United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Michael Clark Brei, Defendant-appellant, 943 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Michael Clark Brei appeals his sentence, following a guilty plea, for conspiracy to possess and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1) and 846. Brei contends that the government violated his plea agreement by failing to move for a downward departure below the United States Sentencing Guidelines range, and that the district court should have made an independent assessment of whether Brei had met his own obligations under the agreement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.

We review for clear error a district court's construction of a plea agreement. United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990). " 'In determining whether a plea agreement has been broken, courts look to what was reasonably understood by [the defendant] when he entered his plea of guilty,' " and disputed terms are determined by objective standards. United States v. Travis, 735 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1984).

A defendant may receive a departure below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range in return for his substantial assistance to the government, but such a departure is conditioned upon a motion by the government. United States v. Mena, 925 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1991); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1;¹  see United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1989) (U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 was intended to "lodge some sentencing discretion in the prosecutor"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 847 (1990)

Here, the record shows that Brei entered into plea agreement with the government, pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts in return for the government's dismissal of the remaining counts against him. Brei also agreed to cooperate with the government in its investigation into drug trafficking activities, and the government expressly reserved its discretion to determine whether to make a section 5K1.1 motion for downward departure at sentencing.² 

After his arraignment, Brei made a statement to DEA agents regarding his own activities and gave preliminary information about others he knew to be involved in drug trafficking. The agents instructed him to contact them with additional information, but Brei concedes that he "held off" on contacting the agents. Subsequently, Brei was arrested on charges of aggravated assault, urinating in public and driving on a suspended license. His conditional release was revoked and he was returned to custody due to the conduct underlying his arrest and for submitting to the probation department urine samples which tested positive for drug use. After his return to custody, Brei and his attorney each made several attempts to contact the DEA and offer further assistance. By then, however, the agents had determined that Brei could not provide the contemplated assistance because of his arrest and his problems with the probation department.³ 

At sentencing, the government declined to move for a downward departure, noting that Brei's illegal activities had caused the government to lose interest in his cooperation. The terms of the plea agreement clearly reserved to the government the discretion to decline to move for departure.⁴  See Travis, 735 F.2d at 1132 (government is held to the literal terms of a plea bargain). We cannot say that this decision was arbitrary or provoked by the bad faith necessary to allow the district court to interfere with the prosecutor's discretion by departing downward for substantial assistance. See Mena, 925 F.2d at 356.

AFFIRMED.