Unpublished Disposition, 923 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1991)

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US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 923 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1991)

Victor M. PAGE, and Laverta W. Page, Plaintiffs/Appellants,v.CITY OF RIALTO, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

Nos. 88-6588, 88-6638.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Nov. 5, 1990.Decided Jan. 25, 1991.

Before HUG, CANBY and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM* 

Victor and Laverta Page appeal the district court's decision in favor of defendants after a bench trial. The district court held that the City of Rialto's rent control ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague and that enforcement of that ordinance does not constitute a taking of property without due process of law. We affirm.

Rent control under the Rialto ordinance did not amount to a taking of apellants' property. The Rialto ordinance fits comfortably into the category of regulatory cases where "the value or usefulness of private property is diminished by regulatory action not involving a physical occupation of the property." See Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 F.2d 198, 202 (9th Cir. 1986). Such regulation does not constitute a "taking." See id.; see also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (despite the drastic diminution in the value and usefulness of the property, the city's action did not amount to a taking).1 

Moreover, appellants' argument that the rent control ordinance amounted to a taking because it denied them a reasonable rate of return is defeated by the fact that the rent control ordinance was already in effect at the time they purchased the park. The district court found that the rent restriction was reflected in the purchase price, and that finding was not clearly erroneous. Appellants have offered nothing to indicate that enforcement of the ordinance resulted in a taking of their property.

The appellants' contention that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague is also without merit. The Rialto ordinance states that its purpose is "to protect the owners and occupants of mobilehomes from unreasonable rent increases while at the same time recognizing the need of the park owners to receive a just and reasonable return on their property and rental increases ..." City of Rialto, Ordinance No. 895 Sec. 4.01.010. "A just and reasonable return on investment" is not an unconstitutionally vague standard for administration of a civil statute by a commission. SEE e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942) (Congressional standard requiring "just and reasonable" rates coincides with Constitution, and does not bind commission to any single formula).

The remaining arguments of appellants have no merit. The district court's judgment is affirmed.

 *

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

 1

Compare Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1986), where rent control under the challenged ordinance did constitute a physical taking. The ordinance in Hall gave to the tenants the rights to occupy the property in perpetuity while paying a fixed rate and to transfer this interest. In effect, this denied the mobile park owners the rights of property ownership. The Rialto ordinance does not go nearly so far

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