United States of America, Appellee, v. Donald Eugene Kincaid, Appellant, 362 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1966)

Defendant, convicted of a Dyer Act violation, claims that he lacked mental capacity to waive counsel and plead guilty. When he appeared before the District Court, in answer to questions put by the United States Attorney, he agreed to waive counsel, waive indictment,¹  and to plead guilty. During this proceeding he said that he had turned himself in because "I needed medical treatment or something." When afforded an opportunity to make a statement prior to imposition of sentence he said:

Well I feel I need some kind of psychiatric treatment. I would appreciate it if there was some way you could recommend it, because it is just a continuous thing. I know at times I don't care about life or anything else.

At no time during this proceeding did the District Court undertake to determine, pursuant to the mandate of Rule 11,²  whether the guilty plea was voluntarily and understandingly made. The questions addressed to the defendant regarding the plea of guilty were posed not by the court but by the United States Attorney.³  Nor were any questions asked which were reasonably calculated to elicit information as to the defendant's mental processes.⁴  No attempt was made to explain the elements of the crime, to determine what prompted him to surrender himself and plead guilty, or to explain to him the effect of a guilty plea.

Rule 11 requires something more than conclusionary questions phrased in the language of the rule. It contemplates such an inquiry as will develop the underlying facts from which the court will draw its own conclusion. Particularly, when the defendant had volunteered the information that he had surrendered himself for the purpose of obtaining medical and psychiatric care he thought he needed, careful probing to develop the relevant facts was essential. Minimally, the court should have put questions designed to reveal the nature and details of the supposed need, the defendant's general medical history and the relation, if any, between any mental or emotional defect and the tender of the guilty plea, which, apparently, was an intermediate objective of the voluntary surrender.

We have previously held that failure to comply with Rule 11 does not require that a conviction be set aside where the plea was in fact intelligently made. Gundlach v. United States, 262 F.2d 72, 76.⁵  But, in a case such as this where the defendant twice brought to the attention of the court his need for medical or psychiatric treatment, we think the failure of the District Court to assure itself of the defendant's mental capacity to plead guilty compels the conclusion that the plea was not intelligently made.

Here there was more than a negative failure of compliance with the Rule's requirements, there was a failure to observe the unfurled flags signaling danger and possible or probable infirmity in the defendant's capacity or volition, or both.

The judgment of conviction will be reversed so that the defendant may be properly arraigned.

Reversed.