U.S. at 33-35. 12 1 Mullen v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 100 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 2 n.4 (D.N.J. 1999) ( Hess did not reach the question of 3 whether state law claims could be barred for failure to 4 comply with the commencement of suit and notice 5 requirements. ); Recreation World, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. 6 & N.J., No. 96 Civ. 5549, 1998 WL 107362, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 7 Mar. 9, 1998). 8 The vicarious liability in this case, if any, must arise 9 from state law because the jury found that the Port Authority 10 was not liable under § 1983 for failure to train, the only 11 basis on which Caceres sought to hold the Port Authority 12 liable under federal law. 13 424 n.10; see also Monell v. Dep t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 14 658, 691 (1978) (holding municipalities cannot be liable 15 under § 1983 on vicarious liability theory); Raysor v. Port 16 Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1985) 17 (applying Monell rule to Port Authority). 18 no impact on whether the jurisdictional requisites have been 19 satisfied for Caceres s state law claim. 20 See Caceres, 646 F. Supp. 2d at Hess therefore has Caceres s claim accrued when he was released from 21 custody around midnight on August 5-6, 2004. 22 complaint on February 27, 2006, more than one year afterward. 13 He filed his 1 The district court therefore lacked subject matter 2 jurisdiction to consider the claim. 3 jurisdictional issue was not raised by either party or the 4 district court, it cannot be waived and dismissal is 5 mandatory. 6 919 v. CenterMark Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 7 301 (2d Cir. 1994). Although this See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 8 9 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in favor of 10 Sangiorgi based on qualified immunity is affirmed, the 11 judgment against the Port Authority is vacated, and the case 12 is remanded to the district court with instructions to 13 dismiss the claim against the Port Authority for lack of 14 jurisdiction. 14

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.