Lamacy E. Woods, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Raymond Roberts, John Doe and Kansas Department Ofcorrections, Defendants-appellees, 47 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1995)

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US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - 47 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1995) Feb. 17, 1995

Before KELLY and SETH, Circuit Judges, and KANE,**  District Judge.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT1 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff Lamacy E. Woods appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on his complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1983. Because we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants' unopposed motion, see Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1520 n. 5 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding decision to grant unopposed motion left to court's discretion), we affirm.

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Kansas Secretary of Corrections. His amended complaint alleged violation of his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and further alleged that prison officials had denied him his right to equal protection under the law. These alleged violations stemmed from the decision of prison officials to place plaintiff in protective custody after it came to their attention that he was the likely target of a gang hit man.

The district court addressed the merits of plaintiff's case, even though plaintiff had not responded to defendants' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, plaintiff does not question the merits of the court's decision, but argues instead that it erred in granting summary judgment against him where, because of his pro se status and ignorance of the law, he had not filed a response to defendants' motion. Plaintiff further contends that the district court should have instructed him on the procedures involved in defending against a motion for summary judgment and that he should have been given an opportunity to conduct discovery.

Plaintiff's amended complaint was filed on January 8, 1992. Defendants' answer, containing a request to dismiss, was filed on March 6, 1992. Plaintiff requested and was granted an extension of time up to and including May 11, 1992, in which to reply to defendants' answer and request for dismissal. No reply was forthcoming. On December 21, 1992, almost a full year after plaintiff had filed his amended complaint and fully seventeen months after the filing of plaintiff's original complaint, the district court entered an order directing plaintiff to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. R.Vol. I at 21.

Plaintiff's response to the show cause order alleged that he had filed his reply to defendants' answer " [o]n or in between May 29, and May 30, 1992." Id., tab 22 at 2. The district court clerk, however, had no record of this filing and plaintiff was unable to find any copies. Plaintiff did not include any substantive factual averments in his response to the show cause order sufficient to counter defendants' affirmative defenses and to avoid dismissal, nor did he ever file a separate reply to defendants' answer.

Rather than proceed with the request to dismiss contained in their answer, defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment. Approximately ten months later, again without any response from plaintiff to the summary judgment motion, the district court granted defendants' motion. During the interim, the docket sheet reflects the entry of various certificates of service pertaining to the discovery being conducted by plaintiff. Plaintiff does not contest the statement in defendants' brief that plaintiff's requests for documents were responded to in a timely manner. Appellees' Br. at 2.

"While we of course liberally construe pro se pleadings, an appellant's pro se status does not excuse the obligation of any litigant to comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure." Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 750 (1995); see also Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1336 (1993). Even so, this circuit has expressed concern that pro se litigants not have their suits dismissed on summary judgment merely because they have failed to comply with the technical requirements involved in defending such a motion. See generally Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991); Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 1985). However, while the grant of an unopposed motion for summary judgment against a pro se litigant may, in some circumstances, be an abuse of discretion, see Jaxon, 773 F.2d at 1140, we think that, under the facts of this case, there was no such abuse.

[I]n evaluating the propriety of a trial court's action in dismissing a claim with prejudice, [this] court [focuses] on three aggravating factors: the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; the amount of interference with the judicial process; and the culpability of the litigant. Dismissal is the appropriate sanction only when these factors outweigh the judicial system's strong predisposition to resolve cases on their merits.

Green, 969 F.2d at 917 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff failed to respond to defendants' initial motion to dismiss with any facts which could have created a genuine issue for trial. His response to the court's show cause order was not accompanied by any showing of substantive fact. The policy behind a court's reluctance to dismiss a case with prejudice for failure to respond to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is to ensure that the pro se litigant has a chance to respond before his case is forever barred. See generally, Jaxon, 773 F.2d at 1140 (pro se litigant must have notice of procedural requirements and reasonable opportunity to respond). Here, however, plaintiff had ample opportunity to respond, both when defendants requested dismissal in their answer and when the district court ordered him to show cause. After the motion for summary judgment was filed, plaintiff engaged in discovery and still did not respond.

We note further that prior to filing his amended complaint, plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings based on what he perceived to be defendants' failure to file a timely answer. Thus, plaintiff was aware that judgment can be entered on pleadings if the nonmoving party fails to file a timely response. His assertion in his brief that he was unaware of the consequences of failing to respond to defendants' summary judgment motion, therefore, appears disingenuous.

Although the district court could have granted defendants' motion as a matter of course for lack of opposition, it instead reached the merits of plaintiff's claims and explained why they failed. Plaintiff's claims are nothing more than conclusory allegations devoid of any factual support. Plaintiff was required to set forth facts supporting his claims. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1111.

As discussed above, " [d]istrict courts must take care to insure that pro se litigants are provided with proper notice regarding the complex procedural issues involved in summary judgment proceedings.' " Jaxon, 773 F.2d at 1140 (quoting Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1984)). In this case the record demonstrates that plaintiff had ample opportunity to augment the bare assertions in his complaint with supporting facts. Plaintiff does not contend that he was not notified that defendants had filed a motion for summary judgment or that he did not receive a copy of that motion in a timely manner. His litigation of this case prior to the filing of the motion for summary judgment demonstrates that he was well aware of his right to respond and the risks of failing to do so. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment to defendants. Cf. Oklahoma Federated Gold & Numismatics, Inc. v. Blodgett, 24 F.3d 136, 139-40 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming sanctions against pro se litigant who was neither unaware of the need to comply with discovery requests and deadlines, nor the consequences for failing to do so).

Plaintiff argues that he should have another opportunity to contest defendants' motion. He gives this court, however, no reason to believe that he will be any more successful in coming forth with hard evidence than he has been heretofore.

The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

 **

Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation

 1

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470

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