Samir Taha, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Portland Taxi Cab Co.; Robert Elliott; Randy Owens,defendants-appellees, 129 F.3d 127 (9th Cir. 1997)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Samir Taha, a former taxi driver of Arab descent, appeals pro se the district court's summary judgment for Portland Taxi Cab Company and two of its officers ("Portland Taxi") in his race discrimination action alleging that the termination of his taxi permit sublease violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1985(3). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Taha contends that: (1) summary judgment for Portland Taxi was improper because he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext, and (2) denial of his motion to disqualify the district court judge was an abuse of discretion.¹  These contentions lack merit.

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment. See Bagdadi v. Nazar, 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996). We must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court properly applied the law. See id.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, then defendants must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, and finally plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F 3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).² 

Here, Taha alleged that his taxi permit sublease contained unusually restrictive terms because he is Arab, and that during an argument following the termination of his sublease, the vice-president of Portland Taxi called him a "lousy foreigner." In turn, Portland Taxi presented evidence that Taha's sublease contained additional conditions because he had a record of complaints and traffic accidents, and that his sublease was terminated after one year because of further complaints from various sources, including Portland Airport Ground Transportation, a doorman at the Hilton Hotel, other taxicab drivers, Portland Taxi dispatchers, and Taha's customers.

Even if Taha stated a prima facie case of discrimination, he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. See id. at 890. Accordingly, Portland Taxi was entitled to summary judgment on his § 1981 claim. See Bagdadi, 84 F.3d at 1197.

Because Taha failed to present any evidence of a conspiracy, Portland Taxi was also entitled to summary judgment on his § 1985(3) claim. See Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).

Moreover, because Taha failed to present any evidence of bias, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny his motion for disqualification. See United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1997).³ 

AFFIRMED.