Raceway Ford Cases
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Plaintiffs, appellants, and cross-respondents were consumers who purchased vehicles from defendant, respondent, and cross-appellant Raceway Ford. Plaintiffs raised numerous causes of action based on laws proscribing certain acts against consumers, unfair competition, and deceptive business practices, bringing both individual claims and claims on behalf of two certified classes. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Raceway and against plaintiffs on all causes, except that a single plaintiff was granted rescission on a single cause of action. Separately, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to Raceway. In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s judgment on the merits (case No. E054517) and fee order (case No. E056595); Raceway cross-appealed regarding one aspect of the trial court’s fee order. In their appeal, plaintiffs specifically argued that, as a matter of law, Raceway’s previous practice of “backdating” second or subsequent contracts for sale of a vehicle to the original date of sale violated the Automobile Sales Finance Act (also known as the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act (ASFA)), the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The Court of Appeal agreed that the practice of backdating could have resulted in inaccurate disclosures to class members, thereby violating the ASFA, at least in some cases. On the record, however, the Court declined to order entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, rather reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to plaintiffs’ backdating claims. Plaintiffs also appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to claims of a second certified class, consisting of Raceway customers who purchased used diesel vehicles from Raceway and who were charged fees for smog checks and smog certifications that were only properly applicable to purchases of gasoline vehicles. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ smog fee claims. Additionally, plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway on certain individual plaintiffs’ claims that Raceway violated the ASFA by failing to provide them with copies of their credit applications. The Court found plaintiffs’ evidence in support of these claims was insufficient to overturn the trial court's decision, so that ruling was also affirmed. Lastly, plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to claims under the UCL and the CLRA brought by plaintiff Francisco Salcedo in his individual capacity. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Salcedo on his claim of fraud, and granted him the remedy of rescission, though it declined to award any punitive damages. Plaintiffs contended that the judgment in Mr. Salcedo’s favor on his fraud claim established as a matter of law that he should also have judgment entered in his favor on his UCL and CLRA claims. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed. The basis for the trial court’s award of fees to Raceway was, in part, undermined by the Court's partial reversal of the judgment. The case was therefore remanded with respect to Raceway's claims in light of remand on other issues.
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