United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Felton Anthony Wiggins, A/k/a Bart, Defendant-appellant.united States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Eric Elijah Mickens, A/k/a E-man, Defendant-appellant, 968 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1992)

Felton Anthony Wiggins and Eric Elijah Mickens challenge their convictions for narcotics and firearms violations.¹  Wiggins was a cocaine and crack distributor. Mickens assisted in drug debt collection and procurement of firearms. Wiggins appeals claiming his rights to a speedy trial and due process were violated. Mickens challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting two of his convictions. Finding the claims to be without merit, we affirm.

Wiggins first claims that his right to a speedy trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1988) was violated. The Speedy Trial Act provides that an information or indictment charging an offense must be filed within thirty days of the arrest of the individual. In United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1982), this Court held that only a federal arrest commences the running of the thirty day period.

Wiggins argues that his arrest by state officials was in effect a federal arrest for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. He bases this argument on a police report filed at the time of his arrest by state authorities. The report may be read to suggest that the state officials believed that all charges would be tried in federal court. This belief on the part of state officials cannot convert a state arrest into a federal arrest for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. See United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d at 269.

Wiggins next argues that no rational basis exists for treating one gram of crack the same as one hundred grams of cocaine for sentencing purposes. The sentencing guidelines provide for a 100:1 ratio of cocaine to crack for determination of base offense level; that is, a defendant possessing one hundred times the amount of cocaine as crack receives the same base offense level. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2D1.1(c) (Nov. 1990).

We agree with the circuits which have addressed the question and found the guidelines' mandate constitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1991) (different penalties for crack and cocaine evince rational purpose); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 404 n.7 (8th Cir. 1991) (due process not violated by 100:1 ratio), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. 1991); United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1991) (100:1 ratio does not violate due process or Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. House, 939 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1991) (100:1 ratio not violative of equal protection); United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 1990) (no due process violation when heavier penalties for crack imposed). Wiggins's claim has no merit.

Mickens challenges two convictions on the grounds of insufficient evidence. The relevant question upon such a challenge is whether "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government any rational trier of facts could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).

Sufficient evidence supported Mickens's conviction for use of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (1). Pierce, a gunshot victim, testified that Mickens shot him because Pierce owed money to a drug trafficker. The debt was incurred when Mickens fronted Pierce cocaine which, rather than selling, he consumed. Pierce was then unable to pay for the cocaine. Mickens shot Pierce to force him to repay the debt. There was sufficient evidence to show that the firearm was used in a drug transaction. See United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 224 (6th Cir. 1990) (government must show some relationship between firearm and drug trafficking offense).

Finally, there was sufficient evidence to sustain Mickens's conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The evidence submitted included the testimony of two witnesses that Mickens collected or assisted in the collection of drug debts owed to Wiggins. Additional testimony revealed that Mickens accompanied Wiggins to purchase firearms. The claim is meritless.² 

Accordingly, we affirm the convictions of the Defendants.

AFFIRMED