Unpublished Disposition, 920 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Andre B. Young is an inmate at Twin Rivers Corrections Center, a medium-security prison in Monroe, Washington. Young requested a transfer to a minimum-security prison. Prison administrators asked Dr. Savio Chan, a psychologist who performed contract services for the prison, to examine Young. Dr. Chan examined Young in a perfunctory manner and placed his negative evaluation on Young's record. Subsequently prison officials denied Young's transfer request.

Young brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal court alleging that Dr. Chan's findings caused prison officials to deny his transfer to a minimum-security prison. In his amended complaint, Young contended that Dr. Chan relied on false records and reports from Western State Hospital and sought to have these sources as well as Chan's findings removed from his record. Dr. Chan moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the grounds that Young could not bring a Sec. 1983 action because he does not have a constitutional right to any particular custody classification or incarceration at any particular facility. The District Court for the Western Division of Washington adopted Magistrate Sweigert's report granting defendant's motion and dismissing Young's complaint with prejudice. Young appeals pro se the dismissal of his Sec. 1983 action.¹ 

ANALYSIS

This court reviews de novo a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Bretz v. Kelman, 722 F.2d 503, 504 (9th Cir. 1983).

Section 1983 of 42 U.S.C. provides relief for deprivations of federally protected rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Two essential elements must be present for a Sec. 1983 action: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of laws of the United States. Id. In this case, Young has failed to meet the second requirement: Dr. Chan's conduct violated no recognized federally protected right belonging to Young.² 

Young alleges that Dr. Chan prepared a false psychological report which prison officials used to determine his custody status and deny his transfer to a minimum-security prison. Young, however, has no constitutional right to a particular custody classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976). Nor does Young have a constitutional right to be held at a particular correctional facility or to be transferred from one facility to another. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976) (state may confine prisoner in any of its prisons without violating Constitution) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, Young does not have a constitutional right to rehabilitation. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1982)).

These conditions of confinement are the business of prison officials and due process is not implicated unless state law imposes some substantive restriction on the officials' discretion. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248-49 (1983); Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25; Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530-31. Young does not allege that the relevant Washington rules and practices governing prisoner classification created any such limitations on the prison officials' decision to deny his transfer. Even assuming the officials relied dispositively on Dr. Chan's report to deny the transfer, Young fails to state a claim under Sec. 1983 because he cannot show a constitutional violation.

Young does have a limited constitutional right to have erroneous information expunged from his prison file. Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979). To state a claim of constitutional magnitude, a prisoner must allege: (1) that information is in his file, (2) that the information is false, and (3) that it is relied on to a constitutionally significant degree. Id. at 201. Moreover, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Sec. 1983 action for expungement of false records, the prisoner must allege that he requested prison officials to expunge the false information and that his request has been denied. Id. at 202-03.

There is no indication that Young requested prison officials to expunge his file; therefore the district court would be without jurisdiction to consider the claim under Sec. 1983. Even if the district court had jurisdiction to hear the claim, the denial of Young's transfer request fails to meet the requirement that the false information was relied on to a constitutionally significant degree. Paine, 595 F.2d at 202. Furthermore, Young's dispute with Dr. Chan's evaluations and opinions regarding him is insufficient to state a claim for expungement of false records. See, e.g., Paine, 595 F.2d at 201; Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1160-61 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977) (inmate disagreed with psychiatric evaluation contained in file).

The decision of the district court that Young's complaint be dismissed with prejudice is correct. Young's dissatisfaction with the prison officials' decision to deny his transfer request does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The deficiencies of Young's complaint cannot be cured by amendment. This Court need not address Young's claim on appeal that prison officials deliberately denied him necessary medical treatment as he failed to present the issue to the district court.

AFFIRMED.