In re Flor G

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NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) IN RE FLOR G., DIVISION ONE FILED: 03/15/2012 RUTH A. WILLINGHAM, CLERK BY: DLL 1 CA-JV 11-0158 DEPARTMENT C MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Publication Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 103(G); ARCAP 28) Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County Cause No. S1400JV20110277 The Honorable Kathryn E. Stocking-Tate, Commissioner AFFIRMED Jon R. Smith, Yuma County Attorney By Mark Edward Hessinger, Deputy County Attorney Attorneys for Appellee Yuma The Law Offices of Kelly A. Smith By Kelly A. Smith Attorneys for Appellant Yuma N O R R I S, Judge ¶1 Flor finding first, there her the was G. timely incorrigible court s no appeals for findings evidence at the juvenile habitual were all truancy, clearly . . court s . order and argues, erroneous because that [she] was not accompanied by . . . her mother at all times when she was absent from school, and second, the court misinterpreted the law by using the wrong standard to calculate the number of unexcused absences Flor had on school days. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree and affirm the juvenile court s order. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1 ¶2 In its juvenile court petition, the State alleged Flor was incorrigible and habitually truant because she had 18 unexcused May 24, absences 2011. presented absences from At doctors (the school the notes four from juvenile excusing unexcused August court all days ). 20, 2010 through adjudication, but four One of of Flor those the notes, addressed to whom it may concern, requested, [p]lease excuse my patient from any absences that may have occurred from April 9, 2011 to May 31, 2011, (the blanket excuse ), and was dated June 24, 2011, apparently after school ha[d] been out for almost a month. The record reflects Flor was not absent on all of the days covered by the blanket excuse. ¶3 from Flor s mother also testified she had kept Flor home school on the four unexcused 1 days because of various We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court s findings. See Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 285, ¶ 12, 257 P.3d 1162, 1165 (App. 2011). 2 illnesses. She acknowledged, however, she had not called the school each time to report Flor was sick. ¶4 After hearing this testimony and admitting Flor s school attendance records and doctors notes as evidence, the juvenile court found the State [had] met its burden beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that Flor [was] habitually truant in that she did miss at least five school days without lawful excuse. DISCUSSION ¶5 be When a juvenile is habitually truant, he or she may adjudicated ( A.R.S. ) § an incorrigible 15-803(B) (Supp. (16)(b) (Supp. 2011). child. 2011); see Ariz. also Rev. A.R.S § Stat. 8-201 Habitually truant means a juvenile has had unexcused absence[s] for at least five school days within a year. A.R.S. § 15-803(C). ¶6 Here, the record reflects the juvenile court found the blanket excuse and Flor s mother s testimony not credible. court explained, for whatever reason [the doctor] sign[ed] . . . she s excused from everything, all these days. He does this in June after school has been out almost a month. . . . [I]t would seem to me that there would be a little more investigation done before he . . . did that. I don t know, but obviously he didn t. . . . [I]t seems to me that if Flor s mom got home [from work] at 7:30 [in the morning] she s 3 The not just going to [go] directly to bed. She can pick up the phone and call the school and say Flor is sick. . . . She obviously knew she had to do that because she did it some of the time. And so I find the testimony by Flor s mom that she . . . [simply] didn t call . . . to be, you know, not credible. . . . I think that the evidence when weighed in -in its totality, I think that Flor did have at least five school days unexcused absence from school during the last school year. These credibility determinations were the juvenile court s to make. See Mario G., 227 Ariz. at 287-88, ¶ 24, 257 P.3d at 1167-68 (citation omitted). Considering only the four unexcused days and the ten days of absence covered only by the blanket excuse, 2 Flor had more than the statutorily-required five days of unexcused absence. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding Flor incorrigible. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JV-510312, 183 Ariz. 116, 118, 901 P.2d 464, 466 (App. 1995) (appellate court reviews juvenile court dispositions for abuse of discretion); Rachelle S. v. Ariz. Dep t of Econ. Sec., 191 Ariz. 518, 519, ¶ 9, 958 P.2d 459, 460 (App. 1998) (juvenile court decisions regarding the weight and effect of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous). 2 Although the blanket excuse covered 12 of the days alleged, Flor produced an additional note for two of the same days covered by the blanket excuse. Thus, ten days were supported only by the blanket excuse and Flor s mother s testimony. 4 ¶7 Despite the foregoing, Flor argues the juvenile court misinterpreted the law by counting each missed class period as constituting an unexcused absence on a school day[]. The interpretation given to the applicable statute, A.R.S. § 15803(C)(1), on appeal -- that, for the purposes of calculating unexcused absences, one school day is the same as one [full] calendar day -- is both incorrect and flies in the face of the interpretation offered by Flor s counsel and the State at the adjudication, which the court accepted. Although we acknowledge the court initially made some confusing comments -- noting that even if it believed all of the doctor s notes, there were days for which there s no doctor s slip, the school didn t excuse the absen[ce], and I don t know how many class periods there are in a day. I think there s probably five or six - both the State Flor s and counsel agreed habitual truancy means unexcused absences on [f]ive different days . . . but truant . . . means unexcused absence for at least [one] class period during the day. (Emphasis added.) As noted, once the parties agreed, the court accepted this interpretation. did not misinterpret the law. 5 Thus, the court CONCLUSION ¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court s order finding Flor incorrigible. _/s/_______________________________ PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge CONCURRING: __/s/______________________________ MARGARET H. DOWNIE, Judge _/s/_______________________________ MAURICE PORTLEY, Judge 6

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