ROMAN COLTER v. CHAPMAN CHEVROLET

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IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO ROMAN COLTER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CHAPMAN CHEVROLET, Defendant/Appellee. No. 2 CA-CV 2015-0224 Filed May 25, 2016 THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100CV201501686 The Honorable Stephen F. McCarville, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Roman Colter, Florence In Propria Persona Burch & Cracchiolo, P.A., Phoenix By Melissa Iyer Julian Counsel for Defendant/Appellee COLTER v. CHAPMAN CHEVROLET Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Presiding Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Miller concurred. V Á S Q U E Z, Presiding Judge: ¶1 Roman Colter appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his complaint against Chapman Chevrolet because his claims were “identical” to those raised in a previously dismissed case and, therefore, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1). For the following reasons, we affirm the court’s order. ¶2 On appeal, Colter has not presented this court with any clear argument supported by legal authority, as required by Rule 13(a)(7), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., explaining how the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res judicata. See Aldrich & Steinberger v. Martin, 172 Ariz. 445, 448, 837 P.2d 1180, 1183 (App. 1992) (“‘[A] judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties . . . bars a second suit based on the same cause of action.’”), quoting Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955). In the absence of a properly developed argument, we find any issue related to the court’s decision waived on appeal. See Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, n.2, 154 P.3d 391, 393 n.2 (App. 2007). ¶3 And to the extent Colter has raised any meaningful arguments, they are directed at the previous case, which we cannot address in this appeal. See Rourk v. State, 170 Ariz. 6, 12, 821 P.2d 273, 279 (App. 1991) (scope of review limited to judgment from which appeal is brought). “Parties who choose to represent themselves ‘are entitled to no more consideration than if they had been represented by counsel’ and are held to the same standards as attorneys with respect to ‘familiarity with required procedures and . . . notice of statutes and local rules.’” In re Marriage of Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, ¶ 13, 200 P.3d 1043, 1046 (App. 2008) (alteration in 2 COLTER v. CHAPMAN CHEVROLET Decision of the Court Williams), quoting Smith v. Rabb, 95 Ariz. 49, 53, 386 P.2d 649, 652 (1963). ¶4 We affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint. Chapman argues this appeal is frivolous and requests a monetary award against Colter as a sanction pursuant to Rule 25, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., and A.R.S. § 12-2106. Although we certainly could grant the request under these circumstances, see Gangadean v. Byrne, 16 Ariz. App. 112, 114, 491 P.2d 501, 503 (1971), we exercise our discretion and deny the request for sanctions, see Villa de Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, ¶ 26, 253 P.3d 288, 296 (App. 2011) (“We impose sanctions under Rule 25 only ‘with great reservation.’”), quoting Ariz. Tax Research Ass’n v. Dep’t of Revenue, 163 Ariz. 255, 258, 787 P.2d 1051, 1054 (1989). However, Chapman is entitled to its costs on appeal, subject to compliance with Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 3

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