United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Robert Bradley, Norman Speck, Defendants-appellants, 905 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1990)

Had the district court completely severed appellants from the trial as they requested, they would clearly presently have no double jeopardy claim absent a showing that the government intended "to subvert" the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause by "goad [ing them] into moving for a mistrial." Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676, 102 S. Ct. 2083, 2089, 72 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1982). See United States v. Posner, 780 F.2d 1536, 1537 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182, 106 S. Ct. 2915, 91 L. Ed. 2d 544 (1986). However, in this case, the district court did not so do but rather severed the marijuana counts only and continued the trial against all of the defendants, including Speck and Bradley, as to the cocaine charges. When it so did, Speck and Bradley objected to the proposed severance, sought instead a complete severance, rather than just a severance of the marijuana counts, and advised the court that they were "going to take the position that jeopardy had attached and that there cannot be a trial in connection with those [severed marijuana] counts." The government suggests that since appellants moved for total severance and thus were willing to remove from trial all issues before the empaneled jury, and the district court granted only partial severance, each of appellants waived his right to claim double jeopardy as a result. The government contends that by so doing, appellants made a deliberate election to forego their valued rights to have their guilt or innocence determined before the empaneled jury. Appellants, on the other hand, maintain that by seeking a total severance out of concern for the possible taint or prejudicial spillover from the cocaine evidence adduced against co-defendants, they did not waive their right to claim double jeopardy as to the marijuana counts as a result of the trial court's grant of their co-defendants' motions for partial severance. In that regard, appellants point out that at no time did they make a motion solely for severance of the marijuana charges. Rather, after the jury was sworn, they sought only total severance. In that context, Speck and Bradley are correct--and the government is wrong--with regard to the government's waiver contention.

According to appellants, the necessity for some type of severance was occasioned not by circumstances arising unexpectedly at trial, but rather by the alleged initial misjoinder of the cocaine and marijuana counts in the indictment, and the government's refusal to give up the unfair advantage obtained thereby after trial started and up to and including the severance action by the district court.

In the companion appeal arising from the same prosecution and trial as the within case, United States v. John Weaver, et al., 905 F.2d 1466,⁷  Speck and Bradley's co-defendants, Sikes and Weaver, have challenged the government's joinder of the marijuana counts with the cocaine charges in the same indictment as improper. Speck and Bradley do not expressly raise any claim of improper joinder in this appeal. However, to the extent they implicitly so do, we hold such joinder erroneous for the same reasons stated in our opinion in Weaver, but also conclude that it is harmless error in connection with the cocaine charges against Speck and Bradley for the reasons stated in Weaver and also because Speck was acquitted as to all of the cocaine counts, and the jury failed to reach a verdict as to Bradley concerning any of the cocaine counts. However, Speck and Bradley assert that without the improper initial joinder in the indictment of the marijuana charges with the cocaine charges, they would not have been subject to nearly five days of trial on the marijuana charges before those charges were severed out. That brings us to application of the doctrine of manifest necessity.F. MANIFEST NECESSITY

Neither Bradley nor Speck has alleged--and the record does not reflect--any bad faith conduct on the part of the judge or the prosecutor, or any intent on the part of the prosecutor to provoke any of the defendants in the trial below into seeking a mistrial. Quite the contrary, the record reveals that by joining all defendants and offenses into a single indictment, the prosecutor sought to try all of the defendants only once. Indeed, throughout the trial, the prosecutor opposed all of defendants' various motions for severance or mistrial, and also opposed the trial court's mid-trial severance decision. Unlike Jorn, supra, where the trial judge acted on his own motion in declaring a mistrial without the defendant's consent and gave no consideration to the possibility of a trial continuance, the trial judge below scrupulously considered all of defendants' and the prosecutor's arguments before finally severing the marijuana counts under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14.

Appellants concede that some type of severance was manifestly necessary as a result of the improper misjoinder in the indictment. The question arises, however, as to whether, when such joinder, as it was here, was caused not by bad faith but at most by bad judgment on the part of the prosecution and by an initial error by the district court in not ordering a severance before trial, Speck and Bradley are entitled per se to interpose the bar of double jeopardy to a new trial against them on the marijuana counts. The answer to that question is "no." Initial perfection in such matters is not guaranteed to any defendant. And if error in joinder occurs under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b), the trial court is empowered to sever after trial starts under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 if manifest necessity so requires. If that were not so, "mistrials caused by prosecutorial or judicial errors could never be followed by second trials, because it is never manifestly necessary to make a mistake. Yet ... a prosecutor's blunder in drafting an indictment [can] suppl [y] manifest necessity for a mistrial." United States v. Buljubasic, 808 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 67, 98 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1987). Thus, " [i]f the judge makes a mistake before trial, it can be corrected and the accused tried properly. If the judge makes a mistake after trial, that too can be corrected.... If the prosecution makes a mistake in drafting the indictment, and this causes a mid-trial dismissal, that may be corrected and the trial redone." United States ex rel. Young v. Lane, 768 F.2d 834, 839 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 951, 106 S. Ct. 317, 88 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1985) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261, 274-75 (5th Cir.) (Fay, J.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 863, 98 S. Ct. 195, 54 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1977).

Speck and Bradley also assert in this appeal that, in any event, the severance ordered by the district court was not manifestly necessary. We disagree. The classic formulation of what constitutes manifest necessity was advanced by Justice Story in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L. Ed. 165 (1824). Nevertheless, there is still "no precise formulation or mechanical application" for determining what facts constitute manifest necessity, "for the 'high degree' of necessity mandated by the phrase can be found in a variety of circumstances." Abdi, 744 F.2d at 1503, quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506-07, 98 S. Ct. 824, 830-31, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978) (footnote omitted). To determine if severance was manifestly necessary, a reviewing court must examine "the entire record in the case without limiting itself to the actual findings of the trial court." Abdi at 1503. "The manifest necessity for a mistrial can exist alongside less drastic alternatives, so long as the record discloses that the trial court considered alternatives before declaring mistrial." Id. Thus, an important consideration in an appeal such as this one is whether the trial court carefully considered the alternatives and exercised sound discretion and did not act in an abrupt, precipitous or erratic manner. See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487, 91 S. Ct. at 558. "The decision of the ... trial court that mistrial was a manifest necessity deserves great deference ... especially ... when the grounds for the mistrial relate to jury prejudice, for the trial judge is in a particularly good position to observe the jurors, the witnesses and the attorneys in order to evaluate the extent of the prejudice." Abdi, 744 F.2d at 1503, citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 510-14, 98 S. Ct. at 832-35. No party in a criminal prosecution "has a right to have his case decided by a jury which may be tainted by bias; in these circumstances, 'the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments' must prevail over the defendant's 'valued right' to have his trial concluded before the first jury impaneled." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 516, 98 S. Ct. at 835-36 (1978), quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S. Ct. 834, 837, 93 L. Ed. 974 (1949) (footnotes omitted). Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested that an additional consideration in assessing manifest necessity is a determination "as to which party to the case was the beneficiary of the mistrial ruling." Jorn, 400 U.S. at 482, 91 S. Ct. at 555. Thus, in Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 81 S. Ct. 1523, 6 L. Ed. 2d 901 (1961), the Court "upheld reprosecution" after a mistrial in an opinion which "appears to tie the judgment that there was no abuse of discretion in these circumstances to the fact that the judge was acting 'in the sole interest of the defendant.' " Jorn, 400 U.S. at 482, 91 S. Ct. at 555, quoting Gori, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S. Ct. at 1526.

In its order dismissing appellants' motion to dismiss, the district court noted that " [a]s the trial progressed it became apparent to the court that it was difficult to separate the various conspiracies and that some severance was in order." The record reflects that all defendants agreed at some time during the trial that some type of severance was absolutely necessary; they just could not agree with respect to who or what should be severed. It is also clear that the district court, before declaring a mistrial, listened to detailed argument, devoted substantial time to the issue, carefully weighed possible alternatives and took into account prejudice to the non-appellant defendants, judicial economy and the avoidance of multiple litigations regarding the same or similar offenses. And, as in Gori, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S. Ct. at 1526, in granting the co-defendants' severance motion, the court below acted "in the sole interest [s] of the defendant [s]," and contrary to the urging of the prosecutor. Under the circumstances, manifest necessity existed for the trial court to sever one or more charges and/or defendants. In that light, as Judge Vance has written, "once a severance is found to be warranted by manifest necessity, the trial court has sound discretion over who is to be retained and who is to be severed." United States v. Aguiar, 610 F.2d 1296, 1301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827, 101 S. Ct. 91, 66 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1980). It is true that the district court did not make a specific finding as to manifest necessity. However, that fact is of little import in this case in which the record contains more than "sufficient justification" for such a finding. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 516-17, 98 S. Ct. at 835-36.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court soundly exercised its discretion in granting severance of the marijuana counts. Therefore, retrial of appellants upon the marijuana counts is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court's denial of appellants' motion to dismiss the marijuana counts is Affirmed, and the within case is Remanded to the district court for trial of the marijuana counts.