Robert J. Mcclain, Petitioner-appellant, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent-appellee, 943 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1991)

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Taxpayer Robert J. McClain appeals from the stipulated decision entered by the Tax Court on November 9, 1990. We affirm.

On October 3, 1990, Mr. McClain signed a stipulated decision in open court in which he agreed to pay back taxes for the years 1986 and 1987 in the amount of $4,620. He now appeals that decision, proffering myriad constitutional and legal arguments with respect to the merits of the tax deficiency determination and the Tax Court's jurisdiction to enter judgment.

A party consenting to an entry of judgment waives the right to appeal unless it can show that the consent was not voluntary or that the court entering the judgment lacked jurisdiction to do so. See White v. Commissioner, 776 F.2d 976, 977-78 (11th Cir. 1985); Tapper v. Commissioner, 766 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1985). This rule is applicable to stipulated judgments entered by the Tax Court. Clapp v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1989); see Tapper, 766 F.2d at 403. In this case, the record makes clear that, although he had some questions, Mr. McClain voluntarily signed the stipulated agreement that he owed $4,620 in back taxes. Rec., vol. II, Trial Transcript of October 31, 1990, at 13. Moreover, the Tax Court had jurisdiction to enter the agreement as a stipulated judgment. See I.R.C. §§ 6213, 6214, 7442 (1988). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Tax Court.¹