United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Wayne R. Naplin, Defendant-appellant, 97 F.3d 1462 (9th Cir. 1996)

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 97 F.3d 1462 (9th Cir. 1996) Submitted Sept. 10, 1996. *Decided Sept. 12, 1996

Before: FLETCHER, BRUNETTI and JOHN T. NOONAN, Jr., Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Wayne R. Naplin, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his criminal conviction on double jeopardy grounds. We affirm.

Naplin contends that his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because he had already been punished for the same conduct through prior federal civil forfeiture proceedings. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).

Naplin next contends that his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause based on prior state forfeiture proceedings. He argues that the dual sovereignty doctrine does not preclude his double jeopardy claim because the federal government was a tool for the state. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1959). We disagree. "Close coordination between state and federal authorities, including the employment of agents of one sovereign to help the other sovereign in its prosecution, does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause." See United States v. Real Property Located in El Dorado County at 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974, 987 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Nor does the state's possible pecuniary interest in the federal forfeiture proceeding transform the federal government into a tool of the state. Id. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Naplin's section 2255 motion.

AFFIRMED.1 

 *

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

 1

Because we affirm the district court's denial of Naplin's motion under the former version of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, we do not consider whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 applies to this appeal

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