Unpublished Disposition, 859 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1983)

MEMORANDUM^** 

Gurcharan Dehal ("Dehal") appeals from the district court's finding in favor of the United States Postal Service in his action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Dehal argues that the district court: (1) applied the wrong standard to determine that he had not established a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; and (2) erroneously found that the explanation presented by the defense to rebut the prima facie case was not pretextual. We reject these contentions and affirm.

BACKGROUND

Dehal filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) alleging discriminatory and retaliatory treatment by the Orinda Post Office. Dehal worked at the Orinda office from September of 1980 to July 2, 1983. He was formally terminated in November 1983. Dehal claims that he was singled out for discipline and discriminated against because of his ethnic background¹  and in retaliation for his filing of EEOC complaints and union grievances. More specifically, he alleges that (1) several incidents involving his supervisor, leading up to and including a confrontation on July 2, 1983, and (2) his termination in November of 1983, were discriminatory and retaliatory. After a two day trial, the district court issued an opinion in which it thoroughly canvassed each of Dehal's claims in support of his allegations, and ultimately concluded that he had failed to meet his burden. Dehal appeals from that determination.

ANALYSIS

I. The Legal Standard to Establish a Prima Facie Case

Dehal argues that the district court failed to apply the proper test in determining that there was no prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. This contention is without merit.

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court outlined the procedure for analyzing claims of discriminatory treatment, including that which is necessary to establish a prima facie case. The Court elaborated on this analysis in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983). The complainant carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. The employer then has the burden of production "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the contested conduct. Id. If the employer meets that burden, the complainant must then be given the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's proffered explanation is pretextual. Id. at 804. The burden of persuasion on the issue of improper discriminatory intent "remains at all times with the plaintiff."²  See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.

The model outlined in McDonnell for the determination of whether a plaintiff established a prima facie case is not to be applied rigidly. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n. 6; Foster v. Arcata Associates, 772 F.2d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). However, Dehal's argument fails for a more basic reason. Although the district court questioned whether he established a prima facie case, it went on to evaluate his claims as if he had. That is, the court reviewed the Postal Service's explanations for the challenged actions.

Further " [w]here the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant."³  Aikins, 460 U.S. at 715 (emphasis added). At this point, any presumptions "drop out," and the court must determine, as a factual matter, whether the challenged action was discriminatory or retaliatory within the meaning of Title VII. See id; see also Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 875 (1984) ("ultimate question" is whether employment decision made on basis of race). To prevail, the plaintiff must ultimately prove discriminatory or retaliatory intent. See Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).

The procedure outlined in McDonnell "is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715. At the close of the evidence at trial, the district court "ha [d] before it all the evidence it need [ed] to decide whether 'the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.' " Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). After a two day trial, the district court concluded that the Postal Service did not intentionally discriminate or retaliate against Dehal. The presence or absence of a prima facie case is thus irrelevant.

II. District Court's Conclusion of no Violation

Dehal's second argument is that the district court erred in its conclusion that the Postal Service articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the challenged actions. In effect, Dehal challenges the court's ultimate finding of no Title VII violation.

The burden of proof regarding intentional discrimination or retaliation remains with the plaintiff at all times. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. The issue of discriminatory intent is a question of fact. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715-16; Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982). Thus, we will not disturb the district court's finding unless it is "clearly erroneous". See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 290; Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). "An appellate court cannot find that findings of fact are clearly erroneous unless 'on the entire evidence [it] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)). We are particularly deferential to findings based on the credibility of witnesses. See id.

The district court thoroughly reviewed the facts and testimony surrounding the events leading to and including July 2, 1983, and the ultimate termination of employment in November 1983. The court concluded that Dehal had failed to prove that the Postal Service treated him as it did because of his national origin and color, or in reprisal for prior complaints of discrimination.⁴ 

We find no error in this conclusion. The court concluded, after a two day trial in which it could evaluate the credibility of the various witnesses, that Dehal was not subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory treatment in the events leading to and including July 2, 1983. The court acknowledged that there was a personality conflict between Dehal and his immediate supervisor, but correctly held that such conflicts were beyond the scope of Title VII. See Sutton, 646 F.2d at 410. The court accepted the Postal Service's testimony that the actions of Dehal's supervisor on July 2 were within ordinary guidelines, and were only an attempt to compel Dehal to perform his duties.

The court similarly accepted the Postal Service's testimony that the Orinda Postmaster terminated Dehal in November 1983 because of his refusal to return to work, and the Postmaster's good faith belief that he lacked the authority to effectuate a transfer. The court concluded that even if that belief was in error, the evidence did not support the allegation of a racial or retaliatory motivation. Indeed, Dehal's allegations are generally void of any specific facts that could lead a reasonable fact finder to the conclusion that he was singled out for disparate treatment, or that the Postal Service's proffered explanations for his treatment were pretextual. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (plaintiff must demonstrate that similarly situated employees were not treated equally). The district court's conclusion is by no means clearly erroneous.

AFFIRMED.