FILED BY CLERK
NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
SEP 30 2010
COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF ARIZONA
DIVISION TWO
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
Respondent,
v.
AMADI SCHALON CANNON,
Petitioner.
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2 CA-CR 2010-0200-PR
DEPARTMENT A
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Not for Publication
Rule 111, Rules of
the Supreme Court
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PIMA COUNTY
Cause No. CR20071520
Honorable Richard S. Fields, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney
By Jacob R. Lines
Amadi S. Cannon
Tucson
Attorneys for Respondent
Winslow
In Propria Persona
B R A M M E R, Presiding Judge.
¶1
After a jury trial, petitioner Amadi Cannon was convicted of sale of a
narcotic drug. The trial court found Cannon had two historical prior felony convictions
and sentenced him to a partially mitigated, twelve-year prison term. We affirmed his
convictions and sentences on appeal.
State v. Cannon, No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0250
(memorandum decision filed Jan. 23, 2009). Cannon now seeks review of the court’s
summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to
Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P.
¶2
In his petition below, Cannon alleged trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance because he (1) failed to argue the legislature had not intended
A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7) to encompass Cannon’s transaction with an undercover police
detective and (2) failed to challenge jury instructions that, according to Cannon, misstated
the elements of the offense.1 He also argued that portions of the undercover officer’s
testimony were inconsistent and amounted to perjury and that the jury was instructed
erroneously, in violation of his due process rights. The trial court found Cannon had
failed to state a colorable claim under Rule 32 and summarily denied relief. This petition
for review followed.
¶3
On review, Cannon asserts the same arguments he raised below. We will
not disturb a court’s summary denial of post-conviction relief unless the court has abused
1
Section 13-3408(A)(7) provides, “A person shall not knowingly . . . [t]ransport
for sale, import into this state, offer to transport for sale or import into this state, sell,
transfer or offer to sell or transfer a narcotic drug.” Although Cannon’s claim is not
entirely clear, he appears to have argued he was wrongly convicted of selling narcotics
because he did not have illegal drugs on his person when the undercover detective asked
him to purchase crack cocaine and because the transaction did not involve a “hand-tohand” exchange. According to Cannon, he got in the detective’s vehicle and directed him
to drive to a residential area. The detective then gave Cannon sixty dollars, and Cannon
entered a house and returned with a piece of crack cocaine, which he placed on the
vehicle’s console. In his reply in the proceeding below, Cannon abandoned additional
claims related to whether the cocaine exceeded the threshold amount set forth in A.R.S.
§ 13-3401(36)(c).
2
its discretion. See State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 17, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006). We find
no such abuse here.
¶4
First, Cannon’s claims of perjured testimony and erroneous jury
instructions are claims of trial error that he waived by failing to raise them on appeal;
they therefore are precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(1), (3). Although the trial
court considered whether trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to address allegedly
perjured testimony, our review indicates Cannon had not stated his claim of perjury in the
context of ineffective assistance of counsel. In all other respects, however, we adopt that
court’s ruling on Cannon’s ineffective assistance claims. The court thoroughly addressed
these claims and correctly resolved them, and no purpose would be served by restating
the court’s analysis here. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360
(App. 1993) (when court correctly identifies and rules on issues raised “in a fashion that
will allow any court in the future to understand the resolution[, n]o useful purpose would
be served by this court[’s] rehashing the trial court’s correct ruling in a written
decision”).
¶5
Accordingly, we grant review but deny relief.
/s/ J. William Brammer, Jr.
J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Presiding Judge
CONCURRING:
/s/ Joseph W. Howard
JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Chief Judge
/s/ Philip G. Espinosa
PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge
3
