Unpublished Disposition, 876 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1989)

MEMORANDUM^* 

Appellant Billy Williams appeals the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying his application for Social Security disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 423. We reverse and remand for the award of benefits.

In the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that Williams was not entitled to benefits under the Act because, while Williams could not perform his past relevant work due to "triple vessel coronary artery disease, diabetes, hypertension, anxiety disorder and ... status post myocardial infarcation," he could still perform certain nonstressful sedentary jobs. The ALJ's conclusion that Williams had the residual functional capacity to engage in sedentary nonstressful work was based in large part on the ALJ's decision to discredit Williams' testimony that he experienced debilitating chest pain, depression, and fatigue. The ALJ found that Williams' claims were "not fully credible in light of the medical evidence and observations of the claimant at the hearing."

In concluding that Williams could still perform some jobs, the ALJ apparently also rejected the opinion of Williams' treating physician, Dr. Karahalios, that Williams' physical and emotional impairments prevented him from engaging in any employment that required an eight-hour work day. The ALJ gave no reason for rejecting Dr. Karahalios' opinion and, in fact, did not even mention it in the list of findings.

The ALJ's dismissal of Williams' treating physician's opinion and Williams' own testimony without explanation or specific findings is plainly inadequate under the law of this circuit. It is now well settled in this circuit that if the ALJ "wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating physician, he ... must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for so doing that are based on substantial evidence in the record." Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). The same findings must be made if the ALJ chooses to disbelieve the claimant's excess pain testimony, Gamer v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 815 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1987), or the claimant's testimony that his mental state prevents him from performing any gainful activity. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, the ALJ gave no explanation and made no specific findings.

Ordinarily, remand is required so that the ALJ can make the requisite findings or explanation. However, remand is not necessary if the reviewing court determines that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support a decision to discount the treating physician's opinion or the claimant's testimony. Id. at 1232; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984).

We are convinced that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support either the ALJ's decision to reject Dr. Karahalios's opinion or the ALJ's decision to disbelieve Williams' own testimony about his depressed mental state, constant fatigue and chest pains. Contrary to the ALJ's conclusion, there was objective clinical evidence, as well as medical reports by several examining physicians, indicating that Williams suffers from significant physical impairments which could reasonably be expected to produce both the pain and fatigue about which Williams testified. Furthermore, Williams' testimony that he suffers from anxiety, depression and an inability to concentrate is fully corroborated by Dr. Gould and Dr. Ryan, who performed, respectively, psychiatric and psychological evaluations of Williams.

Thus, there is not substantial evidence in the record to discredit Williams' subjective testimony or the opinion of his treating physician that his mental and physical condition prevent him from working a full work week. Having concluded that the ALJ was not free to disbelieve Williams' testimony or the opinion of his treating physician, we must now assess the ALJ's conclusion that Williams retains the residual functional capacity to perform gainful work in the economy. When the subjective pain testimony and the opinion testimony of the treating physician are credited, as we believe they must be, there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that Williams remains capable of sedentary work. Indeed, it is the uncontradicted testimony of the Secretary's vocational expert that there are no jobs an individual of Williams' age, education and work experience can perform if that individual suffers from the same physical ailments, pain and depressed mental state as Williams. Since the record is fully developed, remand to the ALJ for further findings is not required. See Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1457.

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for payment of benefits.