Filed 9/21/05
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
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)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
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v.
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MARY ELLEN SAMUELS,
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Defendant and Appellant.
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___________________________________ )
S042278
Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA002269
MODIFICATION OF OPINION
ORDER
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case, filed on June 26, 2005 and appearing at 36 Cal.4th 96,
is modified as follows:
1.
The paragraph spanning pages 120-121 is modified to read:
“This case is distinguishable from People v. Lawley (2002) 27
Cal.4th 102, 151-154 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461], upon
which defendant relies, for Bernstein’s facially incriminating
comments were in no way exculpatory, self-serving, or collateral.
Defendant argues that Bernstein’s assertion “that [defendant] had
paid him” for the killing was either collateral to his statement against
penal interest, or an attempt to shift blame. We disagree. This
admission, volunteered to an acquaintance, was specifically
disserving to Bernstein’s interests in that it intimated he had
participated in a contract killing – a particularly heinous type of
murder – and in a conspiracy to commit murder. Under the totality
of the circumstances presented here, we do not regard the reference
to defendant incorporated within this admission as itself constituting
a collateral assertion that should have been purged from Navarro’s
recollection of Bernstein’s precise comments to him. Instead, the
reference was inextricably tied to and part of a specific statement
against penal interest. (See People v. Wilson (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
271, 277 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 420].) Moreover, the differences between
the trustworthiness of the statements involved in this case and those
excluded in People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pages 151-154 (in
which we found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion,
following an offer of proof, of proposed testimony recounting a
prisoner’s assertions that the Aryan Brotherhood was involved in a
homicide he claimed to have committed) are palpable. In any event,
even had the trial judge erred, any such error was harmless. (People
v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)”
2.
The paragraph spanning pages 135-136 is modified to read:
“Unlike the situation in Prieto, here the jury expressed
confusion regarding CALJIC No. 8.84’s meaning. However, we
reject defendant’s claim because the trial court’s refusal to respond
more fully to the jury’s question did not constitute prejudicial error.
In so holding, we follow People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757,
798 [257 Cal.Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844], and People v. Silva (1988)
45 Cal.3d 604, 641 [247 Cal.Rtpr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070], in which we
observed no prejudicial error in refusals to respond to comparable
jury requests for clarification as to the possibility of defendant’s
release from prison. Here, as there, ‘[t]he [court’s] response left the
jury in the same position as when the jury asked the question—i.e.,
uncertain of the answers. It is inconceivable that such uncertainty
affected the jury’s penalty verdict.’ (Silva, at p. 641.)”
This modification does not affect the judgment.
