Unpublished Disposition, 911 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Marvin H. Clark, Jr., an attorney, appeals pro se the district court's findings of fact in its order striking his attorney's lien. Clark does not challenge the district court's order striking his attorney's lien itself. Instead, Clark appeals from the district court's findings of fact which supported the order because of the possible res judicata effect that one of those findings may have on future litigation. Specifically, Clark contends that the district court erred in finding that he had referred the plaintiff's case to his former law firm, Ross, Gingras & Frenz (Ross firm), after he had left the firm. Because the district court's order was clearly erroneous, we reverse.

We review the district court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (appellate court must accept the lower court's findings of fact unless upon review the appellate court is left with the "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made"); Dollar Rent-A-Car of Wash., Inc. v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 774 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985).

The district court, in its order striking Clark's attorney's lien, found that Clark had referred the case to the Ross firm " [s]hortly after he departed the Ross firm." Based on the affidavits of Clark and Thomas S. Gingras, the partner at the Ross firm who handled the case, it appears that Clark did refer the case to the Ross firm prior to his departure. Thus the district court's finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous.

Because the district court's finding of fact was clearly erroneous, we remand the case to the district court to allow it to amend its finding of facts.

REVERSED and REMANDED.