Dillon v. Twin City Bank

Mary DILLON, Kathleen Inmon, and Dorothy
Johnson v. TWIN CITY BANK

95-713                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered July 8, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- when case becomes moot. -- A case becomes
     moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal
     effect upon a then existing legal controversy.

2.   Appeal & error -- moot issues generally not addressed --
     exceptions not applicable. -- As a general rule, the supreme
     court does not address moot issues; there are some exceptions
     to the rule, such as cases that are capable of repetition yet
     evade review and those involving the consideration of public
     interest and prevention of future litigation, but these
     exceptions did not apply to the present case.

3.   Appeal & error -- voluntary transfer of property and
     acceptance were inconsistent with subsequent appeal related to
     transfer. -- Where the ultimate outcome of the proceedings, as
     decreed by the chancellor, was that certain real property was
     to be transferred to appellant A, and, at the time the decree
     was entered, appellant B already had deeded the property to
     appellant A, any judgment rendered would have no practical
     legal effect upon any existing controversy; appellant B's
     voluntary transfer of the property to appellant A and
     appellant A's acceptance were inconsistent with a subsequent
     appeal directly related to the transfer of the property to
     appellant A. 

4.   Appeal & error -- issue not before supreme court -- merits not
     reached. -- Although appellant C asserted that the case was
     not moot with respect to her because she was not involved in
     the transfer of real property from appellant B to appellant A, 
     the property nevertheless was transferred to appellant A,
     which was what the chancery court decreed, and any decision by
     the supreme court would have no legal effect on any existing
     controversy; any separate action that appellant C might have
     had against appellant B and appellant A based upon appellant
     B's transferring the property back to appellant A was not
     before the supreme court and was not cause for the court to
     reach the merits of the appeal, which was dismissed.


     Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court, Fourth Division; Robin
Mays, Chancellor; appeal dismissed.
     Ogles Law Firm, P.A., by: John Ogles and Hubert W. Alexander,
for appellants.
     Hilburn, Calhoon, Harper, Pruniski & Calhoun, Ltd., by:  Susan
Gordon Gunter and Graham F. Sloan, for appellee.

     Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.July 8, 1996
*ADVREP*SC9*







MARY DILLON, KATHLEEN INMON,
AND DOROTHY JOHNSON,
                    APPELLANTS,

V.

TWIN CITY BANK,
                    APPELLEE.


95-713



APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CHANCERY COURT, FOURTH DIVISION
NO. 93-501,
HON. ROBIN MAYS, CHANCELLOR,



APPEAL DISMISSED.


                   Justice Andree Layton Roaf



     Appellants Kathleen Inmon and Mary Dillon are mother and
daughter respectively.  Dorothy Johnson is Inmon's aunt.  Appellee
Twin City Bank, a creditor of Inmon, sued Inmon, Dillon, and
Johnson for the alleged fraudulent conveyance of certain property. 
Inmon and Dillon appeal from the chancellor's ruling that Inmon
made fraudulent transfers with the actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud Twin City Bank.   The final decree entered by the
chancellor purportedly transferred real property that was involved
in the dispute, 7500 Toltec, from Johnson to Inmon.  However, after
the chancellor made her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
but prior to her entering the final decree, Johnson deeded the real
property to Inmon.  We hold that this appeal is moot and dismiss.
     An in-depth discussion of the underlying facts of this case is
not necessary, since the appeal is moot.  In her Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, the chancellor determined that cash funds
used to purchase two pieces of real property, 13 Woodbriar and 7500
Toltec, were paid by Inmon.  The chancellor then determined that 13
Woodbriar was titled in Dillon's name when it was purchased in
April 1991.  She found that Inmon made deposits in an account in
Dillon's name and signed checks with Dillon's name for the
construction of 13 Woodbriar.  The chancellor found that all cash
deposits in Dillon's account and all cash payments for 13 Woodbriar
were from funds from the sale of Inmon's father's property and
Inmon's alimony.  She determined that the purchase of the lot and
the construction costs of 13 Woodbriar were fraudulent conveyances
from Inmon to Dillon.  The chancellor found that all proceeds from
the sale of 13 Woodbriar were placed in an account in the name of
Dillon.  The chancellor found that Inmon purchased 7500 Toltec and
had it titled in Dillon's name.  She found that funds used to
construct Toltec came from the account in Dillon's name that mainly
contained the deposit from the sale of 13 Woodbriar.  The
chancellor concluded that Inmon was the true and equitable owner of
7500 Toltec.  The chancellor found that Dillon transferred 7500
Toltec to Johnson and ruled that the deed of 7500 Toltec from
Dillon to Johnson should be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. 
In sum, the chancellor determined that Inmon fraudulently conveyed
funds to Dillon by making deposits in Dillon's checking accounts
and purchasing property in her name.  She found that the funds were
used to build 13 Woodbriar, and the money from the sale of
Woodbriar was used in the construction of 7500 Toltec.  The
chancellor directed Twin City Bank to prepare a precedent regarding
the title and ownership of 7500 Toltec and send it to appellants
for approval prior to presenting it to the court for entry. 
Following the entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Johnson transferred 7500 Toltec to Inmon by quitclaim deed.  The
deed was recorded on November 15, 1994.  
     The decree from which appellants appeal was entered on
December 16, 1994.  The decree states that neither Dillon nor
Johnson hold a legal or equitable interest in 7500 Toltec.  The
decree states that it operates to pass title of the property to
Inmon.  However, Johnson voluntarily conveyed 7500 Toltec to Inmon
by quitclaim deed prior to the decree being entered.  Therefore,
this case is moot. 
          A case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would
     have no practical legal effect upon a then existing legal
     controversy.  Arkansas Intercollegiate Conference v.
     Parnham, 309 Ark. 170, 174, 828 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1992). 
     As a general rule, this court does not address moot
     issues.  Leonards v. E.A. Martin Machinery Co., 321 Ark.
     239, 900 S.W.2d 546 (1995); Johnson v. State, 319 Ark. 3,
     888 S.W.2d 661 (1994).  There are some exceptions to the
     rule that this court does not address moot issues, such
     as cases which are capable of repetition yet evade
     review, see Nathaniel v. Forrest City School Dist., 300
     Ark. 513, 780 S.W.2d 539 (1989), and cases involving the
     consideration of public interest and prevention of future
     litigation, see Duhon v. Gravett, 302 Ark. 358, 790 S.W.2d 155 (1990), but these exceptions do not apply to
     the present case.  
Thomas v. Arkansas Board of Correction, 324 Ark. 6, 918 S.W.2d 156
(1996).  In the present case, the ultimate outcome of the
proceedings below, as decreed by the chancellor, was that 7500
Toltec was to be transferred to Inmon.  At the time the decree was
entered, Johnson already had deeded 7500 Toltec to Inmon. 
Therefore, any judgment rendered would have no practical legal
effect upon any existing controversy.  Johnson's voluntary transfer
of 7500 Toltec to Inmon and Inmon's acceptance are inconsistent
with a subsequent appeal directly related to the transfer of the
property to Inmon.  See Shepherd v. State Auto Property & Casualty
Ins. Co., 312 Ark. 502, 850 S.W.2d 324 (1993).    
     Appellants did not respond in their reply brief to Twin City
Bank's argument that the appeal is moot.  However, appellants
previously responded to Twin City Bank's motion to dismiss the
appeal based on mootness.  In so doing, appellant Dillon asserted
that the case was not moot as to her, because she was not involved
in the transfer of 7500 Toltec from Johnson to Inmon. 
Nevertheless, the property was transferred to Inmon, which was what
the chancery court decreed, and any decision by this court would
have no legal effect on any existing controversy.  Any separate
action that Dillon might have against Johnson and Inmon based upon
Johnson's transferring the property back to Inmon is not presently
before this court and is not cause for this court to reach the
merits of this appeal.  See Pennington v. Pennington, 315 Ark. 479,
868 S.W.2d 460 (1994).
     Appeal dismissed.
     Dudley and Corbin, JJ., not participating.