Unpublished Disposition, 931 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1989)

MEMORANDUM^*** 

Pamela Hoesing appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary"). The Secretary found that Hoesing was not entitled to disability benefits after March 1984. Hoesing contends that the district court erred because the administrative law judge ("ALJ") failed to give substantial weight to her treating physician's opinion and that the ALJ's hypothetical questions to the vocational expert failed to reflect all of Hoesing's limitations, including her anxiety and depression disorders. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

Standard of Review

This court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Paulson v. Bowen, 836 F.2d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 1988). The Secretary's decision must be supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ must apply the correct legal standards. Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is " 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' " Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). We must consider "both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion; [we will] not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985).

Treating Physician's Opinion

"The medical opinions and conclusions of the treating physician are accorded special weight." Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988). If conflicting medical opinions exist and the ALJ rejects the treating physician's opinion, the ALJ or Appeals Council must set forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record. Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1983).¹  "The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, ... and making findings." Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).

Here, the ALJ considered medical reports from Drs. Donlon and Whipple, examining psychiatrists, and Hoesing's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Tribbey. Dr. Tribbey indicated that from October, 1982 to the present, Hoesing was disabled and unable to work due to her emotional instability. Drs. Donlon and Whipple independently examined Hoesing prior to and after March 1984. Both doctors reported that Hoesing showed marked improvement in her mental health after March 1984 and that she could work in a non-stress environment. The ALJ accepted the opinions of the two examining psychiatrists and rejected that of Dr. Tribbey.² 

In his decisions,³  the ALJ described in detail each physician's psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Tribbey's comments consisted of short answers to questions prepared by Hoesing's attorney or "fill-in-the-blank" type responses. Dr. Tribbey did not provide a narrative report explaining apparent discrepancies between his answers and he did not elaborate on his conclusions. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751 (ALJ need not accept treating physician's opinion that is brief and conclusory); Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).⁴ 

The Appeals Council stated, "Dr. Tribbey's reports [were] internally inconsistent, conclusory and [did] not set forth an adequate basis for his statements that the claimant [could] not work." Court Transcript 208 (Decision of Appeals Council 4/20/89).⁵  This explanation was sufficiently specific and legitimate to reject Dr. Tribbey's opinion, and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 754.

Vocational Expert Testimony

"Hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant...." Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). If the hypothetical does not reflect the claimant's limitations, the ALJ may not rely on the opinion of the expert. Id., 849 F.2d at 423.⁶ 

Here, the ALJ heard testimony from Hoesing describing her previous work responsibilities and testimony from a vocational expert ("VE") evaluating the degree of stress associated with clerk-typist positions. Hoesing testified that her duties as a clerk-typist involved typing, scheduling appointments, photocopying, answering telephones, balancing welfare claimant's overpayments and various other support services. The ALJ posed the following hypothetical to the VE:

Now, if we are dealing with a clerk typist position in a welfare office involving mostly bookkeeping and answering telephones with some screening of calls for the welfare eligibility worker and otherwise dealing with copying and typing but mostly bookkeeping and telephone work, would that be considered stressful or non-stressful?

Court Transcript 272 (Transcript of Hearing before ALJ 8/30/88). The VE answered, " [i]n the way that I look at that kind of work in the broad understanding of stress and non-stress the way that you are describing it, I would not consider it a stressful position." Id. When questioned by Hoesing's attorney, the VE indicated that a person with Hoesing's limitations could perform back office clerk-typist work where public contact was minimal.

The VE's response to the ALJ's hypothetical assumed that Hoesing did not suffer from continuous emotional problems. This assumption was not supported by the record.⁷  Therefore, the VE's response alone could not support the ALJ's decision. See Embrey, 849 F.2d at 423; Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1158 n. 13 (9th Cir. 1989) (ALJ should have included claimant's assertions of pain in hypothetical). Nevertheless, Hoesing's questions to the VE set forth her mental limitations and the VE responded that, although her previous clerk-typist work may have been somewhat stressful, other types of clerk-typist positions were appropriately low in stress to accommodate her needs. See Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1986) (claimant must show inability to return to former type of work and not just former job).

We find that there was substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that Hoesing was no longer disabled and could return to her previous type of work as a clerk-typist. See id.

AFFIRMED.