Unpublished Disposition, 936 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1991)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Ernest Bernard Moore, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. Moore contends that the United States Parole Commission ("USPC") violated his right to due process in calculating his presumptive parole date by failing to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed new criminal activity while on escape status. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Our review of parole decisions is limited to determining whether the USPC "has acted outside its statutory authority or has committed a constitutional violation, but we may not review any decision involving the 'exercise of judgment among a range of possible choices or options.' " Vargas v. United States Parole Comm'n, 865 F.2d 191, 193 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1552 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). Within this unreviewable area are those judgments integral to individual parole decisions, including the nature of the offense and the history of the prisoner. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1987). This court will review a parole determination only where the USPC's evaluation of the evidence is arbitrary. Id. at 1180. Moreover, the USPC may consider information that does not meet the evidentiary standards required at trial, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review the reliability of the sources of such information. Walker v. United States, 816 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1987).

Here, the USPC added 24-32 months to Moore's parole guideline range because it found that Moore had committed fraud by purchasing a car under an assumed name after he escaped from prison. This finding was based on information contained in the presentence report, which included Moore's statements to a probation officer. The USPC rejected Moore's claim that the documents he submitted regarding the repossession of the car established that he had purchased it in his own name.

Moore's challenge to the parole determination fails because the USPC acted within its statutory authority by deciding to rely on the information in the presentence report in setting Moore's presumptive parole date. See Walker, 816 F.2d at 1317 (the presentence report may serve as a basis for USPC's decision), Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1179-80 (the evaluation of evidence properly before the USPC is left almost entirely to its discretion); 18 U.S.C. § 4207(3) (USPC shall consider the presentence report if it is available and relevant). Therefore, we cannot review the parole determination because the USPC's "evaluation of the evidence was not so arbitrary as to be outside the boundary imposed by the preponderance of the evidence standard." Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1180. Moreover, " [t]his court lacks jurisdiction to review the reliability of the sources of information in the presentence report." Walker, 816 F.2d at 1317. Finally, the USPC's consideration of unadjudicated allegations or hearsay information to determine parole guidelines does not violate due process. Vargas, 865 F.2d at 195.

Accordingly, because Moore failed to establish that the USPC deprived him of due process or exceeded its statutory authority, the district court properly dismissed his habeas petition.

AFFIRMED.