Jones v. State

Demetrius Lamont JONES v. STATE of Arkansas

96-765                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 25, 1996


1.   Juveniles -- decision to retain jurisdiction in circuit court
     must be supported by clear and convincing evidence -- when
     circuit court will be reversed. -- The circuit court's
     decision to retain jurisdiction over a juvenile must be
     supported by clear and convincing evidence; the supreme court
     will not reverse the circuit court's order unless it is
     clearly erroneous.    

2.   Juveniles -- factors required to be considered in deciding
     transfer motion need not be given equal weight -- information
     alone is sufficient evidence of serious and violent nature of
     crime. -- The circuit court was not required to give equal
     weight to each of the three factors found in Ark. Code Ann. 
     9-27-318(e)(Supp. 1995); the serious and violent nature of the
     offense is a sufficient basis on which the circuit court may
     deny the transfer motion and try the juvenile as an adult; the
     information alone is sufficient evidence of the serious and
     violent nature of the crime to support an order denying the
     motion to transfer. 

3.   Juveniles -- evidence supported court's denial of motion to
     transfer -- no error found. -- Where the evidence presented
     showed that appellant was accused of committing first-degree
     murder, a violent and serious offense classified as a Class Y
     felony; that he allegedly used violence in the commission of
     that offense; that, considering his history in the juvenile
     system, appellant lacked sufficient prospects for
     rehabilitation; and that, because appellant was currently
     eighteen years old, it was not possible for him to be
     committed to a juvenile facility, the circuit court did not
     err in denying appellant's motion to transfer.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Marion Humphrey, Judge;
affirmed.
     William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, and Bret Qualls,
Deputy Public Defender, by:  C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Deputy Public
Defender, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  David R. Raupp, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.   
     Demetrius Jones appeals the order of the Pulaski County
Circuit Court denying his motion to transfer charges against him to
the Juvenile Division of the Chancery Court.  Mr. Jones was charged
with first-degree murder.  The information alleged that, on
September 17, 1994, Mr. Jones "unlawfully, feloniously, and with a
purpose of causing the death of another person, did cause the death
of Michael Bly, Jr."  Mr. Jones was sixteen years old at the time
he allegedly committed the offense.
     In his motion, Mr. Jones stated that he had no prior criminal
convictions in Circuit Court.  In its response, the State opposed
the transfer on account of the serious and violent nature of the
offense charged, the failed attempts at rehabilitating Mr. Jones,
and Mr. Jones's criminal history in the Juvenile Division.
     At a hearing on the motion, Mr. Jones presented the testimony
of his aunt, Ms. Lee Gertie Williams, who testified that Mr. Jones
is a "good person" and "had good character and always did what I
said."  Ms. Williams indicated that Mr. Jones had been placed in
special education courses at Sylvan Hills High School.  Mr. Jones
also presented the testimony of Mr. Carvil Strong, who had
counseled Mr. Jones during his stay at the Alexander Youth Service
Center.  Mr. Strong testified that Mr. Jones would have good
prospects for rehabilitation if he were able to improve his
educational skills.  Ms. Mary Anthony, a case manager at Alexander
Service Center, also testified on Mr. Jones's behalf.  She
testified that she had performed an educational evaluation of Mr.
Jones in November 1994 and that he tested on a second-grade level. 
     The State presented the testimony of Mr. Sean O'Nale, a deputy
with the Pulaski County Sheriff's Office.  Deputy O'Nale testified
that he investigated a homicide on September 17, 1994.  The victim
was discovered in a van with a fatal gunshot wound, and Mr. Jones
was identified as the suspect and subsequently arrested.  The
Circuit Court heard an audio recording of the statement that Mr.
Jones made following his arrest.  In the statement, Mr. Jones
revealed that he had pointed the gun at the van containing the
victim and that the gun "went off."  The State's other witness was
Mr. David Adams, a sergeant with the Pulaski County Sheriff's
Office, who testified that Mr. Jones displayed limited reading and
writing abilities.
     As Mr. Jones was sixteen years old at the time he allegedly
committed the offense, the Circuit Court and the Juvenile Court had
concurrent jurisdiction, and the prosecutor was authorized to
charge Mr. Jones in either court.  Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(b)(1)
(Supp. 1995).  In reaching its ruling, the Circuit Court was
required by statute to consider the following factors:

          (1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether
     violence was employed by the juvenile in the commission
     of the offense;
          (2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive
     pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the
     determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation
     under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by
     past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and
     the response to such efforts; and
          (3) The prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.

Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e)(1)-(3) (Supp. 1995).
     The Circuit Court's decision to retain jurisdiction over a
juvenile must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Ark.
Code Ann.  9-27-318(f) (Supp. 1995).  We will not reverse the
Circuit Court's order unless it is clearly erroneous.  Booker v.
State, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337 (1996).   
     The Circuit Court was not required to give equal weight to
each of the three factors.  Brooks v. State, 326 Ark. 201, 929 S.W.2d 160 (1996); Lammers v. State, 324 Ark. 222, 920 S.W.2d 7
(1996).  The serious and violent nature of the offense is a
sufficient basis on which the Circuit Court may deny the transfer
motion and try the juvenile as an adult.  Hamilton v. State, 320
Ark. 346, 896 S.W.2d 877 (1995).  The information alone is
sufficient evidence of the serious and violent nature of the crime
to support an order denying the motion to transfer.  Cole v. State,
323 Ark. 136, 913 S.W.2d 779 (1996).
     The evidence presented showed that Mr. Jones was accused of
committing first-degree murder, a violent and serious offense
classified as a Class Y Felony, and that he allegedly used violence
in the commission of that offense.  The evidence also permitted the
Circuit Court to conclude that Mr. Jones, considering his history
in the juvenile system, lacked sufficient prospects for
rehabilitation.  Finally, in light of the fact that Mr. Jones is
currently eighteen years old, it is not possible for him to be
committed to a juvenile facility.  Hansen v. State, 323 Ark. 407,
914 S.W.2d 737 (1996).  Given these circumstances, the Circuit
Court did not err in denying Mr. Jones's motion to transfer.
     Affirmed.
     Roaf, J., concurs.