Donald C. Jackson, Petitioner-appellant, v. Long Beach Police Department; Charles B. Ussery, Chief Ofpolice, et al., Respondents-appellees, 996 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1993)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Donald C. Jackson, a Texas state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo. Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 1992). We vacate the district court's order, and remand for further proceedings.

It is error for the district court to grant a motion for summary judgment solely on the basis of a local rule requiring the entry of summary judgment if no papers opposing the motion are filed or served. Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 949-50 (9th Cir. 1993). Summary judgment may be entered only when the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 have been met. Id.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the appellees solely because Jackson's failure to file a timely response was deemed a consent to the granting of the motion, pursuant to Local Rules 7.6 and 7.14.2. The district court did not consider whether the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 had been met. We remand so the district court may consider the summary judgment motion under the proper legal standard. See id.

Further, we note that Jackson was not advised of the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The district court is obligated to inform pro se prisoner litigants of the requirements of the summary judgment rule before summary judgment is entered. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The district court must advise pro se prisoner litigants that they must submit responsive evidence in order to avoid the entry of summary judgment against them. Id. at 411. In this case, Jackson did not receive fair notice of the requirements of the summary judgment rule. On remand, we direct the district court to inform Jackson accordingly.

VACATED AND REMANDED.