United States of America, Chester Sewer District of Chester,south Carolina; Grand Strand Water and Sewerauthority of Conway, South Carolina,plaintiff-appellee, v. Frank A. Shepherd, Defendant-appellant,andcfw Construction Co., Inc.; Frederick M. Young; Prestoncarroll Co., Inc.; Preston Carroll Enterprises,defendants.united States of America; Chester Sewer District Ofchester, South Carolina; Grand Strand Water Andsewer Authority of Conway, Southcarolina, Plaintiffs-appellees, v. Cfw Construction Co., Inc.; Frederick M. Young, Defendants-appellants,andpreston Carroll Co., Inc.; Preston Carroll Enterprises;frank A. Shepherd, Defendants.united States of America; Chester Sewer District of Chestersouth Carolina; Grand Strand Water and Sewerauthority of Conway, South Carolina,plaintiffs-appellees, v. Preston Carroll Co., Inc.; Preston Carroll Enterprises,defendants-appellants,andcfw Construction Co., Inc.; Frederick M. Young; Frank A.shepherd, Defendants, 819 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1987)

John Gerard Boswell, Kenneth Michael Suggs, Suggs & Kelly, for appellant Shepherd.

Joseph Monroe Strickland, Stephen G. Morrison, Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, for appellants CFW Construction Co., and Young.

Peter L. Murphy, McNair, Glenn, Konduros, Corley, for appellants Preston Carroll Co. and Preston Carroll Enterprises.

Vinton DeVane Lide, United States Attorney, Robert Friedrick, Environmental Protection Agency Office of General Counsel, Michael F. Hertz, Stephen D. Altman, Joan E. Hartman, Department of Justice, for appellee United States.

Arthur Lee Gaston, Gaston, Gaston & Marion, PA, for appellee Chester Sewer District.

Richard Nelson Booth, for appellee Grand Strand Water and Sewer Authority.

PER CURIAM:

Before us is plaintiff-appellee's motion to dismiss these appeals from the district court's order granting partial summary judgment and awarding the government civil penalties pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729. For the reasons stated below, we grant the motion and dismiss these appeals.

Federal appellate jurisdiction generally depends on the existence of a decision by the district court that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides a limited exception to this requirement by permitting a district court to enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims in a multi-claim action when there is " 'more than one claim' for relief presented in the action, and there 'is no just reason for delay.' " Para-Chem Southern, Inc. v. M. Lowenstein Corp., 715 F.2d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has "outlined the steps to be followed," Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980), in certifying judgments for appeal under Rule 54(b):

A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a "final judgment." It must be a "judgment" in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be "final" in the sense that it is "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action."

Once having found finality, the district court must go on to determine whether there is any just reason for delay.

Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 7-8 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)). See also Para-Chem, 715 F.2d at 131.

The district court's order found the defendants liable to the government on the False Claims Act claims of the complaint and awarded the statutory civil penalties as partial damages on these claims; the district court reserved a determination of the actual damages to be awarded on these claims. A partial summary judgment which resolves the question of liability but leaves an issue of damages in dispute is neither final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 nor certifiable under Rule 54(b). Rudd Construction Equipment Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 711 F.2d 54, 56 (6th Cir. 1983).

Appellants assert that the award of statutory civil penalties pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729 constitutes a judgment on a separate "claim" certifiable for appeal under Rule 54(b). The district court's partial summary judgment is not, however, one which "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment" as to the False Claims Act claims. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. at 233.

We hold that the district court did not adjudicate any "claim" with sufficient finality to be certifiable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Because Rule 54(b) "does not authorize the district court to certify non-final decisions as final," Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 802 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985), we must dismiss these appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and oral argument would not significantly aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED.