Unpublished Disposition, 923 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1991)

Annotate this Case
US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 923 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1991)

Tatsuya FURUMOTO, Petitioner,v.IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 89-70368.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 5, 1990.* Decided Jan. 18, 1991.

Before JAMES R. BROWNING, KILKENNY and RYMER, Circuit Judges.


MEMORANDUM** 

Furumoto petitions for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of his application for voluntary departure, arguing that his due process rights were violated when the BIA considered information obtained via coercive interrogation and that the BIA abused its discretion by not considering facts in his favor. We deny the petition and affirm the BIA.

With respect to his first argument, we note that Furumoto raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Although due process claims are generally exempt from the rule that aliens must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking review in this court, Vargas v. I & NS, 831 F.2d 906, 907-08 (CA9 1987), this is not the case if the claim involves a procedural error that was correctable by the administrative tribunal. Id. at 908. The IJ has jurisdiction to determine issues involving coerced testimony and the BIA is empowered to review such decisions. See Cuervas-Ortega v. I & NS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1276 (CA9 1979).

Here, Furumoto neither objected to the introduction of the allegedly coerced testimony in his hearing before the IJ, nor challenged it as an issue on appeal to the BIA. Under these circumstances, the petitioner has failed to exhaust readily available administrative remedies and we are without jurisdiction to entertain his due process claim. See Vargas, 831 F.2d at 908.

Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA's decision to deny voluntary departure even in light of Furumoto's youth and apparent ability to finance his own departure. There is no entitlement to voluntary departure, even if an alien establishes eligibility therefor; it is a privilege, not a right, and rests with the broad discretion of the Attorney General. Villanueva-Franco v. I & NS, 802, F.2d 327, 329 (CA9 1986). Furumoto's ability to pay was obviously considered below, since statutory eligibility necessitates a showing of ability to pay departure expenses. See id. The BIA considered Furumoto's weapon conviction, his failure to attend school, his employment while on a student visa, and his credibility as a witness. We find the BIA considered the relevant factors and did not abuse its discretion.

PETITION DENIED.

 *

The panel unanimously agrees that this case is appropriate for submission without oral argument per Rule 34(a), FRAP, and CA9 Rule 34-4

 **

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir.R. 36-3

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.