Unpublished Disposition, 928 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1985)

MEMORANDUM^** 

In this wrongful termination action, plaintiff-appellant David L. Bruce appeals the granting of the summary judgment motion of defendant-appellee Stauffer Chemical Company. We affirm.

In June 1975, Bruce was hired by Dr. Al Benson as a field research representative for Stauffer's Agricultural Chemical Division. In 1981, Bruce was promoted to senior field research representative. In early November 1985, Bruce asked Benson for permission to move from Santa Barbara to Sacramento to reduce company expenses and travel time by being closer to his corn and rice research work and so that his wife could pursue a teaching opportunity. The permission was granted. Relying on this permission, Bruce apparently began entering into certain financial commitments to move to Sacramento. In December 1985, Bruce and two other field research representatives were terminated. On December 10, 1985, Bruce was informed of the termination, which became effective on December 31, 1985. Bruce received three and one-half months of severance pay.

Bruce brought three claims in his complaint: (1) breach of an employment contract; (2) wrongful discharge under a promissory estoppel theory; and (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court initially granted summary judgment on the first and third claims and limited damages on the second claim, "to that which would compensate him for any economic loss occasioned by [Bruce's] allegedly planned move to Sacramento in December, 1985." Ultimately, a final judgment was entered against Bruce dismissing all claims. The parties agreed at oral argument that it was the intent of the parties that if the judgment were affirmed on appeal, the judgment dismissing all causes of action against the defendant would end the case.

We review a summary judgment ruling de novo. See, e.g., T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1987).

Under California law, after Bruce establishes that good cause was necessary for discharge, the employer Stauffer then has the burden to set forth the reason for the termination. In bearing his ultimate burden to establish wrongful termination, Bruce may then attack the proffered rationale as pretextual. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329-30, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Cal.Ct.App.1981) (Pugh I) ; see also Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 769-70, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195, 213 (Cal.Ct.App.1988) (Pugh II) .

Bruce's first and third claims both hinge on his contention that he held an implied employment agreement providing for termination only upon good cause.¹  We need not resolve this initial issue. We agree with the district court that even assuming arguendo the existence of an implied good cause requirement in the employment contract, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Stauffer had good cause for Bruce's termination.

Stauffer contends that Bruce's termination along with that of two other employees resulted from a bona fide reduction in the work force. See, e.g., Gianaculas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) ("good cause" existed under California law where employees were furloughed as part of a general reduction in work force). Significantly, Bruce does not dispute that Stauffer's reduction of three positions resulted from an economic downturn in the industry. Stauffer submitted ample evidence indicating the furloughs resulted from industry economic difficulties. We therefore find there is no genuine issue of material fact that Stauffer had good cause to support the termination.

Bruce's main argument is that the reason given for his termination was pretextual. We conclude that Bruce has not met his burden, under California law, to establish a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. Bruce has not shown that the reduction in force was illegitimate. Further, Bruce has not shown his selection for termination, as one of three individuals, based upon the reduction in force was pretextual. This is not a case where Bruce was the sole employee terminated; Bruce was terminated along with two others in the same job classification as a result of a reduction in force. We cannot question an otherwise legitimate exercise of managerial discretion. Clutterham v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 1223, 1227, 215 Cal. Rptr. 795, 797 (Cal.Ct.App.1985).

Bruce also appeals the district court's ruling limiting the amount of damages on the promissory estoppel claim. Bruce contends that a genuine issue of material fact was presented as to whether he was also entitled to damages related to his forbearance from seeking other employment opportunities after he was granted permission to move to Sacramento.

We conclude the district court correctly limited the damages on the promissory estoppel claim. Bruce has not cited any authority demonstrating an entitlement to such losses under a promissory estoppel theory. Moreover, Bruce's Declaration does not indicate that his detrimental reliance on permission to move to Sacramento resulted in any loss related to missed employment opportunities. (ER Tab 5, p 9). Bruce therefore has not met his burden of showing specific facts, justifying a conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact exists on this question. See T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630.

AFFIRMED.