United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Dupree Lamar Meadows, Defendant-appellant, 94 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 1996)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Dupree Lamar Meadows appeals his jury conviction of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1).¹ 

Meadows first contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the § 922(g) (1) count because the fact that a firearm may have once traveled in interstate commerce is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish the requisite nexus with interstate commerce with which to confer congressional authority to regulate the subsequent possession of the firearm. Meadows acknowledges that this court rejected the claim that § 922(g) (1) exceeds Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause in United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1995), 116 S. Ct. 543 (1995). Meadows asks us, however, to revisit the issue in light of our subsequent decision in United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995), which held that the fact that a residence received natural gas from out-of-state sources was insufficient to confer federal jurisdiction in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (arson of personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce). A panel of this court not sitting en banc lacks authority to overturn prior Ninth Circuit precedent. See United v. Lucas, 963 F.2d 243, 247 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreover, this court recently rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g) in a post-Pappadopoulos decision. See United States v. Nguyen, Nos. 95-50278 and 95-50281, slip op. 8225, 8242-43 (9th Cir. July 9, 1996).

Meadows also contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because even if Congress does not lack authority to regulate possession of a firearm, the mere fact that the firearm was once shipped or transported in interstate commerce is insufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce element of § 922(g) (1). This contention lacks merit. We recently held that the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) (1) is satisfied by the fact that the firearm "had at some time been in interstate commerce." Id., at 8241.

AFFIRMED.