State v. Jones
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Cite as 2009 Ark. 620
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
09-333
Opinion Delivered 12-10-09
STATE OF ARKANSAS, OFFICE OF
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
APPELLANT,
VS.
KEVIN L. JONES,
APPELLEE,
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT
COURT OF HOT SPRING COUNTY,
NO. DR-98-154-2, HON. PHILLIP H.
SHIRRON , JUDGE,
AFFIRMED.
ROBERT L. BROWN, Associate Justice
Appellant State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement (“OCSE”) appeals
from the Hot Spring County Circuit Court’s December 10, 2008 order, granting appellee
Kevin L. Jones’s motion to vacate his child-support arrearage under Arkansas Code Annotated
section 9-10-115(f)(1)(C). In its appeal, OCSE asserts that the circuit judge erred by
retroactively applying section 9-10-115(f)(1), as amended by Act 60 of 2007, to vacate a
judgment for a child-support arrearage, which was granted prior to the effective date of Act
60. We affirm the circuit judge’s order to vacate.
On August 20, 1998, a default judgment of paternity was entered against Jones finding
that he was the father of Mary Mitchell’s minor child, E.M. He was ordered to pay child
support of $47.00 a week, plus costs and fees. On January 18, 2006, a hearing was held on
a contempt motion filed by OCSE, at which Jones requested and was granted the right to
Cite as 2009 Ark. 620
take a paternity test pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-115(e)(1)(A).
Following the hearing, the circuit judge entered an order on February 14, 2006, finding that
Jones owed $14,342.54 in child-support arrearage to OCSE.1 In addition, the order
continued Jones’s child-support obligation at $47 a week plus an additional $10 per week to
satisfy the judgment. Prior to entry of this order, a paternity test filed with the court excluded
Jones as the biological father of E.M.
On May 3, 2006, Jones moved to set aside the default paternity judgment entered
against him in 1998 and to terminate his child-support obligations based on the results of the
paternity test. In a judgment entered on May 31, 2006, the circuit judge vacated the finding
of paternity against Jones and terminated his obligation to pay future child support. The
circuit judge also denied Jones’s motion to set aside the default judgment and awarded
judgment in favor of OCSE for $14,342.54 as the child-support arrearage. Jones appealed the
denial of his motion to set aside the default paternity judgment to the Arkansas Court of
Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See Jones v. Office of Child Support
Enforcement, CA 06-965 (Ark. Ct. App. May 2, 2007) (unpublished).
On January 11, 2007, this court decided the case of Office of Child Support
Enforcement v. Parker, 368 Ark. 393, 246 S.W.3d 851 (2007). At issue in Parker was whether
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-115(f)(1) (Supp. 2005), allowed a previously
1
Mary Mitchell assigned her rights to the child-support arrearage to OCSE.
-2-
09-333
Cite as 2009 Ark. 620
adjudicated father to be relieved of past-due child support upon a finding that he was not the
child’s biological father. Section 9-10-115(f)(1) provided on January 11, 2007, as follows:
If the test administered under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section excludes the
adjudicated father or man deemed to be the father pursuant to an acknowledgment of
paternity as the biological father of the child and the court so finds, the court shall set
aside the previous finding or establishment of paternity and relieve him of any future
obligation of support as of the date of the finding.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-115(f)(1) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
Based on this statute, this court concluded that the General Assembly intended to
relieve a previously adjudicated father of his obligation to pay future child support upon a
finding that he was not actually the child’s biological father but did not intend to relieve him
of his obligation to pay past-due child support. In a concurring opinion, the General
Assembly, which was then in session, was urged “to clarify section 9-10-115(f)(1) once and
for all on whether child-support arrearages must be paid by a non-biological father in all
instances.” Parker, 368 Ark. at 400, 246 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Brown, J. concurring)
On February 2, 2007, the General Assembly enacted Act 60 of 2007 entitled “An Act
to Clarify the Law on Child Support Arrearages Owed By a Nonbiological Father.” This act
amended Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-10-115(f)(1) to provide as follows:
If the test administered under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section excludes the
adjudicated father or man deemed to be the father pursuant to an acknowledgment of
paternity as the biological father of the child and the court so finds, the court shall:
(A) Set aside the previous finding or establishment of paternity;
(B) Find that there is no future obligation of support;
(C) Order that any unpaid support owed under the previous order is vacated; and
-3-
09-333
Cite as 2009 Ark. 620
(D) Order that any support previously paid is not subject to refund.
See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-115(f)(1) (Repl. 2008) (emphasis added). The effective date of
Act 60 was July 31, 2007.
On March 7, 2008, Jones moved to vacate the unpaid balance of his child-support
arrearage pursuant to section 9-10-115(f)(1), as amended by Act 60. OCSE answered and
moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that the amended version of
section 9-10-115(f)(1) could not be applied retroactively. At a subsequent hearing on the
matter, OCSE argued that section 9-10-115(f)(1), as amended by Act 60, could not be
applied retroactively to the May 31, 2006 arrearage judgment entered before Act 60's effective
date, because the General Assembly had not expressed an intent that it be applied
retroactively. Thus, OCSE contended that it was entitled under Arkansas Code Annotated
section 9-14-235 to continue to collect payments from Jones until the arrearage had been
completely satisfied.
Jones countered that he was not asking that the amended version of section 9-10115(f)(1) be applied retroactively but rather that it be applied prospectively to the unpaid
balance of the arrearage due OCSE. He conceded that he was not entitled to a refund of the
payments made against the arrearage prior to the date of the hearing.2 Following the hearing,
2
At the hearing, OCSE told the circuit judge that Jones had paid the judgment
down from $14,343 to $6,296.
-4-
09-333
Cite as 2009 Ark. 620
the circuit judge entered an order on December 10, 2008, which vacated Jones’s unpaid
child-support arrearage.
OCSE asserts as its sole point on appeal that the circuit judge erred by vacating Jones’s
unpaid child-support arrearage. Specifically, OCSE contends that the amended version of
section 9-10-115(f)(1) could not be retroactively applied to vacate a judgment entered prior
to the effective date of Act 60 because (1) the General Assembly neither stated expressly nor
implicitly that the amended statute was to have retroactive effect, and (2) to do so would
interfere with its vested right to recover the child-support arrearage from Jones.
We first must determine whether the circuit judge applied the amended version of
section 9-10-115(f)(1) prospectively or retroactively. In doing so, we must pinpoint the event
around which prospective and retroactive application of amended section 9-10-115(f)(1)
turns. See Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 866 S.W.2d 823 (1993).
OCSE asserts that this event was the circuit judge’s original order fixing the arrearage amount
at $14,342.51, which was entered on May 31, 2006.
Jones maintains that the triggering
event is the date of the circuit judge’s order on his motion to vacate unpaid support owed.
Under the amended version of section 9-10-115(f)(1), if a circuit judge finds that an
adjudicated father is not the biological father of the minor child based on genetic testing, the
circuit judge must vacate any unpaid child support owed under a previous order. See Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-10-115(f)(1)(C) (Repl. 2008).
-5-
09-333
Cite as 2009 Ark. 620
In the instant case, the circuit judge correctly applied the amended version of section
9-10-115(f)(1) to determine Jones’s obligation to pay the child-support arrearage from the
time of the hearing on his motion to vacate his support arrearage because that date was after
the effective date of Act 60. The circuit judge ordered that Jones was not obligated to pay
the unpaid balance of his support obligation from the date of the order forward pursuant to
section 9-10-115(f)(1)(C). We hold that the circuit judge’s application of Act 60 to a
determination of an adjudicated father’s obligation to pay the unpaid balance of the childsupport arrearage from the date of the December 10, 2008 order, which was after the
effective date of the Act, was a prospective application of the statute and comported with the
plain language of the Act. See Walters, 315 Ark. at 209, 866 S.W.2d at 825.
Affirmed.
IMBER, J., not participating.
-6-
09-333
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.