Butler v. State
Annotate this Case
Louis Ricardo BUTLER v. STATE of Arkansas
95-981 ___ S.W.2d ___
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered May 28, 1996
1. Juveniles -- limited jurisdiction of circuit court. --
Arkansas Code Annotated 9-27-318 (Repl. 1993) specifically
provides, and the supreme court has consistently held, that
the circuit court has jurisdiction over a juvenile aged
fourteen or fifteen only when the juvenile is charged with one
or more of the offenses enumerated in section 9-27-318(b)(1);
any other charges against the juvenile must be dismissed by
the circuit court for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Juveniles -- circuit court never had jurisdiction of theft
charges -- theft counts dismissed. -- Where the three theft
charges filed against appellant were not among those
enumerated in Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318(b)(1), and where the
prosecutor did not file the charges in juvenile court and then
move to transfer them to circuit court, the circuit court
never had jurisdiction of those charges; therefore, the three
counts of theft of property filed against appellant in circuit
court were dismissed.
3. Juveniles -- denial of transfer from circuit to juvenile court
-- standard of review -- appellant did not meet burden of
proof. -- A circuit court's decision to deny transfer of an
appellant's case to juvenile court will not be reversed unless
it is clearly erroneous; furthermore, it is the movant's
burden to prove that the transfer to juvenile court was
warranted; this was a burden that appellant did not meet.
4. Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- determination that juvenile
should be tried as adult must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. -- Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-
318(f), the determination that a juvenile should be tried as
an adult must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
5. Evidence -- clear and convincing evidence defined. -- Clear
and convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof
that will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction
regarding the allegation sought to be established.
6. Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- factors to be considered. --
Under Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318(e), the circuit court shall
consider the following factors when making the decision to
retain jurisdiction or transfer the case to juvenile court:
(1) the seriousness of the offense, and whether violence was
employed by the juvenile in the commission of the offense; (2)
whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of
adjudicated offenses that would lead to the determination that
the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing
rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat
and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such
efforts; and (3) the prior history, character traits, mental
maturity, and any other factor that reflects upon the
juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.
7. Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- factors need not be given
equal weight -- serious and violent nature of charged offenses
warranted denial of transfer to juvenile court. -- Although a
circuit court must consider all of the factors listed in Ark.
Code Ann. 9-27-318(e), the circuit court need not give each
of the factors equal weight; it is permissible to give
substantial weight to the criminal information; indeed, the
criminal information, on its own, is sufficient to establish
that the offense charged is of a violent and serious nature,
thus satisfying the first element listed in section 9-27-
318(e); moreover, proof of each factor need not be introduced
against the juvenile in order for the circuit court to retain
jurisdiction; the fact that the offenses charged were serious
in nature and committed with the use of violence was
sufficient to warrant a denial of transfer of appellant's case
to juvenile court.
8. Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- use of violence --
sufficient reason for circuit court's denial of transfer. --
The use of violence in the commission of a serious offense is
a factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit court to
retain jurisdiction of a juvenile's case; although it is
possible to commit the offense of aggravated robbery without
the actual employment of violence, the supreme court found
that was not the case in the three incidents with which
appellant was charged; here, the circuit court could easily
have found that the evidence presented satisfied the first
factor provided in Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318(e), and this
factor alone would have been sufficient reason for the circuit
court's denial of transfer.
9. Juveniles -- appellant's association with use of weapon was
sufficient to satisfy violence criterion. -- The fact that
appellant may not have held a gun in each of the robberies did
not change the nature of the charges pending against him; it
was of no consequence that appellant may or may not have
personally used a weapon because his association with the use
of a weapon in the course of the crimes was sufficient to
satisfy the violence criterion; the testimony of a police
detective, coupled with the factual basis set out in the
felony information, provided sufficient grounds for the
circuit court to find that the offenses committed were serious
and that violence was employed by appellant during their
commission.
10. Juveniles -- juvenile transfer -- circuit court's denial on
aggravated robbery counts not clearly erroneous. -- The
supreme court held that there was ample evidence from the
record with which to affirm the circuit court's denial of
transfer of appellant's case to juvenile court; where the
remaining charges against appellant consisted of three counts
of aggravated robbery (a Class Y felony, the most serious
level of offense), and where violence was employed through
appellant's use of deadly weapons to cause a threat of death
or serious physical injury to the victims, the supreme court
could not say that the denial of transfer with respect to the
three counts of aggravated robbery was clearly erroneous.
11. Appeal & error -- even constitutional issues will not be heard
for the first time on appeal. -- Even constitutional issues
will not be heard for the first time on appeal.
Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Fourth Division; John W.
Langston, Judge; affirmed in part; reversed and dismissed in part.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law Legal
Clinic, by: Spencer R. Robinson, Rule XV Law Student, and Gerard F.
Glynn, Rule XV Supervising Attorney, for appellant.
Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.
Donald L. Corbin, Justice. Associate Justice Donald L.
Corbin, 5-28-96 *ADVREP*SC5*
LOUIS RICARDO BUTLER,
APPELLANT,
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,
95-981
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH DIVISION,
NO. CR 94-2875,
HON. JOHN W. LANGSTON, JUDGE,
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
DISMISSED IN PART.
Appellant, Louis Ricardo Butler, appeals the order of the
Pulaski County Circuit Court, denying transfer of his case to
juvenile court. This interlocutory appeal is provided in Ark. Code
Ann. 9-27-318(h) (Repl. 1993). Jurisdiction is properly in this
court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(12).
A felony information was filed in circuit court charging
appellant and Myron Antonio McClendon with three counts of
aggravated robbery, Class Y felony, in violation of Ark. Code Ann.
5-12-103 (Repl. 1993), and three counts of theft of property, two
being Class A misdemeanors and the other being a Class B felony, in
violation of Ark. Code Ann. 5-36-103 (Repl. 1993). The
information reflects that the charges stem from three separate
instances, taking place on July 7, 1994, July 10, 1994, and
August 11, 1994, involving appellant and McClendon robbing three
different pizza delivery personnel at gun point with the purpose of
committing a theft. Appellant was born April 23, 1979, and was
thus fifteen years of age at the time of the alleged offenses.
After the state filed the felony information, a delinquency
petition was filed against appellant in juvenile court concerning
the robbery which occurred on August 11, 1994. The record reflects
that the state mistakenly filed the last aggravated robbery
incident in juvenile court, not realizing that charges arising out
of all three robberies had already been filed in circuit court.
The state had also filed an unrelated delinquency petition alleging
that appellant had committed the offenses of residential burglary,
Class B felony, and theft of property, Class A misdemeanor, on
July 13, 1994.
Appellant moved to transfer the charges pending in circuit
court to juvenile court. The circuit court conducted a hearing on
appellant's motion, during which hearing testimony was heard from
appellant's parents, Mr. Louis Butler Sr. and Mrs. Lady Williams,
appellant's counselor, Mr. Sanford Tollette, and the police officer
who investigated the three robberies, Detective Todd Armstrong, of
the Little Rock Police Department.
Mr. Butler testified that his son began having trouble when he
and his mother were divorced in 1988, and that before the divorce,
appellant had been in advanced classes at school. Mr. Butler
stated that after the divorce, appellant had been placed in
alternative schooling at the Joseph Pfeifer Kiwanis Camp, and that
he had begun to show progress within three or four weeks.
Mr. Butler stated that his son was a good kid and that he knew
right from wrong. Mr. Butler expressed concerns for appellant's
safety should he be sentenced to prison, and stated that sentencing
appellant to prison would not help to rehabilitate him.
Mrs. Williams also testified that appellant had only begun to
have trouble since the divorce of his parents, and that because of
his troubles, she had put appellant in a program at Pinnacle Point
Hospital, in addition to the Pfeifer camp, and she had attempted to
place him in the New Futures program. Mrs. Williams stated that
prison would not be a good place for appellant because he needs
rehabilitation. Mrs. Williams concluded by saying that appellant
was not a violent person, but when he consumes alcohol, his
personality changes completely.
Sanford Tollette, director of the alternative classroom
program for kids at risk at the Pfeifer camp, took the stand next
on behalf of appellant. Mr. Tollette stated that appellant had
been assigned to his program in November 1988, and that he had
completed the thirty-day program. Mr. Tollette stated that
appellant had continued to come back to the program over the next
three years as part of the summer camp, and that he eventually
became an honor camper. Mr. Tollette stated that he felt appellant
was a good kid with a good heart, and that the seriousness of the
offenses had made an impression on him.
The last witness to testify at the hearing was Detective
Armstrong, who described each of the robberies for the court.
Detective Armstrong stated that on July 7, 1994, pizza was ordered
from Pizza 4 Less and upon the driver's arrival, two black males--
one armed with a shotgun and the other with a handgun--robbed the
deliveryman of two pizzas and cash. Detective Armstrong stated
that on July 10, 1994, pizza was again ordered from Pizza 4 Less
and when the driver arrived, he was asked to come inside. The
detective noted that on this occasion the robbery had taken place
at appellant's father's residence. Once the driver was inside the
residence, Detective Armstrong continued, the deliveryman was
robbed of his pizzas with the use of a sawed-off shotgun.
Regarding the third and last robbery, which occurred on August 11,
1994, Detective Armstrong stated that pizza was ordered from Pizza
Hut and upon the driver's arrival, he was approached by two black
males, one of whom was armed with a rock or brick and threatened
the deliveryman. Upon the threat being made with the weapon,
Detective Armstrong stated, the deliveryman fled his vehicle, while
one of the suspects got into the vehicle and left. Detective
Armstrong further testified that he had interviewed appellant
concerning the crimes, and that appellant had confessed his
participation in two of the three robberies. Before leaving the
witness stand, Detective Armstrong identified appellant for the
record.
At the conclusion of Detective Armstrong's testimony, the
state submitted the two previously mentioned juvenile delinquency
petitions against appellant as evidence, and the court received
them into the record. The circuit court subsequently denied
appellant's motion to transfer his case to juvenile court at a
later hearing. Appellant now brings this interlocutory appeal.
In support of this appeal, appellant raises three points:
First, that the circuit court erred in not dismissing the three
counts of theft of property charged in the felony information, as
they are not listed among those offenses enumerated in section 9-
27-318(b)(1); second, that the circuit court erred in denying the
motion to transfer the case to juvenile court as there was not
clear and convincing evidence that appellant should be tried as an
adult; and third, that the circuit court erred by failing to
provide a sufficient statement of the court's findings to
demonstrate that each of the elements set out in section 9-27-
318(e) was considered. We affirm the circuit court's ruling
denying transfer to juvenile court as to the three counts of
aggravated robbery, but we reverse the denial as to the three
counts of theft of property.
I. Jurisdiction of Non-enumerated Offenses
Appellant argues that because he was only fifteen years old at
the time the offenses were allegedly committed, the circuit court
did not have jurisdiction over the three counts of theft charged in
the information because theft of property is not among those
charges enumerated in section 9-27-318(b)(1). Appellee concedes
this error. We agree that the denial of transfer as to the three
charges of theft of property was error.
Section 9-27-318 specifically provides, and this court has
consistently held, that the circuit court has jurisdiction over a
juvenile aged fourteen or fifteen only when the juvenile is charged
with one or more of the offenses enumerated in section 9-27-
318(b)(1). Any other charges against the juvenile must be
dismissed by the circuit court for lack of jurisdiction. See,
e.g., State v. Gray, 319 Ark. 356, 891 S.W.2d 376 (1995); Banks v.
State, 306 Ark. 273, 813 S.W.2d 256 (1991).
Appellant relies on Banks, 306 Ark. 273, 813 S.W.2d 256, in
support of his argument. In Banks, the appellant, who was fourteen
years of age at the time of the crimes, was charged with the
offenses of aggravated robbery, attempted capital murder, theft of
property valued at less than $200.00, and fleeing from arrest. We
held that, given the juvenile's age, the circuit court only had
jurisdiction over the appellant as to the charge of aggravated
robbery, as it was the only one of the four charges facing
appellant which was among those enumerated in section 9-27-
318(b)(1). Because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction
over the remaining three charges, we held that the charges should
have been dismissed. In the case at hand, appellant is charged
with three counts of aggravated robbery and three counts of theft
of property. While aggravated robbery is one of the offenses
enumerated in section 9-27-318(b)(1), theft of property is not.
Our inquiry does not, however, end here.
Section 9-27-318(a) provides that if the prosecutor can file
charges against a juvenile in circuit court, the prosecutor "may
file any other criminal charges that arise out of the same act or
course of conduct in the same circuit court case if after a hearing
before the juvenile court a motion to transfer is so ordered[.]"
(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to this provision, the prosecutor in
this case could have filed the theft charges in juvenile court and
then moved the juvenile court to transfer the charges to circuit
court, where they would be joined with the aggravated robbery
charges. That, however, was not done.
Since the three theft charges are not among those enumerated
in subsection (b)(1) of 9-27-318, and since the prosecutor in this
case did not file the charges in juvenile court and then move to
transfer them to circuit court, the circuit court never had
jurisdiction of those charges. Based on our prior holdings, the
three counts of theft of property filed against appellant in
circuit court must therefore be dismissed.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant argues that there was not sufficient evidence
produced at the hearing for the court to find by clear and
convincing evidence that appellant should be tried as an adult. We
find no merit to this argument.
A circuit court's decision to deny transfer of an appellant's
case to juvenile court will not be reversed unless it is "clearly
erroneous." See, e.g., Williams v. State, 313 Ark. 451, 856 S.W.2d 4 (1993); Vickers v. State, 307 Ark. 298, 819 S.W.2d 13 (1991).
Furthermore, it is the movant's burden to prove the transfer to
juvenile court was warranted. Williams, 313 Ark. 451, 856 S.W.2d 4; Pennington v. State, 305 Ark. 312, 807 S.W.2d 660 (1991). This
is a burden appellant has not met.
We recognize that pursuant to section 9-27-318(f), the
determination that a juvenile should be tried as an adult must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Davis v.
State, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768 (1995); Sebastian v. State, 318
Ark. 494, 885 S.W.2d 882 (1994). Clear and convincing evidence is
defined as "that degree of proof which will produce in the trier of
fact a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be
established." Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 136, 140, 913 S.W.2d 779,
781 (1996) (quoting Cobbins v. State, 306 Ark. 447, 450, 816 S.W.2d 161, 163 (1991)).
Section 9-27-318(e) provides that the circuit court shall
consider the following factors when making the decision to retain
jurisdiction or transfer the case to juvenile court:
(1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether
violence was employed by the juvenile in the commission
of the offense;
(2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive
pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the
determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation
under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by
past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and
the response to such efforts; and
(3) The prior history, character traits, mental
maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the
juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.
In this case, the circuit court announced its decision by
stating that:
I've gone back and reviewed the evidence in this matter,
listened to the Court Reporter's matters, and reviewed
the law on it. And after reviewing the facts of this
case, there's no question in my mind but this case should
not be in juvenile, based upon the circumstances of it,
the Defendant's participation, et cetera.
From this statement, it appears that the circuit court took into
consideration all the testimony and evidence presented at the
hearing concerning the three factors listed in section 9-27-318(e),
and found that the case should be heard in circuit court. It is of
no consequence to appellant's argument concerning the circuit
court's alleged failure to consider the second and third factors
that the circuit court did not methodically list out each piece of
evidence as it related to each specified factor. It is enough that
the circuit court stated that it took into consideration all the
evidence presented at the hearing in making its decision to deny
transfer.
We have stated that although a circuit court must consider all
the factors listed in section 9-27-318(e), the circuit court need
not give each of the factors equal weight, and it is permissible to
give substantial weight to the criminal information. Walker v.
State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502, reh'g denied, 304 Ark. 402-A,
805 S.W.2d 80 (1991). In fact, the criminal information, on its
own, is sufficient to establish that the offense charged is of a
violent and serious nature, thus satisfying the first element
listed in section 9-27-318(e). Davis, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768; Vickers, 307 Ark. 298, 819 S.W.2d 13. Moreover, proof of each
factor need not be introduced against the juvenile in order for the
circuit court to retain jurisdiction. Davis, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768; Hogan v. State, 311 Ark. 262, 843 S.W.2d 830 (1992).
The fact that the offenses charged were serious in nature and
committed with the use of violence is sufficient to warrant a
denial of transfer of appellant's case to juvenile court.
Similarly, the use of violence in the commission of a serious
offense is a factor sufficient in and of itself for a circuit court
to retain jurisdiction of a juvenile's case. Sebastian, 318 Ark.
494, 885 S.W.2d 882; Blevins v. State, 308 Ark. 613, 826 S.W.2d 265
(1992). Although we have previously recognized that it is possible
to commit the offense of aggravated robbery without the actual
employment of violence, we find that was not the case in these
three incidents. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 307 Ark. 525, 823 S.W.2d 440 (1992). The circuit court in this case could easily
have found that the evidence presented satisfied the first factor
provided in section 9-27-318(e), and this factor alone would have
been sufficient reason for the circuit court's denial of transfer.
Moreover, the fact that appellant may not have held a gun in
each of the robberies is of little consolation to appellant as it
does not change the nature of the charges pending against him. In
fact, in Guy v. State, 323 Ark. 649, 916 S.W.2d 760 (1996), we
stated that, "[i]t is of no consequence that appellant may or may
not have personally used a weapon, as his association with the use
of a weapon in the course of the crimes is sufficient to satisfy
the violence criterion." Id. at 654, 916 S.W.2d at 763 (citing
Collins v. State, 322 Ark. 161, 908 S.W.2d 80 (1995)). Detective
Armstrong's testimony coupled with the factual basis set out in the
felony information provided sufficient grounds for the circuit
court to find that the offenses committed were serious and that
violence was employed by the appellant during their commission.
We find that there is ample evidence from the record with
which to affirm the circuit court's denial of transfer. Because
the remaining charges against appellant consist of three counts of
aggravated robbery, Class Y felony, the most serious level of
offense in the State of Arkansas, and because violence was employed
via appellant's use of deadly weapons to cause a threat of death or
serious physical injury to the victims, we cannot say that the
denial of transfer as to the three counts of aggravated robbery was
clearly erroneous.
III. Factual Findings
Lastly, appellant argues that because the circuit court did
not make specific findings of fact in its order, it is impossible
to tell whether the court considered each of the factors set out in
section 9-27-318(e), and because of this impossibility the circuit
court erred in denying transfer. Appellant asserts that, due to
the omission of factual findings, he has been denied a meaningful
review of the circuit court's decision in violation of his rights
under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
Appellant cites no Arkansas case law in favor of his position
and relies solely on Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) for
this argument. Appellee asserts that appellant is precluded from
raising this point on appeal because he did not raise this argument
below. Appellant concedes that this issue was not ever brought
to the attention of the circuit court and was thus not properly
preserved below.
From our review of the record provided, it is clear that
appellant did not raise this issue in the circuit court, nor did he
at any time move the circuit court to detail its reasons for
denying his motion to transfer. We have consistently held, and
appellant agrees, that even constitutional issues will not be heard
for the first time on appeal. Wetherington v. State, 319 Ark. 37,
889 S.W.2d 34 (1994).
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the circuit court's denial of transfer as to the
three charges of aggravated robbery, but we reverse as to the three
counts of theft of property. We dismiss without prejudice the
three charges of theft of property, as proper procedure was not
followed in filing the charges and the circuit court was without
jurisdiction to hear the charges.
Affirmed in part; reversed and dismissed in part.
ROAF, J., dissents.
DUDLEY, J., not participating. MAY 28, 1996. *ADVREP*SC5-A*
LOUIS RICARDO BUTLER,
APPELLANT,
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,
95-981
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR 94-2875,
HON. JOHN W. LANGSTON, JUDGE,
DISSENT.
ANDREE LAYTON ROAF
In 1989, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted Act 273 of
1989, which became known as the Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989. A
declaration of purpose for this legislation is found at Ark. Code
Ann. 9-27-302. It is important in the context of this appeal and
warrants our reconsideration:
This subchapter shall be liberally construed to the end
that its purposes may be carried out:
(1) To assure that all juveniles brought to the
attention of the courts receive the guidance, care and
control, preferably in each juvenile's own home, which
will best serve the emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the juvenile and the best interests of the
state;
(2) To preserve and strengthen the juvenile's family
ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of
his parents only when his welfare or the safety and
protection of the public cannot adequately be safeguarded
without such removal; and, when the juvenile is removed
nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have
been given by his parents; and to assure, in all cases in
which a juvenile must be permanently removed from the
custody of his parents, that the juvenile be placed in an
approved family home and be made a member of the family
by adoption;
(3) To protect society more effectively by substituting
for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of
offender rehabilitation and rehabilitative restitution,
recognizing that the application of sanctions which are
consistent with the seriousness of the offense is
appropriate in all cases;
(4) To provide means through which the provisions of
this subchapter are executed and enforced and in which
the parties are assured a fair hearing and their
constitutional and other legal rights recognized and
enforced.
Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-302 (Repl. 1993) (emphasis added).
Since 1991, this court has been called upon numerous times to
interpret the provisions of the juvenile code dealing with how we
treat youth who are charged with criminal offenses. The General
Assembly has in turn had the opportunity on several occasions to
react to our holdings. I submit that this court and the General
Assembly have so woefully failed to consider a significant portion
of the stated purposes underpinning the juvenile code that this
language has become meaningless.
We have neither liberally construed the statute to the benefit
of the emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the juveniles,
nor even for the best interests of the state. We have failed to
insure that methods of rehabilitation and restitution are
substituted wherever possible, for retributive punishment, and we
have surely failed to provide that juveniles are assured fair
hearings and that their constitutional and other rights provided by
this statute are uniformly recognized and enforced. We share this
responsibility equally with our elected state representatives.
Today, we once again affirm a trial court's refusal to
transfer a criminal case involving a juvenile to juvenile court.
The trial court's ruling, and our affirmance, were foregone
conclusions because of the prior holdings of this court, because of
the weight of stare decisis, and because of the legislature's
failure to revisit this legislation in light of our holdings.
Children between the ages of 14 and 17 years are paying the price
for our failures. We cannot even take comfort in the notion that
the best interests of the state are being served, for many of these
juveniles will return to our midst as adults, and the opportunity
to use our best efforts to rehabilitate, guide and care for them
will have been lost.
The landmark case which has led us down this path is, of
course, Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991). In
Walker, by a 4 to 3 decision, this court reached several
significant holdings which have been repeatedly reavowed and
reaffirmed since Walker -- that a juvenile movant has the burden of
proof when seeking to transfer a case from circuit court to
juvenile court -- that the trial court need not give equal weight
to the three factors that the statute directs it to consider in
determining whether to transfer a case -- that the prosecutor is
not even required to introduce proof on each of the three factors
that the trial court is directed to consider -- that the criminal
information alone can provide a sufficient basis for the denial of
a transfer to juvenile court -- that a trial court does not have to
make findings of fact or provide a rationale for its decision in a
juvenile transfer proceeding.
We have also held that juveniles "ultimately" charged and
tried in circuit court are subject to the procedures prescribed for
adults, and are not afforded the protections provided by the
juvenile code, such as the requirement of parental consent to a
waiver of right to counsel. See Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-317; Ring v.
State, 320 Ark. 128, 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995); Sims v. State, 320 Ark.
528, ___ S.W.2d ___ (1995).
I am not unmindful of the fact that since 1991, the general
assembly has twice amended Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318, which deals
with waiver and transfer to circuit court, each time to the
detriment of juvenile defendants. However, they have not seen fit
to amend the stated purposes for the juvenile code. I suggest that
they do so at the next opportunity. Until then, our decisions and
their inaction are in direct conflict with these purposes.
I dissent.
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