Alabama Department of Public Safety v. Leon Albert Prince

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REL: 10/2/09 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2009 2080866 Alabama Department o f P u b l i c S a f e t y v. Leon A l b e r t P r i n c e Appeal from Montgomery C i r c u i t (CV-08-675) Court BRYAN, J u d g e . The Alabama Department") appeals Court Department of Public Safety ("the f r o m a j u d g m e n t o f t h e Montgomery Circuit r e v e r s i n g an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r d e r f i n d i n g Leon Albert P r i n c e t o be s u b j e c t t o t h e Community N o t i f i c a t i o n A c t , § 1 5 - 2080866 20-20 e t seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the CNA"). We reverse and remand. In 1991, Prince was convicted of c a r n a l knowledge of girl l e s s t h a n 12 y e a r s o l d , i n v i o l a t i o n o f § 398, Ala. Code 1940 state prison, November (Recomp. and 2006. he 1958). Prince released February In was 2007, was from the December 2007, the in incarceration in Department Department n o t i f i e d notified However, 1 Prince by letter t h a t , upon f u r t h e r r e v i e w o f h i s f i l e , he i s i n d e e d s u b j e c t the 14, incarcerated P r i n c e by l e t t e r t h a t he i s n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e CNA. in Title a to CNA. Prince decision sought a d m i n i s t r a t i v e that he is subject to r e v i e w of the the CNA. Department's That review was g o v e r n e d by t h e A l a b a m a A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e A c t , § 4 1 - 2 2 ¬ 1 et seq., review A l a . Code 1975 constituted a contested 41-22-3(3), A l a . part, ("the as "[a] Code 1975 proceeding AAPA"). case under (defining a ... The in the administrative AAPA. "contested which the See case," legal § in rights, The CNA was e n a c t e d i n 1996 " t o p r o t e c t c o m m u n i t i e s and t h e i r most v u l n e r a b l e c i t i z e n s , c h i l d r e n , f r o m t h e p r o v e n d a n g e r o f r e c i d i v i s m by c r i m i n a l sex o f f e n d e r s . " S a l t e r v. S t a t e , 971 So. 2d 31, 37 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2007). 1 2 2080866 duties, or p r i v i l e g e s d e t e r m i n e d by Typically, that a p a r t y are agency a f t e r an of an review would r e q u i r e d by opportunity have been a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l a w j u d g e ("ALJ") w o r k i n g hearings division of However, b e c a u s e t h e the Office of to be for hearing"). conducted by an i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e the attorney general law Attorney decided General. to personally r e p r e s e n t the Department i n P r i n c e ' s case, a l l the ALJs i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g s d i v i s i o n of the O f f i c e of the General recused themselves. general counsel f o r the Weller, an Personnel, review. employed asking Weller letter January Department, ALJ The In by 2008, sent Alabama hear to Jack a letter the Prince's over hearing Prince's before days Prince f i l e d his Julia for [Prince]." of administrative "We office, who ... p r e s i d e o v e r the Weller agreed to p r e s i d e case. Two to to Weller stated, i n pertinent p a r t : w i l l be p r e s e n t i n g t h i s c a s e [ , ] t h a t you process Curtis, Department a r e r e q u e s t i n g on b e h a l f o f t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s due Attorney case. subject to the administrative hearing a motion seeking W e l l e r ' s In the h i s motion, Prince 3 held, r e c u s a l as t h e A L J asserted authority, direction was and that Weller discretion of in "is the 2080866 Attorney General." Therefore, Prince argued, d i s q u a l i f i e d from h e a r i n g h i s case p u r s u a n t Ala. Code individual order 1975, who or f i n a l subject which provides, participates i n the making to the a u t h o r i t y , d i r e c t i o n p e r s o n who h a s p r o s e c u t e d o r a d v o c a t e d contested recusal that case she was upholding by o f any case "No proposed shall be or d i s c r e t i o n o f any i n connection with that P r i n c e ' s motion the O f f i c e subsequently hearing. part: t h a t i t had been u n t i m e l y not employed Weller contested-case order Weller denied on t h e g r o u n d s General. an " was to § 41-22-18(a), i n pertinent decision i n a contested Weller seeking filed and of the Attorney over Prince's presided F o l l o w i n g the hearing, Weller issued the Department's d e c i s i o n t h a t P r i n c e i s s u b j e c t t o t h e CNA. Prince appealed the order to the c i r c u i t court, t o § 4 1 - 2 2 - 2 0 , A l a . Code 1975. Prince f i l e d pursuant i n the c i r c u i t c o u r t a motion s e e k i n g j u d i c i a l review o f t h e d e n i a l by W e l l e r of P r i n c e ' s motion f o r r e c u s a l . I n t h a t motion, an o r d e r d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e h e a r i n g c o n d u c t e d had violated under both § 41-22-18(a) t h e Alabama and had d e n i e d P r i n c e sought before h i m due C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e U n i t e d 4 Weller process States 2080866 Constitution. I n response to P r i n c e ' s motion, the Department 2 submitted Curtis's affidavit. testified that, general as In his counsel for affidavit, the Curtis Department, o v e r s e e s a l l l e g a l m a t t e r s a f f e c t i n g the Department. s t a t e d t h a t , a f t e r a l l t h e A L J s who a c a s e s u c h as P r i n c e ' s had that Weller that he had did information. not recall recused themselves, C u r t i s from whom the hearing. Office letter The Byrne, to case. he had of the He requesting Attorney General asking stated learned t h a t she s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t heard learned Curtis C u r t i s t e s t i f i e d t h a t , as "a m a t t e r o f he t h e n w r o t e t h e l e t t e r t o W e l l e r Prince's Curtis w o u l d have t y p i c a l l y agreed to hear P r i n c e ' s he that course," conduct r e c a l l anyone i n him to write the of A l i c e Ann Department of Weller. Department a l s o s u b m i t t e d the general counsel for the affidavit Alabama Personnel, i n response to P r i n c e ' s motion f o r r e c u s a l . affidavit, Byrne t e s t i f i e d , " I n J a n u a r y o f 2008, due in pertinent to the In her part: r e c u s a l [ o f a l l the O u r supreme c o u r t "has c o n s i s t e n t l y i n t e r p r e t e d t h e due p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e d under the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n t o be c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h t h e due p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e d u n d e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . " V i s t a L a n d & E q u i p . , L.L.C. v. Computer P r o g r a m s & S y s . , I n c . , 953 So. 2d 1170, 1174 ( A l a . 2006). 2 5 2080866 ALJs working i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e hearings d i v i s i o n of the O f f i c e of the A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ] , I was c o n t a c t e d by t h e D e p a r t m e n t ... i n q u i r [ i n g ] a b o u t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p r o c e d u r e f o r a p p o i n t i n g an [ A L J ] t o hear a case c o n c e r n i n g the [CNA]. I informed [the D e p a r t m e n t ] t h a t t h e y c o u l d h i r e an o u t s i d e l a w y e r t h r o u g h c o n t r a c t , or send a r e q u e s t t o our C h i e f A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e , ... W e l l e r [ , ] who, i f she were a v a i l a b l e , w o u l d r e q u e s t a p p r o v a l f r o m t h e State Personnel D i r e c t o r to handle the case. "... [ O ] n J a n u a r y 23, 2008, a l e t t e r f r o m J a c k C u r t i s , G e n e r a l C o u n s e l o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t ... , was s e n t t o ... W e l l e r r e q u e s t i n g t h a t she s e r v e as t h e A L J on t h e c a s e . On J a n u a r y 25, 2008, S t a t e Personnel D i r e c t o r J a c k i e Graham approved the request " Byrne testified Prince's case, that, Weller D e p a r t m e n t and was c o n t r o l of the In June at the "was time Weller employed by the presided State over Personnel not s u b j e c t t o the d i r e c t i o n , a u t h o r i t y , or O f f i c e of the A t t o r n e y 2009, the circuit General." court entered a judgment d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t P r i n c e ' s d u e - p r o c e s s r i g h t s had b e e n v i o l a t e d by W e l l e r ' s h e a r i n g h i s case. judgment concluded that Weller f r o m P r i n c e ' s c a s e , and, issued by Weller Prince is subject court's judgment Therefore, have recused court's herself on t h a t g r o u n d , i t r e v e r s e d t h e upholding to should the c i r c u i t the d i d not the CNA. address 6 Department's decision Accordingly, the the substantive order that circuit issue of 2080866 whether P r i n c e i s indeed subsequently s u b j e c t t o t h e CNA. f i l e d an a p p e a l The D e p a r t m e n t to t h i s court, pursuant t o § 41¬ 22-20, A l a . Code 1975. B a s e d on t h e c i r c u i t court's finding that Prince's right t o due p r o c e s s was v i o l a t e d b y W e l l e r ' s n o n r e c u s a l , t h a t c o u r t apparently reversed Weller's 41-22-20(k)(1), to reverse order under the a u t h o r i t y o f § A l a . Code 1975, w h i c h p e r m i t s an constitutional agency action provisions. a circuit made in court reviews "This court violation a of circuit c o u r t ' s judgment w i t h o u t a presumption o f c o r r e c t n e s s because the circuit court i s i n no better agency's d e c i s i o n than t h i s c o u r t . position t o review an C l a r k v. F a n c h e r , 662 So. 2d 258, 261 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 4 ) . " A l a b a m a Bd. o f N u r s i n g v. Peterson, ( A l a . C i v . App. "[T]here 976 So. 2d 1028, i s no p r e s u m p t i o n administrative application of correctness d e c i s i o n maker's] legal of the law t o the f a c t s . " Comm'n o f A l a b a m a v. H e r r e r a , App. 1033 2007). afforded t o [an conclusions or i t s Medical Licensure 918 So. 2d 918, 926 (Ala. C i v . 2005). On a p p e a l , t h e Department f i r s t argues t h a t the c i r c u i t c o u r t e r r e d i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t P r i n c e ' s r i g h t t o due 7 process 2080866 had been v i o l a t e d by W e l l e r ' s h i s case. failure t o recuse h e r s e l f from The D e p a r t m e n t a r g u e s t h a t P r i n c e d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h t h a t h i s r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s h a d b e e n v i o l a t e d b e c a u s e , t h e Department says, Prince d i d not e s t a b l i s h that a c t u a l b i a s i n t h i s case. Conversely, v. A.T. M a s s e y C o a l Co., argues that establish a a showing violation Caperton, the United are objective probability of U.S. due States standards actual (2009), i s not r e q u i r e d to i n this In case. Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t bias decisionmaker i s too high bias process that require on had Prince, c i t i n g Caperton , 129 S. C t . 2252 of actual of Weller the part recusal of "there when the 'the judge or t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y t o l e r a b l e . ' W i t h r o w v. L a r k i n , 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. C t . 1456, 43 L. E d . 2d 712 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . " that, U.S. a t , 129 S. C t . a t 2257. under e i t h e r the " a c t u a l b i a s " standard Department or "probability the objective of actual bias" standard argued by We find a r g u e d by t h e focusing Prince, on the Prince has f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t h i s r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s was v i o l a t e d in this The case. United States Supreme Court has discussed the a p p l i c a t i o n o f due p r o c e s s i n t h e g e n e r a l c o n t e x t o f a j u d g e ' s 8 2080866 qualifications t o hear a case: "[M]ost questions concerning a judge's q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o hear a case a r e n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ones, because t h e Due Process Clause of the F o u r t e e n t h Amendment e s t a b l i s h e s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f l o o r , n o t a u n i f o r m s t a n d a r d . A e t n a L i f e I n s . Co. v. L a v o i e , 475 U.S. 813, 828 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . Instead, these q u e s t i o n s a r e , i n most c a s e s , a n s w e r e d b y common law, s t a t u t e , o r t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a n d a r d s o f t h e bench and b a r . See, e . g . , A e t n a , i d . , a t 820-821; Tumey v. O h i o , 273 U.S. 510, 523 ( 1 9 2 7 ) ; 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455; ABA Code o f J u d i c i a l C o n d u c t , Canon 3C(1)(a) (1980). B u t t h e f l o o r e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s a ' f a i r t r i a l i n a fair tribunal,' W i t h r o w v. L a r k i n , 421 U.S. 35, 46 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , b e f o r e a j u d g e w i t h no a c t u a l b i a s a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t o r i n t e r e s t i n t h e outcome o f his p a r t i c u l a r case. See, e . g . , A e t n a , s u p r a , a t 821-822; Tumey, s u p r a , a t 5 2 3 . " B r a c y v . G r a m l e y , 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 The (1997). D e p a r t m e n t a r g u e s t h a t , i n t h e s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t o f an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g , P r i n c e must e s t a b l i s h a c t u a l b i a s b y W e l l e r i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h a v i o l a t i o n o f due p r o c e s s . The Department's p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e " a c t u a l b i a s " s t a n d a r d i s e x p l a i n e d i n Bunke v. A l a b a m a B o a r d 1437, 1439 (M.D. A l a . o f N u r s i n g , 871 F. Supp. 1994): " ' [ I ] t i s w e l l s e t t l e d i n A l a b a m a t h a t due p r o c e s s must be o b s e r v e d b y a l l b o a r d s as w e l l as c o u r t s . ' [ D e l a v a n v. B o a r d o f D e n t a l Exam'rs o f A l a b a m a , 620 So. 2d 13, 16 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 3 ) ] . I t i s also w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t ' [ a ] t a minimum, due p r o c e s s a s s u r e s n o t i c e a n d a m e a n i n g f u l o p p o r t u n i t y t o be h e a r d b e f o r e a r i g h t o r an i n t e r e s t i s f o r f e i t e d . ' 9 2080866 J o h n s o n v. U.S.D.A., 734 F.2d 774, 782 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1984) ( c i t i n g Mathews v. E l d r i d g e , 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. C t . 893, 901, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ) . ... The c o u r t s have a l s o n o t e d t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f a h e a r i n g i s no g u a r a n t e e o f due p r o c e s s where the p r e s i d i n g o f f i c e r i s not n e u t r a l . As s t a t e d i n Johnson, '[a] f a i r h e a r i n g r e q u i r e s an i m p a r t i a l a r b i t e r . ' J o h n s o n , 734 F.2d a t 782, see a l s o , G i b s o n v. B e r r y h i l l , 411 U.S. 564, 578, 93 S. C t . 1689, 1697, 36 L. Ed. 2d 488 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . " "Having s e t f o r t h the importance of g u a r a n t e e i n g due p r o c e s s i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e d u r e s , t h o u g h , c o u r t s have a l s o n o t e d t h a t w h i l e t h e s e h e a r i n g s may be quasi-judicial, '[b]road d i s c r e t i o n must be afforded i n non-judicial administrative settings.' D e l a v a n , 620 So. 2d a t 16. T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y so i n c a s e s s u c h as t h i s where t h e d e c i s i o n s of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o d y s u c h as t h e N u r s i n g B o a r d , a r e subject to j u d i c i a l review. § 41-22-20(a)[, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 ] , S m i t h v. O r g a n . o f F o s t e r F a m i l i e s f o r E q u a l i t y and R e f o r m , 431 U.S. 816, 97 S. C t . 2094, 53 L. Ed. 2d 14 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . " " C o u r t s have h e l d ... t h a t i t i s t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s burden i n [cases r e g a r d i n g whether a h e a r i n g o f f i c e r s h o u l d be d i s q u a l i f i e d on d u e - p r o c e s s g r o u n d s ] t o show a c t u a l b i a s on t h e p a r t o f t h e h e a r i n g o f f i c e r . B u r n e y v. P o l k Comm. C o l l e g e , 728 F.2d 1374, 1378 n.11 (11th C i r . 1984); E v e r s v. B r d . o f Med. E x a m i n e r s , 516 So. 2d 650, 654 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 8 7 ) , a p p e a l d i s m i s s e d 486 U.S. 1001, 108 S. C t . 1723, 100 L. Ed. 2d 188 ( 1 9 8 8 ) . A b s e n t a s h o w i n g o f b i a s , t h e o f f i c e r i s p r e s u m e d t o be impartial. S c h w e i k e r v. M c L u r e , 456 U.S. 188, 195, 102 S. C t . 1665, 1669, 72 L. Ed. 2d 1 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , J o h n s o n , 734 F.2d a t 783, B l a c k v. C i t y o f A u b u r n , 857 F. Supp. 1540, 1547 (M.D. A l a . 1994). B i a s i s most readily 10 2080866 a p p a r e n t where t h e h e a r i n g o f f i c e r has a p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t i n t h e outcome o f t h e m a t t e r . See, e.g., G i b s o n , 411 U.S. a t 578, 93 S. C t . a t 1697." In this case, there Weller against Prince. i s no any a l l e g e d a c t u a l b i a s . that the record on a p p e a l that Weller actually "actual bias" explained Prince standard i n Bunke d i d not to of a c t u a l b i a s P r i n c e does n o t seem t o a r g u e contains biased any e v i d e n c e against advocated Prince's establish by him. the that Weller's h e r s e l f v i o l a t e d h i s r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s Caperton, A.T. by Coal and (collectively Company in Court favor "Caperton"). m i l l i o n i n damages. Supreme Supreme Court and the Department and The to recuse to recuse failure under the standard supra. In returned a v e r d i c t against i t s affiliates of proceeding, failure i n Caperton, a j u r y i n West V i r g i n i a Massey "Massey") the Applying process. P r i n c e , however, argues t h a t W e l l e r ' s forth indicating administrative h e r s e l f v i o l a t e d h i s r i g h t t o due set by The c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t does n o t cite was evidence Hugh jury U.S. a t r e c i t e d the f a c t s of Caperton awarded (collectively and others Caperton $50 , 129 S. C t . a t 2257. The Caperton: "Don B l a n k e n s h i p i s M a s s e y ' s c h a i r m a n , c h i e f e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r , and p r e s i d e n t . A f t e r t h e v e r d i c t 11 2080866 b u t b e f o r e t h e a p p e a l , West V i r g i n i a h e l d i t s 2004 judicial elections. K n o w i n g t h e Supreme C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f West V i r g i n i a w o u l d c o n s i d e r t h e a p p e a l i n t h e c a s e , B l a n k e n s h i p d e c i d e d t o s u p p o r t an a t t o r n e y who s o u g h t to replace Justice McGraw. J u s t i c e McGraw was a c a n d i d a t e f o r r e e l e c t i o n t o t h a t c o u r t . The a t t o r n e y who s o u g h t t o r e p l a c e h i m was B r e n t B e n j a m i n . "In addition to contributing the $1,000 s t a t u t o r y maximum t o B e n j a m i n ' s c a m p a i g n c o m m i t t e e , B l a n k e n s h i p d o n a t e d a l m o s t $2.5 m i l l i o n t o 'And F o r The Sake Of The K i d s , ' a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n formed under 26 U.S.C. § 527. The § 527 o r g a n i z a t i o n o p p o s e d McGraw and s u p p o r t e d B e n j a m i n . Blankenship's donations accounted f o r more than t w o - t h i r d s of the t o t a l funds i t r a i s e d . T h i s was not a l l . B l a n k e n s h i p spent, i n a d d i t i o n , j u s t over $500,000 on i n d e p e n d e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s -- f o r d i r e c t m a i l i n g s a n d l e t t e r s s o l i c i t i n g d o n a t i o n s as w e l l as t e l e v i s i o n a n d n e w s p a p e r a d v e r t i s e m e n t s -- ' " t o s u p p o r t ... B r e n t B e n j a m i n . " ' "To p r o v i d e some p e r s p e c t i v e , B l a n k e n s h i p ' s $3 m i l l i o n i n c o n t r i b u t i o n s were more t h a n t h e t o t a l amount s p e n t b y a l l o t h e r B e n j a m i n s u p p o r t e r s a n d t h r e e t i m e s t h e amount s p e n t b y B e n j a m i n ' s own committee. Caperton contends t h a t B l a n k e n s h i p spent $1 m i l l i o n more t h a n t h e t o t a l amount s p e n t b y t h e campaign committees o f b o t h c a n d i d a t e s combined. "Benjamin won. He r e c e i v e d 382,036 votes ( 5 3 . 3 % ) , a n d McGraw r e c e i v e d 334,301 v o t e s ( 4 6 . 7 % ) . " U.S. a t , 129 S. C t . a t 2257 ( c i t a t i o n s to the record omitted). A f t e r Benjamin was e l e c t e d , C a p e r t o n moved t o d i s q u a l i f y him from c o n s i d e r i n g Massey's a p p e a l , a s s e r t i n g a 12 due-process 2080866 violation and a violation J u d i c i a l Conduct. U.S. Appeals at of the West Virginia Code J u s t i c e Benjamin denied Caperton's , 129 S. C t . a t 2257. o f West V i r g i n i a The of motion. Supreme C o u r t subsequently granted review of of the j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d on t h e j u r y v e r d i c t r e n d e r e d a g a i n s t M a s s e y . T h a t c o u r t r e v e r s e d t h e j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d on t h e j u r y verdict by a 3-2 v o t e , w i t h J u s t i c e B e n j a m i n v o t i n g w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y . U.S. at The , 129 S. C t . a t 2258. U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n Caperton identified two c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h t h a t C o u r t h a d p r e v i o u s l y a judge's recusal on due-process grounds: j u d g e has a f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t , U.S. cases at i n which , 129 that stated at "[t]hese S. C t . a t 2261-62. are circumstances a , 129 S. C t . a t 2260, and c e r t a i n t y p e s o f c a s e s i n v o l v i n g c r i m i n a l U.S. required The contempt. Supreme ' i n which Court experience t e a c h e s t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a c t u a l b i a s on t h e p a r t o f t h e judge or decisionmaker tolerable.'" Withrow v. U.S. Larkin, i s too at 421 U.S. high , 129 35, t o be S. 47 constitutionally C t . a t 2259 ( q u o t i n g (1975)). Under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e Supreme C o u r t n o t e d , " [ t ] h e i n q u i r y i s an objective one. The Court asks 13 not whether the judge is 2080866 actually, subjectively biased, b u t whether t h e average judge i n h i s p o s i t i o n i s ' l i k e l y ' t o be n e u t r a l , o r w h e t h e r t h e r e i s an 129 unconstitutional 'potential forbias.'" U.S. a t , S. C t . a t 2262. I n C a p e r t o n , t h e Supreme C o u r t a p p l i e d "in those p r i n c i p l e s the context to of judicial elections" determine i f C a p e r t o n ' s r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s h a d b e e n v i o l a t e d b y J u s t i c e Benjamin's f a i l u r e t o recuse himself. Ct. a t 2262. The Supreme C o u r t U.S. a t , 129 S. continued: "The d i f f i c u l t i e s o f i n q u i r i n g i n t o a c t u a l b i a s , and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n q u i r y i s o f t e n a p r i v a t e one, s i m p l y u n d e r s c o r e t h e n e e d f o r o b j e c t i v e r u l e s . Otherwise there may be no a d e q u a t e protection a g a i n s t a j u d g e who s i m p l y m i s r e a d s o r m i s a p p r e h e n d s t h e r e a l m o t i v e s a t work i n d e c i d i n g t h e c a s e . The j u d g e ' s own i n q u i r y i n t o a c t u a l b i a s , t h e n , i s n o t one t h a t t h e l a w c a n e a s i l y s u p e r i n t e n d o r r e v i e w , t h o u g h a c t u a l b i a s , i f d i s c l o s e d , no d o u b t w o u l d be grounds f o r appropriate relief. In l i e u of e x c l u s i v e r e l i a n c e on t h a t p e r s o n a l i n q u i r y , o r on appellate review of the judge's d e t e r m i n a ti o n i r e s p e c t i n g a c t u a l b i a s , t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e h a s b e e n i m p l e m e n t e d b y o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d s t h a t do n o t require proof of actual bias. See Tumey [ v . O h i o ] , 273 U.S. [510,] 532, 47 S. C t . 437 [(1927)]; M a y b e r r y [ v . P e n n s y l v a n i a ] , 400 U.S. [455,] 465-466, 91 S. C t . 499 [ ( 1 9 7 1 ) ] ; [ A e t n a L i f e I n s . Co. v.] Lavoie, 475 U.S. [818,] 825, 106 S. C t . 1580 [(1986)]. I n d e f i n i n g t h e s e s t a n d a r d s t h e C o u r t has asked whether, 'under a r e a l i s t i c appraisal of p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e n d e n c i e s a n d human w e a k n e s s , ' t h e interest 'poses s u c h a r i s k o f a c t u a l b i a s o r p r e j u d g m e n t t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e must be f o r b i d d e n i f 14 2080866 t h e g u a r a n t e e o f due p r o c e s s i s t o be a d e q u a t e l y implemented.' W i t h r o w [v. L a r k i n ] , 421 U.S., [35,] 47, 95 S. C t . 1456 [(1975)]." U.S. The at , 129 S. C t . a t 2263. Supreme C o u r t t h e n s t a t e d that " t h e r e i s a s e r i o u s r i s k o f a c t u a l b i a s b a s e d on o b j e c t i v e and r e a s o n a b l e p e r c e p t i o n s when a person w i t h a p e r s o n a l s t a k e i n a p a r t i c u l a r case h a d a s i g n i f i c a n t and d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n f l u e n c e i n p l a c i n g t h e j u d g e on t h e c a s e by r a i s i n g f u n d s o r d i r e c t i n g t h e j u d g e ' s e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n when t h e c a s e was p e n d i n g o r i m m i n e n t . The i n q u i r y c e n t e r s on t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n ' s r e l a t i v e s i z e i n c o m p a r i s o n t o the total amount o f money c o n t r i b u t e d to the c a m p a i g n , t h e t o t a l amount s p e n t i n t h e e l e c t i o n , and t h e a p p a r e n t e f f e c t s u c h c o n t r i b u t i o n h a d on t h e outcome o f t h e e l e c t i o n . " U.S. at concluded , 129 that S. C t . a t 2263-64. "Blankenship's campaign c o m p a r e d t o t h e t o t a l amount c o n t r i b u t e d well as the significant total and amount disproportionate outcome." U.S. determining spent that at , Caperton's The right to -¬ t o the campaign, election influence S. Court contributions i n the 129 Supreme on Ct. due -- had at 2264. process had Court that In been f a i l i n g to recuse himself, engendered 'must be that actual forbidden "the bias risk Blankenship's is sufficiently i f the guarantee 15 a the e l e c t o r a l v i o l a t e d by J u s t i c e B e n j a m i n ' s stated as the influence substantial that i t o f due process i s to be 2080866 adequately implemented.'" (quoting W i t h r o w , 421 As Chief Caperton, standard U.S. U.S. Justice , 129 S. C t . a t 2264 a t 47) . Roberts " i t i s unclear at noted whether the in new his dissent in p r o b a b i l i t y of [ a r t i c u l a t e d by t h e C o u r t ' s m a j o r i t y bias i n Caperton] i s somehow l i m i t e d t o f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t i n j u d i c i a l e l e c t i o n s , o r applies to U.S. , 129 is judicial S. unclear discussed applies here, "an U.S. bias" standard in of that f a c t s of "a this that this realistic case. standard c a s e , when t e n d e n c i e s and human w e a k n e s s e s , " f a l l s h o r t of e s t a b l i s h "'a requiring U.S. at light the in of at Weller's , 129 S.Ct. risk of recusal a t 2263 actual on bias or due-process (quoting Withrow, 47). Caperton, exceptional at of It appraisal prejudgment'" In dissenting). situation deciding, i t i s clear that viewed grounds. the without f a c t s needed t o U.S. "probability proceedings, assuming, psychological 421 the C.J., i n Caperton would apply to ALJs p r e s i d i n g over s t a t e objectively those q u e s t i o n s more g e n e r a l l y . " C t . a t 2269 ( R o b e r t s , whether administrative However, recusal , the Supreme C o u r t n o t e d t h a t case" that , 129 S. Ct. presented at 16 "extreme 2263, 2265. Caperton was facts." The Court then 2080866 cautioned t h a t " [ a ] p p l i c a t i o n of the implicated in instances." this case this case will ... U.S. are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l standard at , 129 not the "extreme be S. C t . a t 2267. facts" P r i n c e ' s c o n t e s t e d c a s e , a l l t h e A L J s who heard a case attorney such general as had his recused decided Department i n the case. confined to of of the P r i n c e ' s case. Attorney The f a c t s of Caperton. themselves because the the Consequently, C u r t i s , general The u n d i s p u t e d t h a t C u r t i s wrote the l e t t e r In represent personally General's rare w o u l d have t y p i c a l l y f o r the Department, wrote a l e t t e r t o W e l l e r , behalf to office," counsel requesting, that Weller hear evidence i n t h i s case i n d i c a t e s "as a m a t t e r o f c o u r s e " and that he d i d n o t r e c a l l b e i n g a s k e d by anyone f r o m t h e O f f i c e o f Attorney General to write "on the letter. Comparing the these r e l a t i v e l y innocuous f a c t s t o the "extreme f a c t s " i n C a p e r t o n , i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t P r i n c e has n o t e s t a b l i s h e d a p r o b a b i l i t y o f a c t u a l b i a s t h a t i s t o o h i g h t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y t o l e r a b l e . This case is simply not the "rare instance" p r o c e s s demands t h a t a j u d g e o r d e c i s i o n maker be from a case. erred in A c c o r d i n g l y , we reversing Weller's i n which disqualified conclude t h a t the c i r c u i t order 17 on the due ground that court her 2080866 failure to recuse herself violated Prince's right to due process. Prince argues constitutional that, of to right regardless process violated, due was whether we his may a f f i r m t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e , he s a y s , § 41-221 8 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975, his case. "No i n d i v i d u a l who order Section or subject final to p e r s o n who the r e q u i r e d Weller to recuse 41-22-18(a) p r o v i d e s , decision in a authority, contested case personally represented that Weller discretion" affidavit, State of As the case or noted, shall discretion the attorney Department i n P r i n c e ' s However, t h e to authority, general in this that Weller Department that testimony of any and was direction case. or In her "was e m p l o y e d by the not subject the i s not d i r e c t l y d i s p u t e d . to Attorney Weller, i n d e n y i n g P r i n c e ' s m o t i o n f o r r e c u s a l , s t a t e d t h a t she 18 general contested d i r e c t i o n , a u t h o r i t y , or c o n t r o l of the O f f i c e of the General"; be r e c o r d does n o t e s t a b l i s h the attorney Byrne t e s t i f i e d Personnel direction "subject the contested proposed or advocated i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h a t " Weller. was in pertinent part: p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h e m a k i n g o f any has p r o s e c u t e d case b e f o r e h e r s e l f from was not 2080866 e m p l o y e d by t h e O f f i c e o f t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l . P r i n c e seems t o a r g u e t h a t b e c a u s e i n h i s l e t t e r C u r t i s a s k e d , "on of the A t t o r n e y General's c a s e , W e l l e r was O f f i c e , " that Weller handle Prince's then " s u b j e c t to the a u t h o r i t y , d i r e c t i o n d i s c r e t i o n " of the a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l . Curtis's behalf letter as However, we e s t a b l i s h i n g the necessary do n o t or read "authority, d i r e c t i o n or d i s c r e t i o n " r e q u i r e d t o i m p l i c a t e § 41-22-18(a), e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of Byrne's u n d i s p u t e d that Weller d i d not work f o r t h e 4 1 - 2 2 - 1 8 ( a ) does n o t A c c o r d i n g l y , we testimony attorney require Weller's indicating general. Section recusal in this case. r e v e r s e the judgment of the c i r c u i t court r e v e r s i n g Weller's order determining that Prince i s subject to the for CNA, consistent and we with remand this the case opinion. We further emphasize proceedings that Weller's order remains i n p l a c e pending the c i r c u i t c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n of the substantive merits court, i . e . , whether W e l l e r is s u b j e c t to the REVERSED AND of Prince's appeal to the c o r r e c t l y determined that circuit Prince CNA. REMANDED. Thompson, P . J . , and Pittman Moore, J . , c o n c u r s i n t h e 19 and Thomas, J J . , c o n c u r . r e s u l t , without writing.

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