Milton Wayne Seymore, Petitioner-appellant, v. State of Alabama, Leoneal Davis, Warden, et al., and Theattorney General of the State of Alabama,respondents-appellees, 846 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1988)

Milton Wayne Seymore, an Alabama prisoner, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the district court for the Northern District of Alabama. Seymore contends that his conviction was obtained in violation of the "speedy trial provision" of Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Ala.Code. sec. 15-9-81 (1982) (hereinafter "IAD" or "the Agreement") because he was tried more than 180 days after requesting a final disposition of an outstanding indictment lodged against him.¹  We hold that a violation of Article III(a) of the Agreement will support no post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 when petitioner alleges no facts casting substantial doubt on the state trial's reliability on the question of guilt. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.² 

In 1980, while he was serving a thirty-year sentence in the Tennessee State Penitentiary (TSP), Seymore was indicted by an Alabama grand jury for robbery. In March 1981, the district attorney of the Tenth Judicial District of Alabama lodged a detainer against Seymore. In April 1981, pursuant to Article III(a) of the IAD, Seymore filed an Inmate's Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations or Complaints (hereinafter "Inmate's Notice ") with the Warden of the TSP who, by certified mail, forwarded Seymore's request to the Alabama district attorney and court clerk. In August 1981, Seymore was sent to Alabama where he was arraigned on August 17, 1981; his trial began on November 30, 1981.³  After a two-day trial, the jury found Seymore guilty of robbery and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison.

Prior to his trial, Seymore moved to have the robbery indictment against him dismissed because he was not tried within 180 days after his Inmate's Notice was served on the Alabama district attorney and the Clerk of the Alabama Court. This motion was based on the "speedy trial provision" of Article III(a) of the IAD which provides that where a prisoner incarcerated in one state files an Inmate's Notice on "any untried indictment" pending in another state "on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner," the prisoner must be brought to trial within 180 days. See IAD, Art. III(a). Failure to try the prisoner within this period requires dismissal of the indictment with prejudice. Id. at Art. V(c). The state trial court denied this motion to dismiss; and after Seymore was convicted, he appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. See Seymore v. State, 429 So. 2d 1188 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).

On appeal, Seymore's conviction was affirmed because the Alabama appellate court determined that he had not sustained his burden of proving the date on which his Inmate's Notice was delivered to the Alabama authorities for purposes of calculating the 180-day limitation period contained in Article III(a) of the Agreement. The court held,

[t]he record is void of any evidence tending to prove the date [the Inmate's Notice was] delivered to the prosecuting attorney. There is no evidence that [the Inmate's Notice was] sent by registered mail, return receipt requested, as provided by the statute in this case.

* * *

We hold that when there is not proof of the date of the delivery of the [Inmate's Notice ] documents to the proper prosecuting attorney and the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, the trial court did not err to the prejudice of the appellant when it overruled appellant's motion to dismiss.... The burden of proof is on the appellant to show by the record that the trial court erred to his prejudice. To have the benefits of [the IAD], he must prove the date his request was delivered to the proper officers of the demanding state.

Id. at 1194. (citations omitted).

After this unsuccessful appeal, Seymore wrote to the Tennessee State Penitentiary and was notified that his Inmate's Notice was received by the Alabama district attorney and court clerk on April 17, 1981 and April 16, 1981 respectively.⁴  This information tended to prove that Seymore was tried 227 days after his Inmate's Notice was served upon the appropriate Alabama officials. Armed with this information, Seymore filed the instant habeas petition in federal district court. Although acknowledging "that the circuits are in great conflict concerning whether a violation of the IAD may be a basis for federal habeas relief in an action filed by a state prisoner," the district court assumed for the purposes of its opinion that IAD violations are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court then denied Seymore's petition by agreeing with the conclusion of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that Seymore "never established that the statutory notice was received by the appropriate officials of the receiving state."

In addition, as an alternative basis for its decision, the district court relied upon Article IV of the IAD, which provides that when a state requests return of a prisoner from the custody of another state for trial in the receiving state, the trial must be commenced within 120 days of the date the prisoner arrives in the receiving state. See IAD, Art. IV. Believing the state had fully complied with the requirements of Article IV, the district court determined that no IAD violation had occurred.⁵  Accordingly, the district court denied Seymore's petition; this appeal followed.

Treating Seymore's allegations as true, he was not tried within the time required by Article III(a) of the IAD; therefore, we will determine whether such a violation is cognizable in post-trial federal habeas proceedings. Section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court on only the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

(emphasis added). Initially, we note that the IAD is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the context of the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution.⁶  The Agreement is, thus, considered a "law [ ] ... of the United States." See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719-20, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L. Ed. 516 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42, 101 S. Ct. 703, 706-08, 66 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1981).

Still, not all violations of a "law [ ] of the United States" may be asserted in a habeas corpus proceeding. Indeed, when determining whether nonconstitutional federal claims are cognizable in federal habeas proceedings, "the appropriate inquiry [is] whether the claimed error of law [is] 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' and whether ' [i]t ... present [s] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.' " Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 2305, 41 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1974) (emphasis added) quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429, 82 S. Ct. 468, 472, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962).

Although other Circuits have held differently,⁷  we are persuaded by the decisions of our colleagues on the First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits who have held that various violations of the IAD are nonfundamental defects and--absent a showing of some sort of prejudice--are uncognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Fasano v. Hall, 615 F.2d 555, 558 (1st Cir.) (alleged violation of Article III's speedy trial provision and other alleged IAD violations uncognizable under section 2254 because violations are "not 'fundamental defects' indicating a 'miscarriage of justice' "), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 867, 101 S. Ct. 201, 66 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980); Edwards v. United States, 564 F.2d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (alleged violation of Article IV's anti-shuttling provision uncognizable under section 2255 because violation did not result "in a complete miscarriage of justice"); Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.) ("violation of the 180-day time provision of Article III(a) alleged in this case does not constitute a fundamental defect entitling petitioner to relief under section 2254, because Kerr has failed to show any prejudice...."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 929, 106 S. Ct. 263, 88 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1985); Mars v. United States, 615 F.2d 704, 707 (6th Cir.) (alleged violation of Article IV's anti-shuttling provision "does not rise to the level of seriousness justifying section 2255 relief" because petitioner failed to show actual prejudice), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S. Ct. 138, 66 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1980); Huff v. United States, 599 F.2d 860, 863 (8th Cir.) (alleged violation of Article IV's anti-shuttling provision and speedy trial provision uncognizable under section 2255 because Huff failed to show actual prejudice), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952, 100 S. Ct. 428, 62 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979); Casper v. Ryan, 822 F.2d 1283, 1288-91 (3rd Cir. 1987) (violation of Article III(a) uncognizable in section 2254 proceeding absent a showing of prejudice) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 714, 98 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1988); Greathouse v. United States, 655 F.2d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir. 1981) (alleged violation of Article IV's anti-shuttling provision uncognizable under section 2255), cert. denied, Y455 U.S. 926, 102 S. Ct. 1289, 71 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1982).⁸ 

These cases are consistent with our previous decision in Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. Unit B, August 1981),⁹  which also supports our conclusion that Seymore's claim is uncognizable. Although Sassoon did not confront the issue presented here--whether a violation of Article III(a) of the IAD may warrant federal habeas relief following a state trial--we emphasized that to obtain section 2254 relief, the petitioner needed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by an alleged IAD violation. See id. at 374 (issuance of writ unjustified "where prisoner does not even allege that he was harmed by the violation."). Thus, in that case we concluded that dismissal of Sassoon's indictments was unjustified because no legitimate interest of his was impaired by the alleged IAD violation. Id.

In the instant case, Seymore has asserted no prejudice that resulted from Alabama's failure to try him within 180 days as required by Article III. Indeed, during oral argument Seymore's lawyer conceded that no injury resulting from the violation of the Agreement was alleged in Seymore's petition. Nor could Seymore have demonstrated such an injury since nothing in the record indicates that the "violation of the IAD has in any way affected or impugned the integrity of the fact finding process at his trial." See Mars, 615 F.2d at 707. Consequently, since Seymore has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered any prejudice in defending himself against the robbery charges, we hold that, under Davis, the alleged violation of Article III(a) of the IAD warrants no relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

AFFIRMED.