Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Trussville and the City of Trussville v. Tacala, Inc.

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REL: 04/12/2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2120132 Board o f Zoning Adjustment o f the C i t y o f T r u s s v i l l e and the City of T r u s s v i l l e v. T a c a l a , Inc. Appeal from J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t Court (CV-11-2111) THOMAS, J u d g e . In 1989, T a c a l a , I n c . , c o n s t r u c t e d an 8 0 - f o o t - h i g h a d v e r t i s i n g i t s r e s t a u r a n t , a Taco B e l l interstate i n Trussville sign franchise, along the ( " t h e Taco B e l l sign"). The Taco 2120132 Bell In sign i s not 2006, t h e located C i t y of on the premises of Trussville restaurant. C i t y " ) enacted ("the the a new within the sign ordinance that p r o h i b i t e d off-premises city limits. provided The t h a t nonconforming s i g n s , which the o r d i n a n c e could alterations be but t h a t f a i l to conform or According to § 30.0(C)(2), maintained, other provided changes that that would 2006 intent sign of this conforming designed provisions ordinance Ordinance to within the signs to eventually of the sign. eventually City bring them The that structural its useful " [ i ] t is eliminate either in "no S e c t i o n 30.0(B) of stated s i g n o r d i n a n c e or by I n September 2011, Taco B e l l further could nonconforming extend l i f e " were made t o t h e n o n c o n f o r m i n g s i g n . the (C), defined o r more p r o v i s i o n s o f [ t h e 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e ] , " r e m a i n as e r e c t e d . signs 1 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e , i n § 3 0 . 0 ( A ) and as " s i g n s t h a t were l a w f u l l y e r e c t e d , t o one signs through compliance their all the non- measures with the removal." t r o p i c a l - s t o r m - f o r c e w i n d s damaged t h e Taco B e l l signpost was separated at i t s S e c t i o n 2 . 0 ( Y ) o f t h e 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e d e f i n e s an " o f f - p r e m i s e s s i g n " as " [ a ] s i g n w h i c h d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n t o a b u s i n e s s , commodity, s e r v i c e o r e n t e r t a i n m e n t c o n d u c t e d , s o l d o r o f f e r e d f o r s a l e a t a l o c a t i o n o t h e r t h a n t h e p r e m i s e s on which the s i g n i s l o c a t e d . " 1 2 2120132 second j o i n t presenting such t h a t i t leaned a danger t o that restaurant. The toward a nearby that property and to the restaurant, patrons C i t y ' s b u i l d i n g i n s p e c t o r , Dan of Sargent, and t h e C i t y E n g i n e e r , D w i g h t W a l d r o p , i n s p e c t e d t h e Taco B e l l sign and i n f o r m e d L y n n T o l b e r t , who maintains s i g n f o r T a c a l a , t h a t t h e Taco B e l l s i g n was have t o be removed. lacked e q u i p m e n t t o remove t h e the the Taco damaged and Bell would Because T o l b e r t i n f o r m e d Sargent t h a t Taco B e l l sign that he day, S a r g e n t i n s t r u c t e d T o l b e r t t o t a k e s t e p s t o make t h e Taco B e l l s i g n s a f e u n t i l i t c o u l d be removed. Sargent described the Taco B e l l as m e t a l " f i n s " a r o u n d t h e b e n t p o r t i o n sent pertinent a of signpost. P u r s u a n t t o § 31.0 later T o l b e r t t h e n w e l d e d what notice to of the Tacala. 2006 s i g n Section ordinance, 31.0 Sargent provides, part: " I f a t any t i m e t h e E n g i n e e r i n g and Inspections D e p a r t m e n t , a f t e r an i n s p e c t i o n , d e t e r m i n e s t h a t a sign ... endangers the public safety due to m a t e r i a l , e l e c t r i c a l , o r s t r u c t u r a l d e f i c i e n c i e s ... the Department s h a l l p r o c e e d i n accordance w i t h t h i s s e c t i o n . Upon s u c h d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e Engineering and I n s p e c t i o n s D e p a r t m e n t s h a l l p r e p a r e a n o t i c e w h i c h s h a l l d e s c r i b e t h e s i g n and i t s l o c a t i o n and which s h a l l s t a t e , i f the v i o l a t i o n or v i o l a t i o n s are not c o r r e c t e d w i t h i n t e n ( 1 0 ) w o r k i n g days a f t e r r e c e i p t f o r p e r m a n e n t s i g n s ... , t h e s i g n , i n c l u d i n g t h e s i g n f a c e , s u p p o r t s , and a l l s t r u c t u r a l members 3 in 2120132 p e r t a i n i n g t o s a i d s i g n , s h a l l be removed and the c o s t o f s a i d r e m o v a l b i l l e d t o t h e p r o p e r t y owner a n d / o r s i g n owner. ... "Any p e r s o n f o u n d t o be i n v i o l a t i o n o f any o f t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s A r t i c l e s h a l l be g i v e n t e n (10) w o r k i n g d a y s by written notice t o remedy s u c h v i o l a t i o n s f o r permanent s i g n s " I n the had notice determined that s i g n u n d e r § 30.0 B e l l s i g n had w i n d s , and sent to Tacala, the of Sargent explained Taco B e l l the 2006 s i g n sign was the r e p a i r s necessary to that the Taco September 2011 stabilize the B e l l s i g n w o u l d be a s t r u c t u r a l a l t e r a t i o n n o t p e r m i t t e d § 3 0 . 0 ( C ) ( 2 ) of the r e l i e d on § 31.0 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e . of the above, r e q u i r e s to correct Bell any violation sign would n o n c o n f o r m i n g s i g n s by useful l i f e , the Taco under further quoted t h e C i t y t o g i v e a s i g n owner n o t i c e t h a t i t s However, b e c a u s e S a r g e n t had Taco notice 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e , w h i c h , as s i g n e n d a n g e r s t h e p u b l i c s a f e t y and days The he nonconforming ordinance, b e e n s t r u c t u r a l l y damaged by t h e that a that of t o g i v e t h e s i g n owner 10 the 2006 sign ordinance. c o n c l u d e d t h a t the r e p a i r s t o violate § 30.0(C)(2) relating the to s t r u c t u r a l l y a l t e r i n g i t to extend i t s t h e n o t i c e t o T a c a l a i n s t r u c t e d T a c a l a t o remove Taco B e l l sign instead c o r r e c t o r remedy t h e of providing v i o l a t i o n of the 4 Tacala 2006 s i g n 10 days to ordinance. 2120132 T a c a l a sought r e v i e w of Sargent's d e c i s i o n from the Board of Zoning Adjustment After a hearing, of the C i t y of T r u s s v i l l e ("the the Board unanimously upheld d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e T a c o B e l l s i g n must be removed. appealed Court. Board"). Sargent's T a c a l a then the Board's d e t e r m i n a t i o n to the J e f f e r s o n Circuit The C i t y i n t e r v e n e d i n t h e a c t i o n ; b e c a u s e t h e C i t y ' s interests are hereinafter "the C i t y Both aligned refer with those to the C i t y and of the Board, the Board we will collectively defendants." the C i t y defendants and T a c a l a moved f o r a summary judgment, each p r o v i d i n g v a r i o u s s u p p o r t i n g m a t e r i a l s . a h e a r i n g , the t r i a l for of as c o u r t denied the C i t y defendants After motion a summary j u d g m e n t and e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r Tacala. I n i t s order, the t r i a l c o u r t concluded t h a t the C i t y had n o t c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e b e c a u s e i t had n o t p e r m i t t e d T a c a l a t o c o r r e c t o r remedy t h e v i o l a t i o n o f ordinance Bell and had s i g n ; based Tacala's further on t h a t c o n c l u s i o n , t h e t r i a l motion for a summary j u d g m e n t . The that Sargent's on 30.0(C)(2) of concluded contained in § i n s t e a d o r d e r e d T a c a l a t o remove t h e the 5 reliance 2006 sign Taco court granted trial the court language ordinance was 2120132 arbitrary because according to vague" the the and phrase "extend trial i t s useful l i f e " was, c o u r t , " i m p e r m i s s i b l y ambiguous "unenforceable as written"; based on and that c o n c l u s i o n , the t r i a l c o u r t denied the C i t y d e f e n d a n t s ' motion for a summary j u d g m e n t . On appeal, the The C i t y defendants City defendants appeal. make three distinct a r g u m e n t s : w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n a p p l y i n g t h e wrong standard of review to the Board's d e t e r m i n a t i o n , whether trial court ordinance improperly s t r u c k down § 30.0 of the 2006 s i g n as " u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , " and w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l i g n o r e d the p l a i n language of the ordinance the court and t h e c a n o n s o f s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n i n v a l i d a t i n g the C i t y ' s n o t i c e to T a c a l a and, t h e y s a y , r e p e a l i n g by i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t p o r t i o n o f § 30.0(C)(2) prohibiting the nonconforming s i g n s i n such life. structural a way alteration as t o e x t e n d T a c a l a argues t h a t the t r i a l of their useful c o u r t a p p l i e d the proper s t a n d a r d t o i t s review of the appeal from the Board's d e c i s i o n and City t h a t the trial violated providing ordinance. § Tacala c o u r t was 31.0 10 of the the days Furthermore, correct i n concluding that 2006 sign ordinance by not to remedy any violation of the Tacala 6 argues t h a t the trial court 2120132 did not h o l d § 30.0(C)(2) u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l but m e r e l y that i t was "unenforceable argues t h a t the t r i a l 2006 s i g n We as written." c o u r t d i d not Tacala p o r t i o n of the ordinance. as was applied summary j u d g m e n t material Finally, r e p e a l any r e v i e w a summary j u d g m e n t de standard declared i n the i s t o be f a c t e x i s t s and j u d g m e n t as court. g r a n t e d when no the a m a t t e r of trial n o v o ; we law. the same A motion f o r genuine moving p a r t y Rule apply issue is entitled 5 6 ( c ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. of to Civ. a a P. A p a r t y m o v i n g f o r a summary j u d g m e n t must make a p r i m a f a c i e showing " t h a t fact and law." there i s no that [ i t ] i s e n t i t l e d Rule 56(c)(3); 1036, 1038 burden at then 1038 see ( A l a . 1992) . shifts to p r i m a f a c i e s h o w i n g by 2d genuine (footnote Lee issue as to any t o a j u d g m e n t as v. material a matter C i t y o f Gadsden , 592 So. I f t h e movant meets t h i s b u r d e n , the nonmovant to rebut 'substantial evidence.'" omitted). e v i d e n c e o f s u c h w e i g h t and the Life of the movant's Lee, 592 So. " [ S ] u b s t a n t i a l evidence q u a l i t y that fair-minded Assurance f a c t s o u g h t t o be p r o v e d . " Co. of F l o r i d a , 547 7 So. 2d West v. 870, 2d "the is persons i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t can r e a s o n a b l y i n f e r existence of the Founders 871 (Ala. 2120132 1 9 8 9 ) ; see A l a . Code 1975, reviewing all § 12-21-12(d). F u r t h e r m o r e , when a summary j u d g m e n t , t h e a p p e l l a t e the evidence i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e court must view t o t h e nonmovant and must e n t e r t a i n a l l r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t a j u r y w o u l d be e n t i t l e d t o draw. & Cas. I n s . Co. v. DPF A r c h i t e c t s , P.C., 792 So. 2d 369, Co., 591 So. 2d 372 486, ( A l a . 1991). We the Prop. 2 0 0 0 ) ; and Fuqua v. I n g e r s o l l - R a n d (Ala. 487 See N a t i o n w i d e first a d d r e s s t h e argument t h a t t h e t r i a l i n c o r r e c t "standard o f r e v i e w " when d e c i d i n g from the d e c i s i o n of the Board. court used the appeal We n o t e t h a t i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e s t a t u t e p e r m i t t i n g an a p p e a l f r o m a d e c i s i o n o f t h e B o a r d to the c i r c u i t court provides that t r i e d de n o v o " i n t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t . 81. Caselaw has explained that "the a c t i o n ... shall be A l a . Code 1975, § 11-52¬ the circuit court, when c o n s i d e r i n g an a p p e a l f r o m a b o a r d o f a d j u s t m e n t , " s i t [ s ] as a ' g l o r i f i e d b o a r d o f a d j u s t m e n t ' " and t h a t t h e c i r c u i t court has t h e p o w e r s g r a n t e d t o t h e b o a r d by A l a . Code 1975, § 11¬ 52-80. 1981) C i t y o f Homewood v. C a f f e e , 400 So. 2d 375, 377 ( A l a . ( q u o t i n g N e l s o n v. D o n a l d s o n , 255 A l a . 76, 80, 50 So. 2d 244, 248 (1951)). T h u s , c o n t r a r y t o t h e argument p r e s e n t e d by 8 2120132 the City defendants, the t r i a l court was not r e q u i r e d to r e v i e w t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n u n d e r an a r b i t r a r y - a n d - c a p r i c i o u s standard. 2 Insofar as t h e C i t y court declared defendants § 30.0(C)(2) complain that unconstitutional, the t r i a l we a g r e e with T a c a l a t h a t t h e summary-judgment o r d e r m e r e l y d e t e r m i n e s t h a t § 3 0 . 0 ( C ) ( 2 ) i s u n e n f o r c e a b l e b e c a u s e t h e l a n g u a g e upon w h i c h the City defendants r e l y i s vague. T a c a l a never c h a l l e n g e d the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the ordinance before the t r i a l court. T h e r e f o r e , we c o n c l u d e , as d i d o u r supreme c o u r t i n Swann v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of Jefferson County, 459 So. 2d 896, 901 ( A l a . 1984) ( o p i n i o n e x t e n d e d on r e h e a r i n g ) , t h a t t h e trial court ordinance. the d i d not consider the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y F u r t h e r m o r e , we n o t e t h a t a c i r c u i t authority to consider questions of the court relating to lacks the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f an o r d i n a n c e when h e a r i n g an a p p e a l f r o m We n o t e t h a t t h e c a s e upon w h i c h t h e C i t y d e f e n d a n t s r e l y , Ex p a r t e C i t y o f F a i r h o p e , 739 So. 2d 35, 37 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) , i n v o l v e d an o r i g i n a l a c t i o n i n t h e c i r c u i t court c h a l l e n g i n g t h e g r a n t o f a b u i l d i n g p e r m i t on t h e g r o u n d t h a t the p e r m i t v i o l a t e d p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e c i t y ' s z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e and d i d n o t i n v o l v e an a p p e a l o f t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e c i t y ' s b o a r d o f a d j u s t m e n t u n d e r § 11-52-81. 2 9 2120132 a b o a r d o f a d j u s t m e n t u n d e r § 11-52-81. Caffee, We 400 So. 2d a t 378. now turn judgment o r d e r . of C i t y o f Homewood v. to merits of the t r i a l court's summary- We n o t e t h a t t h e C i t y d e f e n d a n t s s e e k r e v i e w both that p o r t i o n of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment e n t e r i n g a summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f T a c a l a a n d t h a t p o r t i o n judgment denying their motion for a summary of the judgment. A l t h o u g h t h e d e n i a l o f a summary-judgment m o t i o n i s o r d i n a r i l y not a p p e a l a b l e , o u r supreme court has e x p l a i n e d that " a p p e a l from a p r e t r i a l f i n a l judgment d i s p o s i n g o f a l l in t h e case (as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a Rule an claims 5 4 ( b ) summary judgment d i s p o s i n g o f fewer t h a n a l l c l a i m s ) e n t i t l e s t h e [ t h e appellant], f o r purposes of [appellate] review, i s s u e s b a s e d upon t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s a d v e r s e r u l i n g s , the denial o f i t s summary-judgment m o t i o n s . " to raise including Lloyd Noland Found., I n c . v. C i t y o f F a i r f i e l d H e a l t h c a r e A u t h . , 837 So. 2d 253, 263 Cas. Co., 874 court's ( A l a . 2002); see a l s o Tanner So. 2d 1058, 1066 trial b e f o r e i t i n t h e a p p e a l from t h e Board's d e c i s i o n . Therefore, consider t h e arguments 10 case The & a l l issues will i n the present ( A l a . 2003) . Farm F i r e resolved we judgment v. S t a t e the C i t y defendants make 2120132 regarding the summary We trial court's denial of their motion judgment. begin our a n a l y s i s o f t h e summary-judgment o r d e r f a v o r o f T a c a l a by f o c u s i n g on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n had failed Tacala the to comply 2006 sign § on ordinance. their nonconforming Tacala 31.0 sign Bell The because City interpretation signs, 10 d a y s that the C i t y i t d i d not the City defendants of § was 30.0, not § 30.0 would not t h a t would extend the l i f e sign. appeal, that correct or argue which required to t o c o r r e c t o r remedy t h e i s s u e w i t h because alterations Taco with We City give Tacala i t was remedy argued below, entitled the to the alleged 10 sanction of the and v i o l a t i o n s of agree w i t h Tacala 374 So. 2d 305, C i t y d e f e n d a n t s a g r e e t h a t § 31.0 notice to Tacala provide Taco nonconforming again on to attempt to the 2006 sign sign. that the C i t y i s r e q u i r e d to f o l l o w p r o c e d u r e s s e t o u t i n i t s own of Mobile, governs structural argues days of that, the o r d i n a n c e c a u s e d by t h e w i n d damage t o t h e Taco B e l l the in 10 d a y s t o c o r r e c t o r remedy t h e a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n based Bell for a ordinances. 307 See ( A l a . 1979) . S m i t h v. Even the r e q u i r e d the C i t y t o send a t h a t t h e Taco B e l l s i g n v i o l a t e d one o r more 11 2120132 s e c t i o n s o f t h e 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e . with Tacala or thet r i a l However, we c a n n o t a g r e e court that there i s no g e n u i n e of f a c t r e g a r d i n g whether the n o t i c e t h a t t h e C i t y sent to comply with § 31.0. d i s a g r e e m e n t , however, 30.0 In explaining we must c o n s i d e r and 31.0, and, t h u s , we must the basis issue failed f o r this t h e i n t e r p l a y o f §§ construe t h e 2006 sign ordinance and i n t e r p r e t t h e language used i n i t s p r o v i s i o n s . " C i t y o r d i n a n c e s a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e same g e n e r a l rules of construction, as a r e a c t s of the L e g i s l a t u r e . S & S D i s t r i b . Co. v . Town o f New Hope, 334 So. 2d 905 ( A l a . 1976) . I n John Deere Co. v . Gamble, 523 So. 2d 95, 99-100 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) , [ o u r supreme c o u r t ] , q u o t i n g C l a r k v. Houston County Comm'n, 507 So. 2 d 902, 903-04 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) , s e t o u t the following general rules of statutory c o n s t r u c t i o n , which a l s o apply t o the c o n s t r u c t i o n of m u n i c i p a l ordinances: "'"The f u n d a m e n t a l r u l e o f s t a t u t o r y construction i s t o a s c e r t a i n and g i v e effect to the intent of the [city council] i n e n a c t i n g t h e [ o r d i n a n c e ] . A d v e r t i s e r Co. v. H o b b i e , 474 So. 2d 93 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) ; L e a g u e o f Women V o t e r s v . R e n f r o , 292 A l a . 128, 290 So. 2 d 167 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . I f p o s s i b l e , t h e i n t e n t o f t h e [ c i t y c o u n c i l ] s h o u l d be gathered from t h e language of the [ordinance] itself. Advertiser Co. v . Hobbie, supra; Morgan C o u n t y Board of Education v. Alabama Public School & C o l l e g e A u t h o r i t y , 362 So. 2d 850 ( A l a . 1978). I f t h e [ordinance] i s ambiguous o r uncertain, the court may consider c o n d i t i o n s which might a r i s e under t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e [ o r d i n a n c e ] a n d examine 12 2120132 r e s u l t s t h a t w i l l f l o w from g i v i n g t h e l a n g u a g e i n q u e s t i o n one p a r t i c u l a r m e a n i n g r a t h e r t h a n a n o t h e r . S t u d d a r d v. S o u t h C e n t r a l B e l l T e l e p h o n e Co., 356 So. 2d 139 ( A l a . 1 9 7 8 ) ; L e a g u e o f Women V o t e r s v. Renfro, supra."'" Ex 51, parte 55-56 City o f Orange B e a c h Bd. o f A d j u s t m e n t , ( A l a . 2001). Furthermore, not we have recently explained that we should c o n s t r u e t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d i n an o r d i n a n c e i n i s o l a t i o n . C i t y o f M o b i l e v. G r i z z a r d , So. 833 So. 2d 3d , [Ms. 2110169, O c t . 12, 2012] ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 1 2 ) . "'When i n t e r p r e t i n g an o r d i n a n c e , each word o r p h r a s e must be g i v e n m e a n i n g so t h a t no p a r t i s rendered void, superfluous, contradictory, or i n s i g n i f i c a n t . O r d i n a n c e s s h o u l d be r e a d i n p a r i m a t e r i a when r e l e v a n t . ' 1A Norman J . S i n g e r & J.D. Shambie S i n g e r , S u t h e r l a n d S t a t u t e s and S t a t u t o r y Construction § 30:6 ( 7 t h ed.2009) (footnotes omitted). '[T]he whole [ordinance] under c o n s t r u c t i o n s h o u l d be e x a m i n e d a n d , i f p o s s i b l e , e a c h s e c t i o n s h o u l d be g i v e n e f f e c t . ' E m p l o y e e s ' R e t . S y s . o f A l a b a m a v. Head, 369 So. 2d 1227, 1228 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) . '"'"There i s a p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t e v e r y w o r d , s e n t e n c e , o r p r o v i s i o n [ o f an o r d i n a n c e ] was i n t e n d e d f o r some u s e f u l p u r p o s e , h a s some f o r c e a n d e f f e c t , a n d t h a t some e f f e c t i s t o be g i v e n t o e a c h , and a l s o t h a t no s u p e r f l u o u s words o r p r o v i s i o n s were u s e d . " ' " ' S u r t e e s v. V F J V e n t u r e s , I n c . , 8 So. 3d 950, 970 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2008) ( q u o t i n g Ex p a r t e U n i r o y a l T i r e Co., 779 So. 2d 227, 236 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n S h e f f i e l d v. S t a t e , 708 So. 2d 899, 909 ( A l a . C r i m . App. 1997) [, q u o t i n g i n t u r n 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316 a t p. 551-52 (1953)]). 'Instead of taking one i s o l a t e d and n a r r o w l y 13 2120132 c o n s t r u e d s e n t e n c e o f [a s e c t i o n i n an o r d i n a n c e ] , we s h o u l d l o o k t o t h e e n t i r e f r a m e w o r k o f t h e [ordinance], t h e i n t e n t s and purposes of the [ o r d i n a n c e ] a n d t h e means b y w h i c h i t h a s b e e n g i v e n c o n s t r u c t i o n , e f f e c t and o p e r a t i o n d u r i n g i t s years o f e x i s t e n c e . ' J o r d a n v. C i t y o f M o b i l e , 260 A l a . 393, 401, 71 So. 2d 513, 520 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . " Grizzard, So. 3d a t . F i n a l l y , we n o t e t h a t one o f t h e most b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t h a t words i n a s t a t u t e , o r , i n t h i s case, an o r d i n a n c e , meaning. a r e t o be g i v e n t h e i r commonly understood See D e K a l b C n t y . LP Gas Co. v. S u b u r b a n Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 275 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) ; Ex p a r t e C i t y o f Orange B e a c h Bd. o f A d j u s t m e n t , 833 So. 2d 5 1 , 56 ( A l a . 2001) ( r e l y i n g on the p r i n c i p l e has to construe an o r d i n a n c e ) . Our supreme p u t i t t h i s way: " I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e meaning o f a s t a t u t e , t h i s C o u r t l o o k s t o t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e words as w r i t t e n b y t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . As we have s a i d : "'"Words u s e d i n a s t a t u t e must be g i v e n their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly u n d e r s t o o d m e a n i n g , a n d where p l a i n language i s u s e d a c o u r t i s bound t o i n t e r p r e t t h a t l a n g u a g e t o mean e x a c t l y what i t s a y s . I f the language o f the s t a t u t e i s u n a m b i g u o u s , t h e n t h e r e i s no room f o r j u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d t h e c l e a r l y expressed i n t e n t of the l e g i s l a t u r e must be g i v e n e f f e c t . " ' " 14 court 2120132 D e K a l b C n t y . LP Gas Co., & Blue S h i e l d quoting v. 729 So. 2d a t 275 Nielsen, 714 So. 2d (quoting Blue Cross 293, 296 ( A l a . 1998) i n t u r n IMED C o r p . v. Systems Eng'g A s s o c s . C o r p . , So. 2d 344, The 346 602 (Ala. 1992)). language of § 31.0 requires that a sign owner n o t i f i e d o f any v i o l a t i o n o f t h e 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e and the s i g n owner be p e r m i t t e d the violation giving rise 10 d a y s t o "remedy" o r to the n o t i c e . that "correct" However, 3 be as the C i t y d e f e n d a n t s u r g e , we c a n n o t v i e w t h e l a n g u a g e o f § 31.0 i n isolation. B e c a u s e t h e Taco B e l l s i g n i s a n o n c o n f o r m i n g u n d e r § 30.0, we must c o n s i d e r § 30.0(C)(2) nonconforming under § 31.0 place sign to or on else what i m p a c t t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f the right "correct" we run "remedy" that of the owner of the risk " s t r u c t u r a l a l t e r a t i o n s o r o t h e r changes Section 30.0 makes i t c l e a r run permitting limitation useful would of or would extend [the sign's] a o r t o "remedy" a v i o l a t i o n "correction" on sign afoul of a the that life." that the C i t y ' s aim i s to have n o n c o n f o r m i n g s i g n s e i t h e r change t o come i n t o c o m p l i a n c e No p a r t y c o n t e s t s t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m s " c o r r e c t " o r "remedy" u s e d i n § 31.0; c l e a r l y , t h e p a r t i e s c o n s i d e r t h o s e t e r m s t o have t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l m e a n i n g s . 3 15 2120132 w i t h t h e 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e o r be removed. The C i t y was n o t p e r m i t t e d t o order the removal of a l l nonconforming i t e n a c t e d t h e 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e . Inc. v. City (explaining reduction o f Daphne, that, 789 although So. of nonconforming See B u d g e t I n n o f Daphne, 154, 159 municipality a may uses, s i g n s when 2d "an e x i s t i n g ( A l a . 2000) pursue the nonconforming use i s a v e s t e d p r o p e r t y r i g h t t h a t a z o n i n g o r d i n a n c e may n o t abrogate except in limited circumstances"). s t a t e d g o a l of e r a d i c a t i n g nonconforming However, the signs over time i s a t r a d i t i o n a l z o n i n g g o a l t h a t may be a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h " t i m e a n d attrition." (Ala. City 1998). To nonconforming Budget Inn o f F o l e y v. McLeod, that signs, of end, the 709 City So. 2d 471, determined useful l i f e The t r i a l used in § that a l t h o u g h t h e y c o u l d be m a i n t a i n e d , s e e Daphne, 789 So. 2d at 160, could not s t r u c t u r a l l y a l t e r e d o r c h a n g e d i n a manner t h a t w o u l d the 473 of the nonconforming extend sign. c o u r t found the phrase "extend i t s u s e f u l 30.0(C)(2) t o be vague be and ambiguous and life" thus d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e 2006 s i g n o r d i n a n c e was u n e n f o r c e a b l e as written. We cannot agree. Although the t r i a l court found f a u l t w i t h the C i t y f o r not d e f i n i n g the term " u s e f u l l i f e " i n 16 2120132 the ordinance, that alone i s not a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s t o declare t h a t t h e o r d i n a n c e i s t o o vague a n d ambiguous t o be enforced. A u s t i n v . A l a b a m a Check C a s h e r s A s s ' n , 936 So. 2d 1014, 1035 (Ala. 2005) define ( n o t i n g t h a t t h e f a i l u r e o f a l e g i s l a t i v e body t o a term i n a statute or ordinance f o r vagueness enactment void "subvert[] t h e i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e [by] a p p l y [ i n g ] t h e plain, ordinary, and that does n o t make t h e a court does not a n d commonly u n d e r s t o o d m e a n i n g o f a w o r d " ) ; see a l s o Ex p a r t e C i t y o f Orange B e a c h Bd. o f A d j u s t m e n t , 833 So. 2d a t 56. provide that, In fact, the rules of statutory "when a t e r m i s n o t d e f i n e d construction i n a s t a t u t e , the commonly a c c e p t e d d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e t e r m s h o u l d be a p p l i e d . " Bean D r e d g i n g , L.L.C. v. A l a b a m a Dep't o f Revenue, 855 So. 2d 513, 517 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . The trial court failed to apply the p r i n c i p l e s s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d i n t h e 2006 ordinance by failing to consider the commonly of sign accepted d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e words u s e d i n § 3 0 . 0 ( C ) ( 2 ) a n d i n f a i l i n g t o consider the phrase "extend i t s u s e f u l l i f e " § 30.0 o r t h e e n t i r e o r d i n a n c e . Beach Bd. o f A d j u s t m e n t , See Ex p a r t e 833 So. 2d a t 56 17 i n the context of C i t y o f Orange (rejecting this 2120132 court's and determination "dilapidated" dictionary the entire "life" are that were definitions the vague of terms and ambiguous t h o s e t e r m s and ordinance). The a l l commonly understood definitions of each "Extend" i s d e f i n e d words inform as "structurally the based i n the "extend," words. unsound" on context "useful," The longer"; of and dictionary i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of " t o c a u s e t o be the a § 30.0 suggested synonym i s " p r o l o n g . " Merriam-Webster's C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y 442 ( 1 1 t h ed. " U s e f u l " i s d e f i n e d as " c a p a b l e o f put t o use; 2003) . [ e s p e c i a l l y ] : s e r v i c e a b l e f o r an end M e r r i a m - W e b s t e r ' s C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y 1378 "Life" i s defined popularity of as "the p e r i o d of d u r a t i o n , something" or "an opportunity being or purpose." ( 1 1 t h ed. 2003) . usefulness, for continued viability." M e r r i a m - W e b s t e r ' s C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y 718 ed. Section 2003). 30.0 governs nonconforming signs as i t s p u r p o s e t h e e v e n t u a l or (11th and e r a d i c a t i o n of those s i g n s . has Thus, t h e p h r a s e " e x t e n d i t s u s e f u l l i f e " means t o c a u s e t o l e n g t h e n the period during for i t s purpose. which a nonconforming sign We erred i n determining was vague, that therefore is conclude t h a t the serviceable trial t h a t the phrase "extend i t s u s e f u l its vagueness 18 rendered § court life" 30.0(C)(2) 2120132 "unenforceable as w r i t t e n , " and t h a t S a r g e n t ' s r e l i a n c e on l a n g u a g e o f § 3 0 . 0 ( C ) ( 2 ) was However, t h a t whether the in trial determination and before material i s s u e of genuine supports decide 31.0 the trial Only fact demonstrated regarding issue useful l i f e r e p a i r s w o u l d be i f the the evidence lack of complied w i t h the the of the before p h o t o g r a p h s , t h e Taco B e l l storm-force winds restaurant. The S a r g e n t and and was the signpost caused photographs to and Waldrop i n d i c a t e t h a t the at i t s second j o i n t . " f i n s " that, according trial was to Taco p r o h i b i t e d under r e q u i r e m e n t s s e t out evidence before a whether r e p a i r s whether the n o t i c e Sargent p r o v i d e d separated the the trial to Tacala § court a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w on t h a t q u e s t i o n may B a s e d on the court s i g n would extend the s i g n such t h a t the 30.0(C)(2). resolve I n s t e a d , we must c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e evidence Bell does not i n denying the C i t y defendants' motion f o r a summary j u d g m e n t . Taco B e l l arbitrary. c o u r t e r r e d i n e n t e r i n g a summary j u d g m e n t favor of Tacala the the we under § i n that section. court, including damaged by tropical- lean toward affidavit Taco B e l l a nearby testimony of signpost had Some o f t h e p h o t o g r a p h s d e p i c t to Sargent, T o l b e r t welded to 19 the 2120132 Taco B e l l signpost affidavit t e s t i m o n y and documentary e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o t h e repairs a t the second j o i n t . t o t h e Taco B e l l sign A discussion of the i s necessary t o resolve the issue. Sargent s p e c i f i c a l l y permitted testified in his affidavit t h e " f i n s " t o be a t t a c h e d t o t h e Taco B e l l t h a t he signpost as a t e m p o r a r y s a f e t y measure when T o l b e r t i n f o r m e d h i m on t h e date of the i n s p e c t i o n that Tolbert e q u i p m e n t t o remove t h e s i g n . s u p p o r t e d t h e Taco B e l l crane" before and balance." the Taco B e l l required d i d n o t have t h e p r o p e r According sign with t o Sargent, "a c a b l e Tolbert extended attaching the metal " f i n s " to "provide from a strength Sargent f u r t h e r s t a t e d i n h i s a f f i d a v i t that s i g n h a d " s u f f e r e d m a j o r s t r u c t u r a l damage a n d fundamental s t r u c t u r a l repairs to the j o i n t between the bottom and second segments." The City presented p u r s u a n t t o § 31.0. t h a t he h a d i n s p e c t e d by w i n d . as "had the notice to Tacala In that n o t i c e , Sargent n o t i f i e d Tacala sent t h e Taco B e l l s i g n a f t e r i t was damaged Sargent described "major s t r u c t u r a l Sargent t h e damage t o t h e Taco B e l l damage." He f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d sign that he d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e [Taco B e l l ] s i g n e n d a n g e r s t h e p u b l i c 20 2120132 safety due pursuant to to determination suffered those § structural 31.0, he to Tacala. was deficiencies" providing Because d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e "work r e q u i r e d sign i s considered notice t h e Taco s t r u c t u r a l damage, t h e n o t i c e Bell stated, that, of that sign had Sargent had t o r e p a i r t h e [Taco B e l l ] ... a s t r u c t u r a l a l t e r a t i o n e x t e n d t h e u s e f u l l i f e o f t h e Taco B e l l s i g n ] ." explained, and [that would Thus, S a r g e n t he h a d c o n c l u d e d t h a t r e p a i r o f t h e Taco B e l l would v i o l a t e § 30.0(C)(2) and t h a t t h e o n l y r e m a i n i n g to cure the threat to public safety sign option p o s e d b y t h e Taco Bell s i g n was i t s r e m o v a l . Waldrop a l s o t e s t i f i e d by a f f i d a v i t . affidavit that what he d e s c r i b e d added the Taco to "structure Bell and s t r e n g t h He s t a t e d as " s t i f f e n e r signpost by plates" Tolbert to provide Without " s t i f f e n e r p l a t e s o r some o t h e r t y p e o f s t r u c t u r a l r e p a i r o r r e p l a c e m e n t , " W a l d r o p s t a t e d , " t h e Taco B e l l be were to the e x t e r i o r of the pylon at the j o i n t where t h e s t r u c t u r e h a d f a i l e d a n d g i v e n way." the in his leaning t o one s i d e , exerting structure, and p o s s i b l y collapsed 21 abnormal [sic]." ... s i g n w o u l d pressure Like on i t s Sargent, 2120132 Waldrop described structural in Tacala the damage the the affidavit Barter s t r u c t u r a l engineer. testified Taco B e l l remain i n p e r p e t u i t y . " of the "gussets" "'gussets' the cause certain of ... the s i g n has Further, added extend the u s e f u l l i f e the the Taco to the of the failure circumstances he sign as Taco not gusseted be a that finite "can Bell life" and addition signpost I n f a c t , he did been d e t e r m i n e d connections do not stated strengthening since and not that under provide s a i d t h a t t h e Taco B e l l s i g n "can be r e t u r n e d t o i t s o r i g i n a l d e s i g n g u s s e t s can Barter, in his affidavit considered has Marc opined t h a t the sign. c a n n o t be of "no a d d i t i o n a l r e s i s t a n c e t o f a i l u r e " and the Bell nature. presented a sign l i k e to configuration and s a f e l y removed." B a s e d on t h e e v i d e n t i a r y s u b m i s s i o n s made by t h e p a r t i e s , we cannot conclude exists regarding that no genuine whether r e p a i r s to the extend i t s u s e f u l l i f e such t h a t the 30.0(C)(2). a Although S a r g e n t and W a l d r o p and conclusion that issue the fair reading of material Taco B e l l of the determined that 22 would r e p a i r s would v i o l a t e affidavits the n o t i c e sent to Tacala C i t y has sign fact the support repairs § of the to 2120132 t h e Taco B e l l s i g n a r e " s t r u c t u r a l a l t e r a t i o n s ... t h a t w o u l d extend i t s u s e f u l l i f e , " the "gussets" Barter d i d not extend opined that the u s e f u l Thus, a m a t e r i a l f a c t i s i n d i s p u t e , of t h a t f a c t q u e s t i o n , can determine § 31.0 permitted 2006 sign of the s i g n . n e i t h e r t h i s court nor the t r i a l whether complied life and, w i t h o u t r e s o l u t i o n the repairs to the v i o l a t e § 30.0(C)(2) or whether the n o t i c e to the a d d i t i o n of with the Taco Bell to Tacala requirement that court pursuant Tacala 10 d a y s t o c o r r e c t o r remedy any v i o l a t i o n ordinance. judgment i n f a v o r summary-judgment Accordingly, of Tacala, motion, AFFIRMED Thompson, Pittman, reverse the be of the summary a f f i r m the d e n i a l of the C i t y ' s and proceedings consistent with we sign remand this t h e cause for further opinion. IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. P . J . , a n d Moore a n d D o n a l d s o n , J J . , c o n c u r . J . , concurs i n the r e s u l t , without w r i t i n g . 23

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