Unpublished Disposition, 889 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1988)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Harold G. Royce appeals the district court's judgment entered in his civil rights action brought against defendants Charles Jones and George Roybal, who were Royce's superiors when he was employed as a computer specialist at the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD").

In his complaint, Royce claimed that defendants terminated his employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) and his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The Merit Systems Protection Board decided, after a hearing, that Royce's termination had been justified. Royce then brought this action in district court, seeking damages against defendants, who allegedly played a role in his termination.

The district court agreed with the Board's finding that Royce's termination had been justified. The district court found (1) that Royce had had "a full opportunity" to present his grievances and that the Board's decision was supported by "substantial evidence," and that (2) Royce had failed "to complete his assignments in a timely and correct way." Decision at 3 (Aug. 12, 1988). In particular, the district court found that he could have completed his handbook assignment, but that he failed to do so.

We affirm the judgment of the district court because its finding that Royce's termination was justified is not clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The record is replete with instances in which Royce failed to undertake his assignments in a responsible manner. He submitted incomplete work that did not conform to the requirements of the task and that was inevitably late.

The district court did not find the witnesses who testified on Royce's behalf to be credible because they did not work with him and had their own personal grievances against HUD. Decision at 4. Moreover, the district court found Royce's testimony to be marked by "egregious inconsistencies" and to be undermined by the fact that he had submitted a false employment record when applying for a federal position. Id.

In sum, the district court rejected Royce's claim that he was terminated as a result of a conspiracy and in violation of his civil rights, finding that he failed to prove that his termination was motivated by any improper purpose.

Royce complains that the district court based its findings of fact in part on the administrative record, rather than on a trial de novo. The district court acted within its discretion in relying upon the administrative record, as well as the testimony of live witnesses, which the court permitted Royce to call. See Revis v. Laird, 627 F.2d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1980); Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 1974).

Royce provides no authority for his claim that the district court recognized de facto a cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"); his complaint alleges only violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and of his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. We find his de facto APA claim to be without merit.

Royce's First and Fifth Amendment claims are also without merit. They are barred by the existence of administrative procedures to address his claim of improper dismissal. Johnston v. Horne, 875 F.2d 1415, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The existence of statutory and administrative procedures for addressing complaints of improper personnel action bars [plaintiff's] claim."); see Karamanos v. Egger, 882 F.2d 447, 452 (9th Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.