IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE RAY A. REVEL, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. § § § § § § § § § § § No. 298, 2003 Court Below–Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County in Cr. A. Nos. S00-03-0275I & S00-050070I.
Def. ID No. 0002014354
Submitted: June 24, 2003 Decided: September 24, 2003 Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. ORDER This 24th day of September 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: (1) The appellant, Ray A. Revel, filed an appeal from an order of
the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The appellee, State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
On September 7, 2000, Revel pleaded guilty to Driving Under
the Influence of Alcohol (4th offense) and Escape in the Third Degree. He was immediately sentenced, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(C), to a total of six years at Level V, suspended after nine months for one year at a Level IV residential substance abuse treatment program, suspended after successful completion of the program for four years and three months at Level III. Revel did not appeal. (3) In September 2001 and January 2002, the Superior Court
sentenced Revel for having violated his probation. Revel did not file an appeal from either proceeding. In January 2002, Revel filed a motion for correction of sentence. The Superior Court denied that ruling on January 29, 2002, and Revel did not appeal. (4) In March 2002, Revel filed a petition for a writ of prohibition
that sought a correction of his most recent violation of probation sentence. By Order dated April 30, 2002, the Court dismissed the petition. 1 (5) In July 2002, Revel moved in the Superior Court for
modification of his sentence. Revel’s motion was denied on July 16, 2002, and he did not appeal. In March 2003, Revel again sought relief from his
In re Revel, 2002 WL 833257 (Del. Supr.).
sentence. The Superior Court declined to revisit the issue, 2 however, and Revel did not appeal. Finally, on April 30, 2003, Revel moved to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The motion was denied on procedural grounds on May 23, 2003, and this appeal followed. (6) On appeal from the denial of his postconviction motion, Revel
argues, as he did in the Superior Court, that the Court failed to honor Revel’s September 2000 plea agreement. Revel argues that he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for placement only in the Crest Program. Revel, however, was placed in the New Horizons Program, and he argues that this alleged change in placement, from the Crest Program to the New Horizons Program, is a breach of his plea agreement and rendered his plea involuntary. (7) At the September 2000 sentencing, the Superior Court ordered
that Revel was required to complete the “Level 4 Crest Program.”3 The written sentencing order states, however, that Revel was required to complete a Level 4 “residential substance abuse treatment program.” The record reflects that the New Horizons Program, which is a Level 4
See State v. Revel, Del. Super., No. 0002014354, Stokes, J. (Mar. 27, 2003). Hr’g Tr., Sept. 7, 2000, at 14.
residential substance abuse treatment program, is the “primary portion” of the Crest Program. 4 (8) The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when denying When
Revel’s motion for postconviction relief on procedural grounds.
considering a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 61, the Superior Court must apply the procedural requirements before reaching the merits of the claim. 5 (9) To the extent that Revel’s claims of breach of plea agreement
and involuntary plea were not raised in the Superior Court or on direct appeal, they are procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3). Revel has failed to show “cause for relief from the procedural default” or any “prejudice from [a] violation of [his] rights.”6 There is, moreover, no
evidence of a “miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. 7 (10) To the extent that the claims were raised in Revel’s March 2003 request for sentence relief, and rejected by the Superior Court, the claims are
4 5 6
See State v. Revel, Del. Super., No. 0002014354, Stokes, J. (Mar. 27, 2003). Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991). Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
barred under Rule 61(i)(4).
Under this provision, “any ground for relief
which has already been adjudicated is barred unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.”8 (11) It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is without merit. The issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled Delaware law, and to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), the State’s motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland Justice
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).