Alvarado-Aguilera v. Negron, No. 06-2467 (1st Cir. 2007)
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United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 06-2467 à NGEL O. ALVARADO AGUILERA, EMMA I. Bà EZ Là PEZ, IRIS Y. BLANCO RESTO, GLORIA I. Cà LIZ PABELLà N, VIRGEN DEL S. COLà N GONZà LEZ, DEBORAH ORTIZ Pà REZ, DAPHNE Y. PAGà N ORTIZ, BRENDA E. PAGà N RIVERA, MAGDA E. QUIRà Z PAGà N, MIGUEL RODRà GUEZ GONZà LEZ, LUIS A. RODRà GUEZ ORTIZ, ARIADNE RODRà GUEZ VELà ZQUEZ, ANNETTE SAEZ VARGAS, OLGA J. SALDAà A TORRES, and EMMA L. TORRES SANTIAGO, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. JOSà R. NEGRà N, ALBA N. CORA, and CARMEN GONZà LEZ FUSTER, all in their personal capacities, Defendants, Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge] Before Lipez, Circuit Judge, Baldock, * Senior Circuit Judge, and Howard, Circuit Judge. Julio Nigaglioni Arrache on brief for appellants. ** Susana I. PeñagarÃcano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, with whom Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, Solicitor * ** Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. Mr. Nigaglioni Arrache failed to appear for oral argument. In his absence, the Court chose to hear the appellees argument in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 34(e). General, Mariana D. Negrón-Vargas, Deputy Solicitor General, and Maite D. Oronoz-RodrÃguez, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees. December 5, 2007 BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. disposed of concluding the that present case plaintiffs via a complaint The district court motion to failed claim upon which relief could be grated. dismiss, to state a See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Our review of a Rule 12(b)(6)dismissal is de novo. (1st See Diaz-Ramos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 501 F.3d 12, 15 Cir. assume 2007). the truth plaintiff[s] therefrom. the [W]e, of all like district well-plead benefit of all facts court, and reasonable give must the inferences Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). summarize the the facts of plaintiffs complaint. Consequently, we proceed to this case as they appear in See id. at 4. I. From October 1998 to January 2003, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico s Administration of Juvenile Institutions (AJI) contracted with Southwest Key Program (Southwest) to run the Ponce Detention and Training School Center for Girls. Plaintiffs served as custody officers or technicians in the Ponce Detention Center during this period. In January 2003, the AJI decided to reassume direct responsibility for the center s operations. On January 17, 2003, Defendant Negrón, who served as the AJI s administrator, came to the center and met with Southwest s employees. -3- At this meeting, Negrón informed Southwest s employees that they would be able to continue working at the center under temporary government appointments. Thereafter, Negrón assured Southwest s employees that they would receive permanent appointments to government positions at the center. Plaintiffs did receive temporary appointments to their prior positions. These appointments commenced on January 17, 2003, and ended on June 30, 2003. Although plaintiffs did appointments, not receive further temporary continued working at the center until April 2004. this interim government Negrón s period, positions promise government plaintiffs with that positions the they at the applied AJI. would center, they During for permanent Despite Defendant receive permanent plaintiffs were terminated on April 30, 2004. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Negrón s promise gave them a legitimate claim of entitlement to permanent government employment under Puerto Rico law. In addition, plaintiffs claim a right, under Commonwealth law, to notification of the identities of the individuals who were ultimately placed in the permanent positions for which they applied. Plaintiffs claim that the Commonwealth s failure to them grant permanent positions of employment at the center, or notify them of the identity of the individuals -4- selected to substantive replace them, violation of amounts the Due to a procedural and Clause the Process of Fourteenth Amendment. II. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint establish a plausible entitlement to relief. must Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007). Plaintiffs claim the Commonwealth violated their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. state a valid violation exhibit of a claim the Due for a Process constitutionally liberty, or property. procedural Clause, protected or In order to substantive plaintiffs interest in must life, Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005). this case, plaintiffs proprietary rights. assert a violation of In their Property interests are created and defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. 1 Hatfield-Bermudez v. Aldanondo-Rivera, 496 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2007). In order to qualify as a property interest, state law must give an individual a legitimate claim of entitlement to some sort of benefit. Id. 1 For purposes of section 1983, Puerto Rico is the functional equivalent of a state. Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 31 n.6 (1st Cir. 2006). -5- A. We first address plaintiffs claim that Negrón s promise gave them a property interest in a permanent position of government employment. Puerto Rico law provides for the appointment of temporary or transitory employees. Dept. of Natural Res. v. Correa, 18 P.R. Offic. Trans. 795, 801 (1987). A transitory employee does not have a legitimate job retention expectancy once his appointment expires. at 804. promise The question effectively (inquiring whether in this altered a case the transitory is whether status quo. government Id. Negrón s See id. employee s particular circumstances gave him a legitimate expectancy of continuity in his job). In Correa, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico answered this question. In that case, the Court found an employee who was given several temporary appointments, as well as a promise of permanent employment, did not have a legitimate expectation agency. aware of continued employment See id. at 805-06. of the fact that with a government Reasoning the employee was the position he occupied was transitory, the Court concluded that [a] simple offer of a permanent position without any action on the part of the government agency clearly showing an agreement to make good on the promise cannot, by itself, -6- give [an employee] anything beyond a unilateral expectation of job retention. Id. at 806. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico s holding in Correa clearly demonstrates that Negrón s promise did not give plaintiffs a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permanent government position under Puerto Rico law. See Ruiz-Roche v. Lausell, 848 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that a naked-and vague-promise of a permanent position was not enough, under legitimate Puerto expectation Commonwealth). The Rico of law, to give continued agency s a plaintiff employment invitation to with plaintiffs a the to fill out applications for permanent employment, as alleged in the complaint, did not indicate the agency s intent to make good on Negrón s promise. Therefore, plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Correa is unavailing. B. We now turn to plaintiffs argument that Puerto Rico law gave them a property interest in notification of the identity of the candidates selected to fill the permanent positions for which they applied. Assuming Puerto Rico law provides plaintiffs a procedural right to such notification, the simple fact that state law prescribes certain procedures does not mean that the procedures thereby acquire a federal constitutional dimension. -7- Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d Supreme 31, Court 34 (1st has Cir. 1977). clearly held On that the the substance and procedure are distinct. contrary, the categories of Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). cannot be defined by deprivation . . . . the Id. procedures Property provided for its Plaintiffs allegation that they were deprived of a right to a notification procedure related to their termination thus fails to amount to an allegation of a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. III. Plaintiffs complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish they property interest. possessed a constitutionally protected Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to assert a plausible entitlement to relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007). district court, therefore, properly granted The defendants motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. P. 12(b)(6). AFFIRMED. -8- See Fed. R. Civ.
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