Lynn Barter and Joy Barter v. Burton Garland Revocable Trust et al.

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REL: 04/05/2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 2111050 Lynn B a r t e r and Joy B a r t e r v. Burton Garland Revocable Trust e t a l . Appeal from Randolph C i r c u i t (CV-09-66) Court THOMAS, J u d g e . L y n n B a r t e r a n d h i s w i f e , J o y B a r t e r , own L o t s 38 a n d 39 i n Lakeview E s t a t e s , a s u b d i v i s i o n l o c a t e d i n Randolph County; t h e B a r t e r s p u r c h a s e d t h e i r l o t s f r o m Mawal, I n c . , one o f t h e 2111050 6 0 named d e f e n d a n t s i n t h i s 39, w h i c h i s d a t e d J u l y appeal. That deed case. 1999, The 1 B a r t e r s ' deed t o L o t i s c o n t a i n e d i n the r e c o r d includes the following exception ("the e x c e p t i o n " ) from the g r a n t of Lot 39: "Except a l l r i g h t s title and t o t h e d i r t d r i v e roadway and b o a t ramp l o c a t e d on t h e East side of s a i d l o t as shown on t h e p l a t recorded i n P l a t Book 2 Page 70 and Page 89 i n t h e o f f i c e o f t h e P r o b a t e of on Randolph Barters County, purchased executed Estates"; a Alabama." Lot quitclaim the deed quitclaim[ed], and 39, deed recited In Burlin to title, Meadows "all that interest, 1999, and l o t owners i t "remise[d], convey[ed] to the d e s c r i b e d as " t h e owners o f l o t s right, April one before the Gwen Meadows of Lakeview release[d], l o t owners," thru Judge which i t fifty-four," "all and c l a i m i n and t o " t h e roadway the b o a t ramp shown i n t h e s u b d i v i s i o n p l a t t o be l o c a t e d Lot 39. and on 2 A t o t a l o f 60 d e f e n d a n t s were named, b u t i t a p p e a r s t h a t d e f e n d a n t number 36 was l a t e r named as d e f e n d a n t number 6 0 , so the a c t i o n a c t u a l l y i n v o l v e d o n l y 59 d e f e n d a n t s . 1 T h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s two deeds c o n v e y i n g t h e roadway and the b o a t ramp. The f i r s t d e e d d e s c r i b e s t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp by u s e o f t h o s e t e r m s and by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e subdivision plat. The s e c o n d d e e d g i v e s a l e g a l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y by metes and b o u n d s . No p a r t y c o n t e n d s t h a t 2 2 2111050 I n June 2009, t h e B a r t e r s f i l e d an a c t i o n i n t h e R a n d o l p h Circuit Court seeking an abatement of the nuisance they a l l e g e d was c a u s e d by t h e u s e o f t h e b o a t ramp and s e e k i n g declaration of the l e g a l deed of the roadway Lakeview Estates." Lakeview Estates effect of the A p r i l and the boat The Barters 1999 q u i t c l a i m ramp to "the named as defendants Homeowners A s s o c i a t i o n and a owners a l l the of the record owners o f L a k e v i e w E s t a t e s as o f A p r i l 1999 ( " t h e s u b d i v i s i o n lot owners"), i n c l u d i n g the Burton G a r l a n d Revocable Mawal, I n c . , and D e n n i s C o n n e l l . n o t a l l , o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s was d e f e n d a n t s answered, letter through to an the attorney, counterclaim, an trial A f t e r s e r v i c e on some, b u t perfected, o n l y a few o f t h e a l l b u t one o f them a p p e a r i n g p r o se by court. Dennis The only Connell, defendant answered i n w h i c h he s o u g h t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n e x p r e s s easement Trust, over the the roadway Barters had and to and appear filed t h a t he the boat determination that e a s e m e n t , and an i n j u n c t i o n r e q u i r i n g t h e B a r t e r s a had ramp, i n t e r f e r e d with a that t o remove t h e g a t e a c r o s s t h e roadway and t o p e r m i t u n f e t t e r e d a c c e s s t o t h e b o a t ramp. t h e deeds do n o t c o n v e y identical 3 property. 2111050 C o n n e l l f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t i n F e b r u a r y 2011. The Barters opposed t h a t motion. i n the p a r t i e s ' p l e a d i n g s and v a r i o u s s u b m i s s i o n s , t h a t t h e B a r t e r s a l l e g e d t h a t t h e y had by paving times, had who the area surrounding c l e a r e d the area. The been b u r g l a r i z e d t w i c e were not gathering and owners of d r i n k i n g at the facts i t appears i m p r o v e d t h e b o a t ramp boat ramp and had, at that people, i n c l u d i n g people lots the in Lakeview boat Estates, ramp, w h i c h the were Barters B a s e d on r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f r o m t h e department, the gate across the the B a r t e r s a l l e g e d t h a t t h e i r house and a l l e g e d created a nuisance. sheriff's B a s e d on Barters stated, roadway t o r e s t r i c t t h e y had placed a a c c e s s t o t h e b o a t ramp. According t o t h e B a r t e r s , t h e y w o u l d g i v e a key t o t h e g a t e t o whomever requested interest in the one. The roadway and s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners as an In his the A p r i l the 1999 July deed 1999 to boat characterized ramp motion, Connell q u i t c l a i m d e e d and the s u b d i v i s i o n l o t o w n e r s , and roadway and t h e b o a t ramp. granted the to the easement. summary-judgment b a s e d on the Barters Barters, argued the Connell, exception and n o t t h e B a r t e r s , had the title He f u r t h e r a r g u e d t h a t t h e 4 that, in other to the Barters 2111050 had "improperly enjoyment caused impediment of h i s j o i n t l y to owned l a n d . " Connell's use and Connell noted i n h i s m o t i o n t h a t t h e B a r t e r s were on n o t i c e o f t h e s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owner's common o w n e r s h i p o f t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp a t t h e t i m e t h e y p u r c h a s e d L o t 39. B a r t e r s had n o t case "sufficiently f o r nuisance." Connell a l s o s t a t e d that the p l e a d or proved a prima C o n n e l l ' s motion d i d not facie contain n a r r a t i v e summary o f f a c t s , b u t he s u p p o r t e d h i s m o t i o n a with a copy o f t h e A p r i l 1999 q u i t c l a i m d e e d , a 1993 d e e d c o n v e y i n g h i s l o t t o h i m , and t h e J u l y 1999 d e e d c o n v e y i n g L o t 39 t o t h e B a r t e r s , as w e l l as w i t h h i s own The argued Barters, that only in their nine of affidavit. response the to Connell's subdivision motion, l o t owners had o b j e c t e d t o t h e B a r t e r s ' c l a i m o f o w n e r s h i p o f t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp o r t o t h e B a r t e r s ' t h e roadway and The Barters r e q u e s t s t o have t h e u s e t h e b o a t ramp e n d e d o r a t l e a s t offered Lynn Barter's affidavit, restricted. i n which e x p l a i n e d the f a c t s g i v i n g r i s e to the l i t i g a t i o n , descriptions ramp. In o f some o f t h e b e h a v i o r o c c u r r i n g the statement of facts of he including at the contained i n their boat first b r i e f i n o p p o s i t i o n t o C o n n e l l ' s summary-judgment m o t i o n , t h e 5 2111050 Barters stated create the that the Lakeview Meadowses had Estates r e f l e c t e d a d i r t roadway and 39, and April that 1999 the the s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners. in opposition solely on b u r d e n an not to the subdivision, The address Connell's and the to plat Lot the boat ramp to the b r i e f the B a r t e r s offered summary-judgment m o t i o n right first focused of e a s e m e n t i n s o f a r as unreasonable. that plat e x e c u t e d a q u i t c l a i m deed i n roadway Connell's legal the t h e b o a t ramp t h a t r a n a c r o s s Meadowses had conveying recorded a servient the estate b u r d e n on the holder easement i s However, the B a r t e r s ' f i r s t b r i e f d i d c l a i m t h a t t h e 1999 to not q u i t c l a i m deed conveyed t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp t o t h e s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners i n fee simple. After a hearing on the summary-judgment m o t i o n , the t r i a l c o u r t d i r e c t e d the p a r t i e s to b r i e f the i s s u e of parties' i n t e r e s t s i n the T h u s , i n June 2011, roadway and the which they argued that the t h e b o a t ramp. Barters b r i e f i n support of t h e i r opposition April filed 1999 a deed f r o m the the ambiguous description of the motion, in o r i g i n a l developers grantees 6 supplemental q u i t c l a i m deed, which s u b d i v i s i o n , was Estates a to Connell's t h e y c h a r a c t e r i z e d as Lakeview the void in because that of deed. of the The 2111050 Barters also delivered. briefly argued Connell that responded with t h e deed had n o t been h i s own brief, which c o n t a i n e d a s t a t e m e n t o f f a c t s a n d a b r i e f l e g a l argument t h a t the grantees were capable o f t h e d e e d were s u f f i c i e n t l y named b e c a u s e of being ascertained. The B a r t e r s they filed an o b j e c t i o n t o Connell's b r i e f , i n which they requested t h a t the trial c o u r t n o t c o n s i d e r C o n n e l l ' s b r i e f b e c a u s e i t was f i l e d a f t e r t h e d e a d l i n e t h e c o u r t had s e t ; t h e t r i a l r u l e on t h a t m o t i o n . a summary defendants. The court d i d not A f t e r a hearing, the t r i a l court judgment i n favor of Connell and entered the other 3 Barters f i l e d a postjudgment m o t i o n , i n which they a d v a n c e d s e v e r a l a r g u m e n t s t h a t t h e y h a d n o t made b e f o r e t h e T h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s on a l l c l a i m s made i n t h e B a r t e r s ' c o m p l a i n t . On a p p e a l , t h e B a r t e r s r a i s e a r g u m e n t s as t o o n l y t h o s e c l a i m s r e l a t i n g t o t h e o w n e r s h i p o f t h e roadway a n d t h e b o a t ramp a n d t h e i r r i g h t t o p l a c e a g a t e a c r o s s t h e roadway. T h e y do n o t r a i s e a n y a r g u m e n t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t d i s p o s e d o f t h e i r n u i s a n c e c l a i m . T h u s , we a f f i r m t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t d i s p o s e d o f t h e B a r t e r s ' n u i s a n c e c l a i m . Edosomwan ex r e l . Edosomwan v. A.B.C. D a y c a r e & K i n d e r g a r t e n , I n c . , 32 So. 3d 5 9 1 , 593 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2009) ( c i t i n g T u c k e r v. C u l l m a n - J e f f e r s o n C o u n t i e s Gas D i s t . , 864 So. 2d 317, 319 ( A l a . 2003)) ( s t a t i n g t h a t i s s u e s n o t r a i s e d and a r g u e d i n b r i e f a r e w a i v e d a n d a f f i r m i n g a summary j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t r e l a t e d t o c l a i m s a b o u t w h i c h t h e a p p e l l a n t h a d f a i l e d t o r a i s e an a r g u m e n t on a p p e a l ) . 3 7 2111050 entry o f t h e summary j u d g m e n t . strike Connell's ground that further F i r s t , the Barters a f f i d a v i t b a s e d o n , among o t h e r the a f f i d a v i t argued t h a t contained Connell's things, the hearsay evidence. motion f o r a summary had been p r o c e d u r a l l y d e f i c i e n t because summary o f f a c t s . moved t o They judgment i tlacked a narrative The B a r t e r s a l s o a r g u e d t o t h e t r i a l court t h a t C o n n e l l d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e Meadowses h a d h a d good title 1999 t o t h e roadway and t h e b o a t quitclaim deed could s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners, fact had that convey although ramp s u c h t h a t fee-simple title to the they had never d i s p u t e d the t h e Meadowses c o u l d have c o n v e y e d stated at a hearing the A p r i l an e a s e m e n t a n d on t h e summary-judgment m o t i o n t h e Meadowses h a d c o n v e y e d t h e roadway a n d t h e b o a t ramp t o t h e s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners t o a v o i d l i a b i l i t y t h a t m i g h t from t h e use o f t h e boat conceded April of The B a r t e r s that instead, title as t h e g r a n t that they, t o t h e roadway n o t as a and t h e b o a t Finally, i n common w i t h 8 the Barters f u r t h e r argued t h a t the o f an e a s e m e n t . as t e n a n t s arise t o t h e roadway a n d 1999 q u i t c l a i m d e e d s h o u l d be c o n s t r u e d fee-simple argued ramp, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e Meadowses h a d h a d t i t l e t h e b o a t ramp t o c o n v e y . that grant ramp b u t , the Barters the other l o t 2111050 o w n e r s , had the r i g h t to i n s t a l l because the Barters' actions i n i n s t a l l i n g amount t o an o u s t e r did not rule on the o p e r a t i o n of law. then timely transferred 1975, § On they See R u l e 59.1, the appeal for Although to t h i s not r e q u i r e d t o do Blalock, The trial i t was C i v . P. Supreme not court denied The by Barters Court, which court, pursuant to A l a . 525 So. 2d Code d i d not c o u r t may so. See 1366, of consider generally, Espinoza court time in their postjudgment c o n s i d e r an a r g u m e n t made court i s Green Tree A c c e p t a n c e , 1369 ( A l a . 1988). Inc. In the v. present c o u r t p e r m i t t e d the postjudgment motion to operation (indicating first time i n a postjudgment motion, a t r i a l the t r i a l by the a trial the f i r s t trial Alabama gate d i d a p p e a l , t h e B a r t e r s a d v a n c e some o f t h e a r g u m e n t s t h a t for court the A l a . R. roadway 12-2-7(6). motion. denied to and the the cotenants. B a r t e r s ' motion, appealed presented case, of the other the gate across t h a t an law, which indicates that the Barters' tardy the trial arguments. See, v. R u d o l p h , 46 So. 3d 403, appellate court w i l l considered the merits an not 416 (Ala. 2010) presume t h a t a untimely asserted l e g a l a r g u m e n t a b s e n t an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t i t d i d s o ) . Thus, t o 9 of be 2111050 t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e B a r t e r s r e l y on a p p e a l a s s e r t e d f o r the cannot c o n s i d e r first those on t h o s e time i n t h e i r postjudgment motion, we a r g u m e n t s as a b a s i s f o r r e v e r s i n g summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f C o n n e l l and t h e o t h e r Ex p a r t e R y a l s , 773 So. arguments 2d 1011, 1013 the defendants. ( A l a . 2000) ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t " t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t can c o n s i d e r an argument a g a i n s t the validity the of a summary j u d g m e n t o n l y to the extent that r e c o r d on a p p e a l c o n t a i n s m a t e r i a l f r o m t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r e s e n t i n g t h a t argument t o t h e t r i a l or at the time of submission o f t h e m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t " ) . We will address the t h e r e f o r e not issues court before record relating p o s s e s s e d by t h e g r a n t o r s o f t h e A p r i l 1999 to the title q u i t c l a i m deed 4 or We n o t e t h a t t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s a document t h a t a p p e a r s t o r e f l e c t t h e c h a i n o f t i t l e t o L o t 39, o r i g i n a t i n g w i t h t h e Meadowses and c u l m i n a t i n g i n Mawal, I n c . , t h e p r e d e c e s s o r i n t i t l e t o t h e B a r t e r s . I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e document m i g h t have b e e n s u b m i t t e d by t h e B a r t e r s , b u t t h e r e c o r d i s n o t c l e a r on that point. I n any e v e n t , no p a r t y moved t o s t r i k e the document, and, a l t h o u g h i t i s c l e a r l y h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e o f t h e c h a i n o f t i t l e , i t c o u l d have b e e n c o n s i d e r e d by t h e t r i a l court. See Chatham v. CSX T r a n s p . , I n c . , 613 So. 2d 341, 344 ( A l a . 1993) ( s t a t i n g t h a t " [ a ] p a r t y must move t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o s t r i k e any nonadmissible evidence that v i o l a t e s Rule 5 6 ( e ) , " A l a . R. C i v . P., and t h a t " [ f ] a i l u r e t o do so w a i v e s any o b j e c t i o n on a p p e a l and a l l o w s [an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ] t o c o n s i d e r t h e d e f e c t i v e e v i d e n c e " ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , a t one o f t h e h e a r i n g s on t h e summary-judgment m o t i o n , t h e a t t o r n e y f o r t h e B a r t e r s s t a t e s t h a t B u r l i n Meadows c o n v e y e d t h e roadway and 4 10 2111050 the alleged procedural judgment m o t i o n . So. 2d 609, 615 deficiencies in See M i n o r H e i g h t s ( A l a . C i v . App. whether the t r i a l Connell's summary- F i r e D i s t . v. S k i n n e r , 2002) (refusing to 831 consider c o u r t e r r e d i n e n t e r i n g a summary j u d g m e n t when t h e movant had f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e a n a r r a t i v e summary o f f a c t s b e c a u s e t h e nonmovant had n o t o b j e c t e d t o t h e f a i l u r e i n c l u d e the The summary i n t h e t r i a l B a r t e r s a r g u e on not have e n t e r e d the other and, provide court). appeal t h a t the trial court should a summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f C o n n e l l defendants because C o n n e l l ' s thus, to failed to shift the m o t i o n was burden s u b s t a n t i a l evidence to rebut to the and deficient the Barters motion. As to noted above, the B a r t e r s f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o the l a c k of a n a r r a t i v e summary o f f a c t s b e f o r e the e n t r y o f the judgment i n f a v o r Connell defendants, consider and the other thus, we will t h e B a r t e r s ' argument i n s o f a r as i t i s b a s e d on l a c k o f a n a r r a t i v e summary o f also and, argue that Connell's facts. However, t h e summary-judgment m o t i o n of not the Barters sought a summary j u d g m e n t i n h i s f a v o r on h i s c o u n t e r c l a i m s , upon w h i c h somebody g o t h u r t down t h e r e , " i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e B a r t e r s c o n c e d e d t h a t t h e Meadowses owned t h e p r o p e r t y b e f o r e they c o n v e y e d i t i n t h e A p r i l 1999 q u i t c l a i m d e e d . 11 2111050 he w o u l d have h a d c o n t e n d , C o n n e l l was the burden of proof at t r i a l ; thus, they r e q u i r e d t o s a t i s f y a d i f f e r e n t b u r d e n as movant t h a n i s a movant who on t h e i s s u e a t t r i a l . does n o t have t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f Furthermore, C o n n e l l f a i l e d t o meet t h a t the B a r t e r s argue burden. "'"'[T]he manner in which the [summary-judgment] movant's burden of p r o d u c t i o n i s met depends upon w h i c h p a r t y has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f ... a t t r i a l . ' " Ex p 2d 903, p a r t-e G e n e r a l M o t o r s C o r p . , 7( e r a l M.otors 909 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Berner v. C a l d w e l l , 543 So. 2d 686, 691 ( A l a . 1989) (Houston, J . , c o n c u r r i n g s p e c i a l l y ) ) . I f ... " ' t h e movant has t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f a t t r i a l , t h e movant must s u p p o r t h i s m o t i o n w i t h c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e , u s i n g any o f t h e m a t e r i a l s p e c i f i e d i n R u l e 5 6 ( c ) , [ A l a . ] R. Civ. P. ( " p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , a n s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and a d m i s s i o n s on f i l e , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a f f i d a v i t s " ) . ' " 769 So. 2d a t 909. "'The m o v a n t ' s p r o o f must be such t h a t he w o u l d be entitled to a directed verdict [now r e f e r r e d t o as a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w , see R u l e 50, Ala. R. C i v . P.] i f t h i s e v i d e n c e was n o t controverted at t r i a l . ' " Id. In other w o r d s , "when t h e movant has t h e b u r d e n [ o f p r o o f a t t r i a l ] , i t s own s u b m i s s i o n s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e m o t i o n must e n t i t l e i t t o j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . " A l b e e Tomato, Inc. v. A.B. Shalom P r o d u c e C o r p . , 155 F.3d 612, 618 (2d C i r . 1998) (emphasis added). See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Union Independiente de la A u t o r i d a d de A c u e d u c t o s y A l c a n t a r i l l a d o s de P u e r t o R i c o , 279 F.3d 49 (1st C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) ; R u s h i n g v. K a n s a s C i t y S o u t h e r n Ry., 12 that 2111050 185 F.3d 496 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) ; F o n t e n o t v. U p j o h n Co., 780 F.2d 1190 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) ; C a l d e r o n e v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 799 F.2d 254 ( 6 t h C i r . 1986) "Denmark v. M e r c a n t i l e S t o r e s Co., 1195 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) . " Jones-Lowe Co. 362, 367 v. S o u t h e r n L a n d ( A l a . 2009). 844 So. 2d & E x p l o r a t i o n Co., 1189, 18 So. 3d We n o t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t " a l l e v i d e n c e o f r e c o r d , as w e l l as t h a t e v i d e n c e f o r m a l l y s u b m i t t e d i n s u p p o r t of or i n o p p o s i t i o n to a motion be c o n s i d e r e d i n r u l i n g 404 So. 2d 614, We at 618 f o r summary j u d g m e n t , on t h e m o t i o n . " should F o u n t a i n v. P h i l l i p s , ( A l a . 1981). a g r e e t h a t C o n n e l l w o u l d have h a d t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f trial conveyed on his claim that fee-simple t i t l e the April 1999 quitclaim deed t o t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp t o h i m and t h e o t h e r s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners and h i s r e q u e s t f o r an i n j u n c t i o n r e q u i r i n g t h e B a r t e r s t o remove t h e g a t e a c r o s s the roadway. Thus, we a g r e e t h a t he was required to present evidence i n support of h i s motion s u f f i c i e n t a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . that claim Connell of failed However, we a r e n o t c o n v i n c e d t o meet h i s b u r d e n fee-simple t i t l e t o e n t i t l e him t o with t o t h e roadway and 13 respect to his the boat ramp 2111050 u n d e r t h e A p r i l 1999 q u i t c l a i m deed or h i s c l a i m r e q u e s t i n g i n j u n c t i o n r e q u i r i n g the The removal of the E f f e c t of the A p r i l In t h e i r c o m p l a i n t , 1999 gate. Quitclaim the B a r t e r s requested Deed t h a t the c o u r t determine the e f f e c t of the A p r i l 1999 Connell, t h a t the i n his counterclaim, requested an e x p r e s s e a s e m e n t i n t h e the his ramp. In summary-judgment trial q u i t c l a i m deed. d e t e r m i n e t h a t he had boat an trial court roadway motion, and Connell changed h i s argument, s p e c i f i c a l l y a r g u i n g t h a t the A p r i l 1999 quitclaim 1999 d e e d and the exception i n the d e e d t o L o t 39 d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t he and lot owners had ramp. The fee-simple title to the based on the 1999 proven owned t h e The question Deas, 230 subdivision roadway and the arguments asserted that he (and roadway and the of Lindsey A l a . 447, trial parties, law, Connell subdivision lot owners) t h e b o a t ramp. a and the the a matter of other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of law by boat regarding q u i t c l a i m d e e d , and p r o c e e d e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r , as had the other July p a r t i e s proceeded to b r i e f the q u e s t i o n the v a l i d i t y of the A p r i l court, Barters' fact. 449, 161 So. 14 deed 473, is sometimes Lumber 474 & Export (1935) a mixed Co. (opinion v. on 2111050 rehearing) (recognizing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may that "in d e p e n d upon t h e some instances sense i n which the the words a r e u s e d , and upon f a c t s a l i u n d e " ) . However, " [ i ] n a s u i t to construe a c t u a l knowledge of the an unambiguous i n s t r u m e n t , p a r t i e s , o r a l s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e p a r t i e s , and o t h e r m a t t e r s a r e inadmissible." Therefore, necessary we C o l e v. M i n o r , 518 So. 2d 61, 64 ( A l a . 1987). must d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e f f e c t o f t h e A p r i l 1999 was quitclaim deed. The B a r t e r s a s s e r t e d b e l o w and the A p r i l 1999 grant an of title. 400 5 now a r g u e on q u i t c l a i m d e e d c o u l d be construed easement as opposed to a grant of appeal as o n l y 140 the B a r t e r s argue t h a t Alabama law p r o v i d e s a c o n v e y a n c e o f a " r o a d way" the fee-simple R e l y i n g on L o o n e y v. B l a c k w o o d , 224 A l a . 342, (1932), that So. that i s a c t u a l l y the conveyance of an In t h e i r b r i e f s i n opposition to Connell's summaryj u d g m e n t m o t i o n , t h e B a r t e r s m e r e l y a s s e r t e d t h a t C o n n e l l and t h e o t h e r s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners h e l d o n l y an e a s e m e n t i n t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp; t h e B a r t e r s f i r s t s u p p o r t e d this assertion with legal argument and authority in their postjudgment motion. However, b e c a u s e t h e r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e B a r t e r s d i d m a i n t a i n , a l b e i t w i t h no l e g a l s u p p o r t , t h a t t h e A p r i l 1999 q u i t c l a i m d e e d c o n v e y e d o n l y an e a s e m e n t , we w i l l c o n s i d e r t h e more d e v e l o p e d argument t h e y make on appeal. 5 15 2111050 easement o r r i g h t - o f - w a y o v e r t h e roadway. i n a p p o s i t e , because the c o n v e y a n c e i n L o o n e y was property o f a roadway" f o r i n g r e s s and and "the grant over the g r a n t o r ' s from b e i n g 401. The conveyed adjoining property landlocked. April 1999 a l l right, L o o n e y , 224 However, L o o n e y i s not A l a . a t 343, title, and interest i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e d e e d was Under A l a . Code 1975, i s presumed roadway and 392, i n the intended grantee 140 So. real at to have conveyed 396-97 ( A l a . 2001) See of 1999 fee-simple Moss v. W i l l i a m s , merely another. quitclaim title 822 to the So. 2d ( c o n s t r u i n g s i m i l a r l y w o r d e d deeds and e x p l a i n i n g t h e p r e s u m p t i o n s t a t e d i n A l a . Code 1975, that "[e]very estate i n lands ... unless clearly estate t h e b o a t ramp, to create § 35-4-2, t h e A p r i l t h e b o a t ramp. i t egress q u i t c l a i m deed, which i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t an easement f o r i n g r e s s and e g r e s s o v e r t h e l a n d s deed certain to p r e v e n t the more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d as t h e roadway and did for i s t o be appears that § 35-4-2, t a k e n as a f e e a less simple estate intended"). "'[T]he g r a n t i n g c l a u s e i n a deed d e t e r m i n e s the i n t e r e s t c o n v e y e d , and u n l e s s t h e r e i s r e p u g n a n c y , o b s c u r i t y or ambiguity i n t h a t c l a u s e , i t p r e v a i l s over i n t r o d u c t o r y statements or r e c i t a l s i n c o n f l i c t therewith, and o v e r t h e habendum, t o o , i f that c l a u s e i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y or repugnant to i t . ' S l a t e n 16 was 2111050 v. L o y d , 282 A l a . 485, 487-88, 213 So. 2d 219, 220-21 (1968) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . Where t h e g r a n t i n g c l a u s e , however, d e s i g n a t e s no p a r t i c u l a r e s t a t e , any i n t e n t t o overcome t h e s t a t u t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e c o n v e y a n c e i s o f a f e e - s i m p l e e s t a t e 'must o f n e c e s s i t y be f o u n d i n l u c i d , unambiguous l a n g u a g e used to express i t , r a t h e r than statements merely c o n t r a d i c t o r y or repugnant t o t h a t found i n [the] g r a n t i n g c l a u s e . ' S l a t e n , 282 A l a . a t 488, 213 So. 2d a t 221 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . Moss, 822 So. 2d at 397. In certain cases, the Alabama Supreme C o u r t has d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a c o n v e y a n c e o f a roadway o r of land intended conveyance of f o r use only a McGee, 492 So. 2d 307 of the i n t e r e s t deed. as a roadway right-of-way. ( A l a . 1986) . was, See, in e.g., fact, the Greaves v. However, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n c o n v e y e d h i n g e s on t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d i n t h e Moss, 822 So. 2d a t 397. I n Moss, o u r supreme c o u r t c o n s t r u e d the language i n the g r a n t i n g c l a u s e s o f two d e e d s , one i n which the grantor used the release quit clause claim "'does ... the hereby strip of remise, land'" and the and other forever i n which the g r a n t o r u s e d t h e c l a u s e "'does h e r e b y g r a n t , b a r g a i n , s e l l and c o n v e y ... a l l t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y . ' " (emphasis deeds ommited). stated: [grantees,] "'To Further, Have t h e habendum c l a u s e s and i t s successors I d . a t 397 To and 17 Hold assigns the same i n both unto forever.'" the Id. 2111050 (emphasis ommited). grantors I n o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e d e e d s , however, u s e d t h e t e r m " ' r i g h t o f way.'" the Id. B a s e d on t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d i n t h e deeds a t i s s u e i n Moss, our supreme simple court determined that t i t l e to the property r e l i e d h e a v i l y on R o w e l l 463, 28 So. 2d 209 deeds Id. conveyed at 398. the court right conveyed the instead, a feecourt 248 A l a . on t h e f a c t t h a t t o use clauses land. i n both deeds "property," fee-simple the the respectively, t h e y d i d n o t c o n v e y an conveyed The O h i o R.R., to a right and conveyed I d . a t 400. focused granting "land" concluded that but, and as o p p o s e d Because unambiguously at issue. v. G u l f , M o b i l e (1946), land t h e deeds incorporeal estate in the described property. I d . a t 399. The A p r i l q u i t c l a i m deed "remise[s], quitclaim[s], and c o n v e y [ s ] ... a l l r i g h t , t i t l e , i n t e r e s t and c l a i m i n and 1999 to the f o l l o w i n g described real estate Moss, i t w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t the g r a n t i n g " clause 1999 q u i t c l a i m d e e d i n d i c a t e s t h a t a f e e - s i m p l e intended. Thus, b a s e d on i n the April conveyance U n l i k e t h e deeds i n Moss, t h e A p r i l 1999 q u i t c l a i m d e e d c o n t a i n s no r e f e r e n c e t h a t c o u l d p o s s i b l y be c o n s t r u e d limit was the conveyance t o an e a s e m e n t o r a r i g h t - o f - w a y . 18 to The 2111050 o n l y p o s s i b l y l i m i t i n g word c o n t a i n e d is i n the A p r i l t h e t e r m "roadway," w h i c h i s c o n t a i n e d of the r e a l before e s t a t e conveyed. of the A p r i l 1999 q u i t c l a i m deed cannot agree t h a t the was insufficient the trial court to determine the evidence presented to the conveyed fee-simple title trial 1999 i n the had effect t h e d e e d i t s e l f -- and to determine t h a t the A p r i l deed, i f v a l i d , deed i n the d e s c r i p t i o n Therefore, i t the o n l y evidence necessary 1999 we court quitclaim roadway and t h e b o a t ramp t o C o n n e l l and t h e o t h e r s u b d i v i s i o n l o t o w n e r s . As they d i d below, the Barters f u r t h e r argue d e s c r i p t i o n of the grantees o f t h e d e e d was render Barters the deed v o i d . United Methodist 1156 The ( A l a . 1998), as support too ambiguous for for their the deed C e r t a i n l y , as o u r supreme c o u r t has serve as a identifiable 1159. The Community.'" successful i n Haney's Id. 19 be to considered the the valid. " f o r a deed t o grantee named as the that 2d q u i t c l a i m deed Haney's C h a p e l , Chapel According 1999 explained, conveyance, with certainty." deed to Chapel C h u r c h , 716 So. contention i n the A p r i l the so ambiguous as t o upon Haney's C h u r c h v. U n i t e d M e t h o d i s t d e s c r i p t i o n of the grantees was rely that 716 must So. grantee court, no 2d be at "'This evidence 2111050 explaining exact the i n t e n t of the grantors meaning unknown, the rendering The A p r i l the of identity designation was admitted "'This the deed v o i d . and t h e Community'" was Id. 1999 q u i t c l a i m d e e d , i n c o n t r a s t , makes c l e a r o f t h e g r a n t e e s by d e s c r i b i n g and further them as " a l l l o t owners of Lakeview E s t a t e s " describing them "being t h e owners o f l o t s numbered one t h r u f i f t y - f o u r . " The i d e n t i t y o f t h e g r a n t e e s was t h u s r e a d i l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e . e.g., R o e c k l v. F.D.I.C., (quoting 6 George W. of Property Real 1962)) and described the w o r l d ' " ) ; 1989) 1067, 1071 (Alaska 1994) a t 349 (John S. Grimes r e p l . " t h e g r a n t e e n e e d o n l y be 'so Law ed. designated as t o d i s t i n g u i s h h i m [ o r h e r ] f r o m t h e r e s t o f G a r r a w a y v. Y o n c e , 549 So. 2d 1341, 1342 (Miss. ( s t a t i n g t h a t t h e l a w r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t " t h e g r a n t e e be described in such terms that by reference to e v i d e n c e o t h e r w i s e a v a i l a b l e , h i s i d e n t i t y may be with reasonable c e r t a i n t y " ) ; Close 305, See, Thompson, C o m m e n t a r i e s on t h e Modern § 3006, (noting that 885 P.2d as 307, 112 N.W. 800, 801 (1907) objective ascertained v. O ' B r i e n & Co., 135 Iowa ("It i s a well-recognized r u l e t h a t t h e g r a n t e e i n a d e e d may, u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , be i d e n t i f i e d by e x t r i n s i c evidence, 20 and, where the grantee 2111050 may be i d e n t i f i e d by p a r o l o r by o t h e r evidence, w i l l vest the legal t i t l e as c o m p l e t e l y were f u l l y i d e n t i f i e d a conveyance a n d as s u r e l y as i f he by t h e conveyance i t s e l f . " ) ; see a l s o 4 H e r b e r t T h o r n d i k e T i f f a n y , The Law o f R e a l P r o p e r t y ed. 1975) ("The g r a n t e e means or grantees for their must conveyance, or thereby."). Thus, we a r e n o t c o n v i n c e d § 967 (3d be named identification i n the furnished t h a t t h e A p r i l 1999 q u i t c l a i m d e e d was v o i d b e c a u s e i t d i d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y the grantees. To the extent the Barters a p p e a l and i n t h e t r i a l deed was disagree. invalid 6 court because have that i t was argued the A p r i l sufficiently on 1999 q u i t c l a i m not delivered, we must As t h e B a r t e r s a d m i t , " t h e r e c o r d i n g o f a d e e d b y T h e e n t i r e argument on t h i s i s s u e made t o t h e t r i a l as f o l l o w s : 6 was name court "One o f t h o s e r e q u i r e m e n t s i s t h a t t h e d e e d h a s t o be d e l i v e r e d . The q u e s t i o n h e r e i s how do you deliver a deed t o 54 different unsuspecting g r a n t e e s . The o n l y a r g u m e n t t o a c c o m p l i s h d e l i v e r y w o u l d be t h a t t h e d e e d was r e c o r d e d . The n e x t q u e s t i o n i s c a n y o u g i v e somebody s o m e t h i n g t h a t t h e y d o n ' t want t o h a v e . The A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n t h e c a s e o f B l a c k m o n v . Q u e n n e l l e , 189 A l a . 630, 66 So. 608 ( A l a . l 9 1 4 ) t h a t 'A d e e d i s b u t an e x e c u t e d c o n t r a c t o f s a l e . ' I t i s b a s i c l a w o f c o n t r a c t s t h a t t o have a v a l i d c o n t r a c t t h e r e h a s t o be a m e e t i n g o f t h e m i n d s . T h e r e i s no d i s p u t e i n 21 2111050 a grantor can often constitute i n s t r u m e n t t o convey t i t l e , grantor." T i e r c e v. Northport, 519 "[i]f [a presumption So. deed] 2d is delivery of the i f t h a t i s the i n t e n t i o n of the Church of Macedonia 451, duly 459 sufficient United Methodist ( A l a . 1987) . acknowledged of d e l i v e r y a t t a c h e s , which and Furthermore, recorded, the can be r e p e l l e d only by e v i d e n c e o f t h e d i s s e n t o f t h e g r a n t e e . " G u l f Red C e d a r v. C r e n s h a w , 169 may be regarded p u r p o r t i n g t o be A l a . 606, as settled 613, 53 in this So. 812, state 814 (1910) t h a t when a Co. ("It paper a d e e d i s shown t o have b e e n s i g n e d by the g r a n t o r , t o have b e e n t h e n a c k n o w l e d g e d and d u l y c e r t i f i e d by a proper o f f i c e r , of and recorded i n the o f f i c e of the judge t h e c a s e a t b a r t h a t t h e r e was no m e e t i n g o f t h e m i n d s . The u n s u s p e c t i n g l o t owners had no k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l d e v e l o p e r s , i n an e f f o r t t o a v o i d l i a b i l i t y , were d e e d i n g t h e b o a t ramp t o them and had n o t i n q u i r e d i f t h e y e v e r w a n t e d t o be an owner o f t h e b o a t ramp." The a r g u m e n t p r e s e n t e d i n t h e B a r t e r s ' b r i e f on a p p e a l c o n s i s t s o f one p a r a g r a p h i n w h i c h t h e y s t a t e t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t d e l i v e r y of a deed i s r e q u i r e d ; s t a t e , w i t h o u t c i t a t i o n t o s u p p o r t i n g a u t h o r i t y , t h a t the r e c o r d i n g o f a deed " i n c e r t a i n i n s t a n c e s " can f u n c t i o n as d e l i v e r y ; and t h e n a r g u e , i n one s e n t e n c e , w i t h o u t c i t a t i o n t o s u p p o r t i n g a u t h o r i t y , t h a t t h e f a i l u r e o f some o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s t o a n s w e r and t h a t t h e a n s w e r s o f some o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e y d i d n o t c l a i m and i n t e r e s t i n t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp s h o u l d prevent the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h a t r u l e i n the present case. 22 2111050 p r o b a t e of the other proof sufficient there county i n which the to weaken the force no d i r e c t proof quitclaim deed defendants failed was of to b o a t ramp, we the defendants dissented amount t o Thus, we that proof such that cannot agree w i t h the and the Connell Further, The boat and the ascertainable April ramp the 1999 in other this April some the is c i t e no by and, thus, the some void Barters of the l o t owners that Connell did entitle on t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r the fee-simple the and title did because not the in subdivision lot roadway merely l o t owners sufficiently 23 the authority some subdivision and t h e o t h e r simple not of evidence t h a t would subdivision deed 1999 c o m p l a i n t and q u i t c l a i m deed conveyed the fee is deed. conveyed roadway and t h e b o a t ramp t o him owners. The although actions d e l i v e r y of the q u i t c l a i m deed facts, i s no d e l i v e r y , although the B a r t e r s t o a j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f law 1999 by Barters' n o t meet h i s b u r d e n o f p r e s e n t i n g April these there i n t e r e s t i n t h e roadway and c a n n o t a g r e e , and from the and, answer t h e proposition, l i e , and delivery."). recorded, f i l e d a n s w e r s d i s c l a i m i n g any him of p r o o f of complete execution is for lands an grant easement. grantees named and because were the 2111050 presumption that rebutted. We the d e e d was d e l i v e r e d was the title other effectively t h e r e f o r e a f f i r m t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e A p r i l 1999 simple not i n the roadway and q u i t c l a i m deed conveyed f e e t h e b o a t ramp t o C o n n e l l s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners. The Injunction Requiring Removal o f t h e R e g a r d i n g t h e summary j u d g m e n t on C o n n e l l ' s Gate claim seeking an i n j u n c t i o n r e q u i r i n g t h e B a r t e r s t o remove t h e g a t e t h e roadway and we reach the same c o n c l u s i o n . t h a t would e n t i t l e him t o an Connell, The trial deed and the specifically c o u r t had Barters' conveyance of Lot deed Thus, trial conveyed party required to present having evidence See at before Jones-Lowe Co., i t the A p r i l 1999 deed roadway and the to 18 So. 1999 3d quitclaim Lot 39, which b o a t ramp f r o m the 39. c o u r t determined t h a t the A p r i l fee-simple i t appears "original the of July excepts the as i n j u n c t i o n r e q u i r i n g removal t h e g a t e as a m a t t e r o f l a w . 367. across t o p e r m i t u n f e t t e r e d a c c e s s t o t h e b o a t ramp, t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f a t t r i a l , was The and that grantees" the -- title to trial namely, 24 the court 1999 quitclaim "original grantees." determined Connell and that the the other 2111050 s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners -roadway and owned i n d i v i s i b l e t h e b o a t ramp as t e n a n t s f a c t t h a t t h e B a r t e r s d i d n o t own 1999 in q u i t c l a i m d e e d was the July correctly, to the 1999 i n common. the trial b a s e d on t h e court and the boat ramp. The the April exception necessarily, and c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e B a r t e r s d i d n o t h o l d any roadway the B a s e d on L o t 39 a t t h e t i m e t h e e x e c u t e d , and deed, interests in Barters title concede much, s t a t i n g i n t h e i r b r i e f on a p p e a l t h a t , i f t h e A p r i l q u i t c l a i m deed i s c o n s t r u e d as 1999 as a c o n v e y a n c e o f t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp i n f e e s i m p l e , t i t l e t o t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp w o u l d n o t p a s s w i t h t h e t r a n s f e r o f t i t l e t o a l o t i n t h e s u b d i v i s i o n b e c a u s e t h e t i t l e t o t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp w o u l d be "title to land a d d i t i o n a l to that described deed a in to lot appurtenance." have not the 23 Am. presented subdivision and] cannot J u r . 2d Deeds § 55 any evidence predecessor in title roadway and principle that easement, see the Barters to indicating them provide an Barters that their Lovvorn, 25 interest in authority a s e r v i e n t e s t a t e may Hammond v. any The as t h e b o a t ramp. Although conveyed (2002). pass [ i n the 16 place So. for the the legal a gate across 3d 813 (Ala. an Civ. 2111050 App. 2009), t h a t p r i n c i p l e trial court determined conveyed fee-simple does n o t that title the t o the assist April the B a r t e r s . 1999 The quitclaim roadway and the boat deed ramp, and we have a f f i r m e d t h a t l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n ; t h u s , t h e r i g h t the s e r v i e n t - e s t a t e h o l d e r to p l a c e a gate across provided that application. the easement Therefore, not unduly the e v i d e n c e b e f o r e e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t C o n n e l l and own is an easement burdened the trial has to e r e c t a gate across no court t h e o t h e r s u b d i v i s i o n l o t owners t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp and t h a t t h e B a r t e r s have right of the roadway. no 7 I n t h e i r b r i e f on a p p e a l , t h e B a r t e r s a l s o a r g u e t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t a c o t e n a n t i n p o s s e s s i o n may safeguard h i s o r h e r p r o p e r t y w i t h l o c k s p r o v i d e d he does n o t o u s t h i s cotenants. See S p i l l e r v. M a c k e r e t h , 334 So. 2d 859 ( A l a . 1976) ( h o l d i n g t h a t a c o t e n a n t who c o m p l a i n e d t h a t a n o t h e r c o t e n a n t i n p o s s e s s i o n had p l a c e d l o c k s on a b u i l d i n g owned i n common had n o t p r o v e n o u s t e r b e c a u s e o f a l a c k o f e v i d e n c e t h a t the cotenant i n p o s s e s s i o n intended to exclude h i s c o t e n a n t s by use o f t h e l o c k s ) . As n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y , t h i s p a r t i c u l a r argument was n o t p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t u n t i l the B a r t e r s f i l e d t h e i r postjudgment motion. Therefore, we need not c o n s i d e r t h i s argument. However, e v e n i f we d i d consider this argument despite i t s tardy postjudgment a s s e r t i o n by t h e B a r t e r s , we w o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t i t l a c k s merit. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e " o r i g i n a l grantees," which would i n c l u d e the B a r t e r s ' p r e d e c e s s o r s i n t i t l e , h o l d f e e - s i m p l e t i t l e t o t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp n e c e s s a r i l y determines t h a t the B a r t e r s are not c o t e n a n t s i n t h e roadway and t h e b o a t ramp. 7 26 2111050 Because the evidence p r e s e n t e d t h e A p r i l 1999 at t r i a l established that q u i t c l a i m deed conveyed f e e - s i m p l e t i t l e i n the roadway and t h e b o a t ramp t o C o n n e l l and t h e o t h e r s u b d i v i s i o n lot owners, the the other affirmed. summary j u d g m e n t d e c l a r i n g t h a t C o n n e l l defendants own Furthermore, t h a t the A p r i l 1999 t o C o n n e l l and the other original roadway because the and the trial boat court ramp i s determined q u i t c l a i m deed conveyed f e e - s i m p l e grantees, s u b d i v i s i o n l o t o w n e r s , who i t also B a r t e r s d i d n o t h o l d any ramp. the and n e c e s s a r i l y determined i n t e r e s t i n t h e roadway and title were the that the the boat A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y e n t e r e d a summary judgment i n f a v o r of Connell on his counterclaim seeking i n j u n c t i o n r e q u i r i n g t h e B a r t e r s t o remove t h e g a t e a c r o s s roadway. The summary j u d g m e n t i s t h e r e f o r e affirmed an the in i t s entirety. AFFIRMED. Thompson, P . J . , and Pittman, concur. 27 Moore, and Donaldson, J J . ,

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